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ABSTRACT 
A GENERALIZED MODEL OF INVESTMENT WITH AN APPLICATION TO 
FINNISH HOG FARMS 
This study develops a method for estimating a generalized investment model. 
Irreversible investment behavior is allowed to arise either from generalized adjustment 
costs, uncertainty, or both. The model is estimated using data for a group of Finnish hog 
farms over the period 1977-93. Two out of four decision variables are allowed to obtain 
zero value with positive probability. The sample is endogenously partitioned into the 
regimes of zero and positive investments (four regimes in total). Then, the decision rules 
are estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. The 
model has a similar structure as the censored Tobit model. 
The goal of the study is to find out the effects of frictions caused by uncertainty, 
irreversibility, and adjustment costs on investments in Finnish hog farms. External 
restrictions, such as liquidity constraints caused by credit rationing are also studied. The 
study's maun goal is to obtain estimates for adjustment rates, elasticities, and shadow 
prices such that we account for the fact that optimal investments may be zero. 
The results suggest that there are scale economies among Finnish hog farms and, 
in addition, scale effects in their investments. Thus, production costs per unit decrease 
as the amount of production increases. The instantaneous cost function is decreasing in 
investment so that larger investments will result in lower adjustment costs. These results 
suggest that Finnish pork producers have potential for improving their competitiveness 
by establishing large production units through drastic expansions. 
It is expected that the Finnish hog industry has the potential for reaching the 
average cost level of Danish hog industry in 1995. Reaching the Danish cost level, 
however, will require Finnish production units to at least triple their size. Tripling the 
average firm size while keeping the aggregate production capacity constant, as required 
by hog adjustment programs, implies that two thirds of the current producers will need 
to exit the industry. Over a five year period, for example, this would require an exit rate 
of 8 % per year, which is almost twice the 4.3 % average exit rate of 1996 in Finnish 
agriculture. Therefore, it is expected that an inflexible labor market, combined with 
excess labor in farming, will delay the substitution of capital for labor and slow down 
the whole adjustment process. 
The shadow price estimates show that Finnish hog farms have had excess capital 
relative to their exogenously restricted production levels. Hog farmers appear to have 
unconstrained access to capital. It is expected that increasing firm size will eventually 
result in more efficiently utilized and allocated farm capital. Still, low returns to farm 
capital cause severe difficulties in the farmers' adjustment to new market conditions. 
The results provide evidence that farm investments have been made with too low returns 
to capital or, alternatively, additional incentives for investments have been provided, for 
example, through investment programs or through tax shields. 
Because the hog industry exhibits substantial economies of size, environmental 
regulations combined with rigidities in the local land markets are expected to have 
increasingly important effects on the development of hog industry structure and 
production costs. 
Index vvords: investment, uncertainty, adjustment costs, dynamic models, Tobit 
models, hog industry  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Uncertainty about continuation of the national agricultural policy scheme in Finland 
increased in 1991, when the political debate about Finland joining the European 
Union (EU) began. Four years later, in 1995, Finland joined the EU, adopted the price 
mechanism of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and abolished border controls 
for trade with other member states. Membership in the EU has created a challenge for 
Finnish agriculture and the Finnish hog industry in particular. The average producer 
price of pork immediately fell by about 50 percent. But EU membership also resulted 
in a decrease in costs of hog production as grain prices went down, environmental 
taxes on phosphorus and nitrogen used in fertilizers were abolished, and the European 
Value Added Tax (VAT) was introduced. Although the output price declines have 
been partially compensated by reduced input prices and by income transfers, most 
farmers have yet to respond to the changed market environment and adjust their 
production to the increased competition in order to maintain an adequate income 
level (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1996). 
Finnish agriculture is dominated by livestock production, and the hog sector is 
the third largest livestock production sector after milk and beef. In 1995 the hog sector 
accounted for 14 % of total agricultural gross returns. The hog production sector also 
creates an important market for domestic feed grains, including barley and oats. In 
Finland, the whole food industry is closely related to domestic agricultural production 
and, in particular, to the dairy and meat sectors. The food industry is the third most 
important industrial sector in Finland, while slaughtering, meat processing, and 
related industries are one of the largest sectors within the food industries (Aaltonen 
1996). The future role of the Finnish hog industry is therefore important to Finland's 
economy. 
Most hog farms in Finland are too small to use modern production technology 
as efficiently as their European competitors. Danish hog farms, for example, have 
herd sizes about twice as large as Finnish hog farms. Previous studies have shown that 
the differences in production costs, and in overall efficiency, between existing small 
and large farms are large (Hemilä 1983, Heikkilä 1987, Ryhänen 1992). This can also 
be supported simply by comparing production costs between the small and large 
production units. Thus, an increase in the size of production units offers a promising 
way to increase the competitiveness of Finnish agriculture. 
But a shortcoming of the earlier studies in analyzing size economies has been 
their assumption that firms operate in a static environment with no uncertainty. They 
have assumed that firms can accumulate capacity ali at once by increasing the stock of 
capital, or that the accumulation is exogenously restricted. Thus, they implicitly 
1 
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assume that individual firms operate at the long-run optimum, given exogenous 
prices, output or/and fixed inputs. It is likely that biased estimates of size economies 
are generated in static studies, because they ignore frictions that prevent instantaneous 
and costless adjustment of employment and the capital stock. Firms do not necessarily 
operate at their long-run optimum, and the implicit assumption of a static environment 
is not generally valid. In general, the link between the optimal capital stock and the 
optimal investment pattern cannot be established in a static framework. 
Firms face two types of time dependent frictions; irreversibility and adjustment 
costs (Lucas 1967, Arrow 1968, and Abel and Eberly 1994). Most farm investments 
are at least partially irreversible. Once investments have been made, it will be 
expensive to reverse them for four reasons. First, there may be a wedge between the 
purchase prices and the resale prices of industry or finn specific capital goods (Arrow 
1968). The wedge also can be caused by the adverse selection problem (Akerlof 
1970), or by institutional rationing or transaction costs (Pindyck 1991). Second, 
strictly positive adjustment costs may be faced with negative investments (Caballero 
1991). Third, the adjustment cost function may have a lcink at the point of zero 
investment so that there may be a comer solution at zero. And fourth, fixed 
adjustment costs may be faced with even a small investment or disinvestment (Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994). 
Irreversibility is important in investment problems, since it makes investment 
expenditures sunk costs that cannot be recovered, or can be recovered only partially. 
If, in addition, investments can be delayed, irreversibility makes them especially 
sensitive to uncertainty (Pindyck 1991). Uncertain future cash flows create a value for 
an option to wait for new, but never complete information. Therefore, less investment 
will be triggered than the traditional NPV rule suggests (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). The 
more volatile the expected future cash flows are, the more the ability to delay 
irreversible investment will affect the decision to investl . 
Adjustment costs are costs that are realized when new capital is installed. They 
are traditionally thought of as being increasing and convex in the firm's investment 
and, therefore, they penalize rapid changes in the firm's capital stock, which results in 
investment smoothing (Lucas 1967, Treadway 1970, and Rothschild 1971). In this 
framework, the firm's capital stock is linked across time by adjustment costs. The 
stock cannot be adjusted instantaneously, as can variable factors in static models, but 
it can be changed, unlike fixed factors, as time passes by. In other words, the time 
pattem of the capital stock is endogenously decided by the entrepreneur, but there can 
be a substantial discrepancy between the firm's desired and actual capital stock, with 
the latter being less volatile than the former (Lucas 1967). 
Adjustment costs can arise from internal or extemal causes (Mussa 1977). 
Intemal adjustment costs are realized if scarce resources (inputs) need to be 
withdrawn from production to install new capital stock, resulting in reduced output 
(Lucas 1967). Similarly, with an exogenously determined output, intemal adjustment 
costs will be realized in terms of increased costs. Intemal adjustment costs can result, 
1 Pindyck (1991) compares the investment option to a financial call option; the option 
gives the holder the right to exercise the option and in retum receive an asset. 
Exercising the option is irreversible. 
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for example, from lack of information about new technology and from infiexible 
design of durables. External adjustment costs, on the other hand, cannot be controlled 
by firms themselves. They can arise, for example, in a rationed credit market, or if the 
cost of borrowing increases with a firm's debt to equity ratio as its credit reserve 
decreases (Steigum 1983, Eichberger 1989, Robison and Barry 1996, Zeldes 1989). 
Numerous empirical applications rationalize the observed spread of aggregate 
investment over time by adjustment costs which are assumed to be increasing and 
convex functions of the rate of investment. But the arguments supporting the idea that 
adjustment costs are an increasing and convex fimction of investment are weak. 
Decreasing adjustment costs are just as plausible as increasing adjustment costs 
(Rothschild 1971). In aggregate data, the observed spread of investment over time 
may not have resulted from investment smoothing of individual firms but from 
aggregating the individual firm's responses over firms. Estimated investment 
smoothing in firm level data, on the other hand, may have resulted from the fact that 
the discrete characteristics of the investment behavior have not been accounted for. 
There also exists an extensive literature on the theory of irreversible investment 
under uncertainty (see e.g. Pindyck 1991, Chavas 1994, and Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
In recent theoretical work the notions of irreversibility and adjustment costs have also 
been combined (Abel and Eberly 1994). But little has been done on combining the 
notions of irreversibility and adjustment costs in empirical work. In particular, we still 
lack empirical applications of investment rules estimated from models that allow for 
investment delays driven up by generalized adjustment costs, by uncertainty, or by 
both of them. Therefore, it is important to address these frictions delaying and 
spreading firm investments in a detailed empirical model. 
The frictions caused by uncertainty, irreversibility, and adjustment costs are of 
great importance, particularly in the Finnish hog industry which is facing a relatively 
drastic stnictural change. Investment frictions, if they exist, delay and spread 
investment over time. More importantly, they create entry barriers and protection by 
conferring cost advantages for early entrants and investors (see e.g., Tirole, 1992). The 
frictions will, therefore, have considerable implications for the success and survival of 
the Finnish hog industry as a new entrant in the Common Market. 
We may expect that irreversibility and adjustment costs play a crucial role in the 
farmers' optimal response to the increased competition. Thus, they have important 
implications for our understanding of pork producers' decisions to invest or to exit the 
industry. They also help in understanding the adjustment process at the industry level 
and in designing structural adjustment programs2, especially if the goal is to stimulate 
investments to get larger and more competitive production units for meeting domestic 
production goals. At present, however, we lack accurate information about the extent 
of irreversibility and the characteristics of adjustment costs in the Finnish hog farms. 
This study is desigmated to help close this gap in knowledge. 
2 Structural adjustment programs refer here to (public) programs that are applied to 
reduce negative short-term effects to promote the realization of desired long-term 
effects of a certain policy change. 
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1.2 Objective and Scope of the Study 
High production costs and relatively small herd sizes in the Finnish hog industry raise 
important questions concerning the future of the industry in the Common Market. 
First, is it realistic to expect that average hog production costs can be reduced fast 
enough, and far enough, to allow the Finnish hog industry to compete in the Common 
Market after a five year transitional period? Second, how much expansion in farm size 
will be needed in order to reduce average costs to competitive levels? Third, what is 
the most efficient path for farm expansion from the perspective of farmer welfare, and 
the welfare of society as whole? The answers to these questions require detailed 
knowledge of the dynamic structure of production, investment, capital accumulation, 
and costs in the Finnish hog industry. 
This study analyses the dynamic structure of the Finnish hog industry to better 
understand how farm investments are determined and adjusted to external shocks. 
Knowledge of the dynamic structure of the industry will provide information about the 
hog industry's potential to adjust to the Common Market, and how adjustment 
programs might be designed for assisting the optimal adjustment. 
As part of the structural analysis we investigate several specific questions 
surrounding the structure of the hog industry. Each of the following questions will be 
addressed in the remainder of the dissertation: 
Are there long run economies of size in the industry? The answer to this 
question provides information on the industry's potential to survive in the long 
run as part of the Common Market. If such size economies do not exist then 
expanding farm size is not going to reduce costs no matter how long the 
transition period is. Alternatively, if size economies exist then the industry has 
potential for reducing its production costs by expanding firm size. In this case 
the realized cost reductions will depend on the short run adjustment costs, too. 
Are investments and expansion paths infiuenced by adjustment costs and do the 
shadow prices of installed capital differ from zero? The answers to these 
questions have important implications for the speed of adjustment and the 
length of time that it will take the industry to adjust to the shock of joining the 
Common Market. 
If adjustment costs exist, how are they characterized? For example, are they 
increasing or decreasing in the scale of investment? If there are economies of 
scale in investments in the sense that adjustment costs increase at a decreasing 
rate or decrease in the scale of investment, then it may be appropriate to 
encourage swift, drastic one-time investment and a large scale adjustment in 
response to the shock of joining the Common market. But if there are 
diseconomies of scale in investment, such that adjustment costs increase at an 
increasing rate in the scale of investment, then it may be better to allow slow, 
incremental adjustment. 
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Have hog farmer investments and access to capital been restricted by liquidity 
constraints? If farmer access to credit is restricted, or liquidity constraints are 
restricting investment for other reasons, then liquidity constraints may have 
important implications on how the sector can respond to the shock ofjoining the 
Common Market. The optimal adjustment may be influenced by these 
constraints. 
What are the estimated shadow prices for capital and labor in the hog sector? 
These estimated shadow prices will indicate the marginal impact on production 
costs from adjusting capital and labor towards their steady state values. Thus, 
the shadow prices provide an indication of potential cost reductions from 
eliminating any discrepancy between the firm's desired (steady state) and 
current capital stock and labor allocation. 
How do the steady state levels of capital stocks and labor services relate to their 
current levels? If there are no discrepancies between the steady states and 
current levels then neither adjustment costs, external restrictions (e.g. past 
production controls), nor the prospect of entry into the Common Market will 
have caused serious deviations away from steady state paths of capital and labor 
in the hog industry. But if there exists wide discrepancies between the steady 
states and current levels we need to know how long it will take to adjust to the 
steady state, and what policies might assist this adjustment process. 
How are firms' capital and labor markets linked? To understand the adjustment 
process, it is essential to know how a discrepancy between the current and 
steady states of one input will affect the demand for other inputs and, hence, the 
whole adjustment process. Having knowledge on the linkages between the 
demands for individual inputs, and discrepancies between their current and 
steady states, it is possible to design adjustment programs with clesired effects. 
How do capital investments and labor services respond to changes in factor 
prices and output? As Finland entered the Common Market factor prices 
changed and production controls were abolished, which results in output 
adjustments. To understand the consequences of these changes we need to have 
detailed knowledge of input demand elasticities for factors of production in the 
sector. 
How does uncertainty affect investments? It is valuable to know if, for example, 
uncertainty over policy makers own actions influence how adjustment programs 
affect farm investments and, hence, the whole adjustment process. 
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1.3 An Overview 
The study examines the dynamic structure of Finnish hog farms3. The goal is to 
answer the questions highlighted above by investigating the importance and 
consequences of uncertainty, irreversibility, and adjustment costs in hog producers' 
optimal employment and investment mies. First we develop a method for estimating a 
generalized model of investment which is consistent with the dynamic theory of the 
firm. Irreversible investment behavior is allowed to arise either from generalized 
adjustment costs, from uncertainty, or from both of them. The model is estimated for a 
group of Finnish hog farms using data from the period 1977-93, and the estimated 
investment and employment mies are used for addressing the questions given in 
previous section. 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the current situation 
and outlook for the Finnish hog sector. Chapter 3 reviews and discusses the literature 
on methods for constructing dynamic investment models, and it concludes with a 
preferred method for our application. Chapter 4 sketches out the derivation of the 
economic model for the finns' dynamic optimization problem. This chapter concludes 
with the optimal decision mies. The next chapter constructs the statistical model for 
estimating the decision mies and concludes with the likelihood function used for 
estimating the model. Chapter 6 illustrates how the data are obtained and characterizes 
basic statistical properties of the data. The estimation results are presented in Chapter 
7. Economic implications of these results are discussed in Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 
9 provides a summary of the study and the most important conclusions, as well as 
some suggestions for future research. 
3 The sample consists of farm level data on Finnish booklceeping hog farms (about 
100 farms a year) over the period 1976-1993. The data are described in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
Chapter 2 
THE HOG PRODUCTION SECTOR IN FINLAND 
This Chapter reviews the current situation and outlook of the Finnish hog industry. 
We begin with a brief summary of the scale of the Finnish hog sector and, then, move 
on to industry structure. The structure of the Finnish hog sector is compared to that of 
the Danish hog sector. Denmark was chosen as a comparison, because it is an old EU 
member with one of the most competitive hog sectors among the EU member states 
(see, for example, Agra Europe, Nov. 1996). Denmark exports pork to other EU 
countries, including Finland. 
Production costs are reviewed in the third section. The Finnish data are 
compared again to the Danish data to highlight the differences between small and 
large production units. The last section discusses the major changes in the economic 
environment facing Finnish hog farmers at the time Finland entered the EU. This 
discussion is focused on the factors that are driving the Finnish hog industry into a 
relatively fast (compared to the pre-membership period) structural adjustment phase. 
In particular, challenges and investment incentives provided by the new adjustment 
programs are introduced. The chapter concludes with some preliminary observations 
on how farmers are responding to the changed environment even though it is too early 
to make final conclusions about farmer reactions.1 
2.1 Size of the Hog Sector in Finland 
Finnish agriculture is dominated by livestock production. When the size of the sector 
is measured by gross returns, hog production is the third largest livestock production 
sector, behind the milk and beef sectors. For example, in 1995 the gross returns from 
hog production accounted for 14 % of the total agricultural gross returns. The 
domestic hog industry also has an important impact on field crop production because 
it creates demand for feed grains, including barley and oats. Hog production is 
concentrated in the southem and westem parts of Finland which are the most fertile 
and climatically favorable agricultural areas in the country. 
In 1995 the number of hog farms in Finland was estimated at 6,200. About 
2,600 of the hog farms were specialized in producing weaners and 2,200 of the hog 
farms were specialized in fattening pigs. The percentage of total farms that raise hogs 
was estimated at 3.7 % in 1995. Even though a relatively small percentage of farms 
1 Main Sources in the Chapter: Official Statistics of Finland 1996: Farm Register 
1995; Agriculture and Forestry 1996:2; and Monthly Review of Agricultural Statistics 
1996. 
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raise hogs, the hog farms are very important, particularly in the southwestem part of 
the country where the share of hog farms out of ali farms exceeds 10 %. 
Total pork production in Finland has varied between 168-187 million kilograms 
in the 1990s whereas consumption has been less than production (Table 2.1). The 
consumption of pork has varied in the 1990s between 150 and 170 million kilograms 
(30-34 kilograms per capita). Prior to 1995 Finland was usually a net exporter of pork 
and very little pork was imported. These exports were, however, subsidized whereas 
imports were restricted by border controls. In 1995 imports grew considerably, 
because border controls were abolished and the decreased prices increased the amount 
of pork consumed. At the same time exports of pork decreased and Finland became a 
net importer of pork. Most recently, the decreased retail prices of pork have increased 
pork consumption and tumed the past net export situation into one in which 
consumption and domestic production of pork are roughly equal. Therefore, it is 
justified under the European Common Agricultural Policy, to have a goal of keeping 
the domestic pork production capacity at its current level so as to meet domestic 
demand for pork. 
Table 2.1 Production, Consumption, and Trade Flows of Pork in Finland. a 
Year 
1980 1990 1994 1995 1996 
Production 169 187 171 169 172 
Consumption 142 164 151 170 170 
Exports 15 23 22 9 15 
Imports - - 2 12 11 
a Million kilograms per year. 
2.2 Farm Structure 
After the second world war, farm size was already increasing in other parts of Europe 
but decreasing in Finland where the largest farms were divided to provide land for war 
veterans, and for those who had their farms in the lost eastem area. Since then, 
agricultural policies have supported farm income on small farms so that the average 
farm size has been increasing slowly. On average, Finnish farms are still small despite 
rapid technical changes that favor increasing farm size. In 1995 the average farm size 
was 22 hectares of arable land and 49 hectares of forest. 
Farm expansion may also have been restricted by liquidity constraints caused by 
credit rationing. Until 1985 the Finnish credit market was rationed so that interest 
rates for loans were set below market clearing rates by the Bank of Finland. At these 
loan rates there was excess demand for loans, and firms access to credit may have 
been rationed by restricted credit approvals. Credit market liberalization began in 
1985 (for more details see e.g. Pajuoja 1995). In addition, farm growth has been 
partially deterred by the small supply of supplementary land. The supply of farm land 
has been further decreased by policies that included an incentive for retiring farmers 
to idle their land. 
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Also, the livestock production units are small on average because capacity 
expansions have been restricted through various production controls since the early 
eighties. Production controls were seen as an effective means of supporting high 
domestic producer prices and farm income. In the hog industry, authorities started to 
regulate the establishment of production units in 1975 by a licensing scheme, 
originally to prevent production from becoming too industrialized. The policy 
required the farmer to have a license for enlargening his existing facility or investing 
in a new plant. Specific criteria for new licenses have been complicated and they have 
varied over time, but the standard has been that licenses are granted only to full time 
farmers. In 1978 the licensing scheme was complemented by a tule that a farm has to 
have land for producing at least 25 of the feed for the hog production. Until 1982 
the maximum size of a new production unit was a fattening capacity of 1,000 pigs 
and, in practice, the scheme did not restrict investments. In the 1970s, for example, 
the license was granted to 91 % of ali applications, and a notable number of 
applications were rejected only after the feed production restriction was implemented 
in 1978 (Kola 1987). 
Nevertheless, the rules of the licensing scheme were tightened considerably in 
1982. Thereafter, the standard has been that new licenses have not been granted to 
enterprises with over 400 hogs. Environmental regulations were also tightened. The 
license for new hog production capacity was granted only if the farm had enough land 
for producing at least two fifths of the feed needed in the hog production. This 
requirement was further increased in 1984 so that the farm had to have land for 
producing at least 75 percent of the feed needed in the hog production. 
In 1995, when these stringent production controls were abolished, a new Agri-
Environmental Program (AEP) was introduced. It provides incentives for farmers to 
keep the number of livestock units per hectare low for environmentally friendly 
utilization of manure and slurry. Therefore, the maximum size of a hog production 
facility is still in practice tied to the farm's arable land area. A farmer is eligible under 
the AEP only if he has a maximum of 11 fattening pigs or three sows per hectare of 
land. A production unit of 60 sows and fattening capacity of 500 pigs, for example, is 
eligible under the AEP only if it has at least 66 hectares of arable land for spreading 
manure and slurry. 
Even though the production controls did not significantly restrict the hog sector 
prior to 1982, the current hog industry in Finland is dominated by small family farms 
rather than by large industrialized units. In 1995 the average herd size of fattening pigs 
in Finland was 79, whereas an average Danish herd had 178 fattening pigs. That is, 
Danish herds were more than twice as large as Finnish herds. The average sow herd 
size was 31 sows in Finland, but in Denmark the average size was 75 sows, which is 
again more than twice as large as in Finland. 
By comparing the production of different herd sizes, we find that Danish hog 
production is concentrated in much larger herds than Finnish production. Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 present the distribution of sows and fattening pigs into different herd size 
categories for approximating and characterizing this concentration. In Denmark, for 
example, 76 % of sows are in production units of more than 100 sows. But in Finland 
only 2 % of herds and 9 % of sows are in herds of more than 100 sows. Also in 
finished hog production, the distribution of the farm size differs substantially between 
the two countries. In Denmark, for example, 43 % of fattening pigs were in production 
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units of more than 500 pigs. In Finland only 13 % of fattening pigs were in such large 
units. Further, if we take the sum of ali pigs in the herd, then in Denmark 61 % of the 
pigs are in herds of more than 1,000 pigs, while only 2 % of ali pigs were in such 
large units in Finland. 
Table 2.2. Sows and Sow Herds by Herd Size in Finland and Denmark in 1995.a  
% of sows 	 % of herds 
Herd size 
Finland Denmark Finland Denmark 
1-49 61.4 9.4 84.2 57.7 
50-99 29.4 14.3 14.1 15.0 
100-199 6.1 31.6 1.5 16.9 
200-499 3.1 35.1 0.3 9.3 
>500 0 9.6 0 1.0 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik: Agricultural Statistics 1995; and Official Statistics of Finland: Farm 
Register 1995. 
Table 2.3. Fattening Pigs and Pig Herds by Herd Size in Finland and Denmark in 
1995.' 
% of fattening pigs 	 % of herds 
Herd size 
Finland Denmark Finland Denmark 
1-49 10.8 4.0 59.7 40.9 
50-99 14.4 5.5 15.8 13.9 
100-199 21.9 12.2 12.3 15.4 
200-499 40.1 34.9 10.7 20.5 
>500 12.8 43.4 1.4 9.3 
See Table 2.2. 
2.3 Production Costs 
In Finnish bookkeeping hog farms, with an average fattening capacity of roughly 200 
pigs, the production cost of pork, excluding labor cost, is estimated at 9.4 FInnish 
Marks per kilogram (FIM/kg) in 1995. By adding labor cost of 2.8 FIM/kg we end up 
with the total production cost of 12 FIM/kg. Equipment and buildings account for 14 
% and 6.8 % of the total production costs. The estimated production costs, even if we 
exclude labor, have exceeded the average producer price for pork (8.1 FIM/kg) by 
about 14 %. Nevertheless, producers received direct income transfers that accounted 
for about 41 % of their total agricultural revenues. These income transfers, if they are 
compared to the scale of the farms' hog production, corresponded to a gross retum of 
about 5.7 FIM/kg? 
2 Costs have been estimated using the data in AERI Working Papers 5/96. 
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In 1995 the average total production cost of pork among ali hog farms in 
Denmark was estimated at 9.7 FIM/kg, i.e. about 19 % lower than in the Finnish 
bookkeeping farms (Agra Europe 8/1996). The Danish bookkeeping farms were even 
more efficient than ali farms on average. For example, in the group of the largest 
bookkeeping hog farms, with more than 1,400 pig fattening capacity, the production 
cost of pork is estimated at 7.6 FIM/kg (for more details see Table 2.5). 3  
Because there are no adequate data on the group of large-scale hog farms in 
Finland, we use the Danish bookkeeping farm data for characterizing how the average 
production costs depend on the size of the enterprise. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the 
production costs for two herd sizes in both sow and fattening pig herds. Note that in 
these tables the smaller production units represent herd sizes that are also common in 
Finland. The group averages suggest that there is a notable decrease in production 
costs per unit produced as we move from the small unit to the large unit. Both feed 
and labor costs (per unit produced), in particular, decrease with herd size. Equipment 
costs, on the other hand, increase with herd size. These observations suggest that as 
herd size has been growing firms have been substituting equipment for labor which, in 
turn, has resulted in advanced feeding technologies and decreased feed costs. 
Table 2.4. Production Costs of Weaners on Danish Bookkeeping Farms.  
Herd size, number of sows 
Input 
10-49 >250 
Difference % 
Feed 156 115 -26 
Equipment 19.5 27.6 +42 
Buildings 27.3 17.4 -36 
Others 45.9 42.1 -8 
Total costs excl. labor 249 202 -19 
Labor 114 46.9 -59 
Total costs 363 249 -31 
FIM/weaner. 1 DKK=0.779 FIM. Data Source: Okonomien i landbrugets driftsgrene 1994/1995. 
3 Exchange rate 1 Danish lcrone (DKK) =0.779 FIM has been used. 
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Table 2.5. Production Costs of Pork on Danish Bookkeeping Farms.  
Herd size, number of fattening pigs 
Input 
200-499 >1400 
Difference % 
Weaner 3.70 3.70 0 
Feed 2.80 2.62 -6,4 
Equipment 0.249 0.263 +5.6 
Buildings 0.323 0.263 -19 
Others 0.377 0.354 -6.1 
Total costs excl. labor 7.45 7.20 -3.4 
Labor 0.970 0.400 -59 
Total costs 8.42 7.60 -17 
FIM/kg. 1 DICK=0.779 FIM. A 78 kg carcass weight has been used. Data Source: Okonomien i 
landbrugets driftsgrene 1994/1995. 
It is likely, however, that the differences between the group averages in Tables 
2.4 and 2.5 are affected by significant selectivity bias, because farmers have been 
allowed to choose their firm size endogenously in Denmark. Fanners who have been 
able to profit from large units have expanded firm size, while others have continued 
with smaller units. The selectivity bias is also supported by the observation that the 
number of weaners per sow increases with the herd size. In the large herds the number 
of weaners was 21.1 per sow, but in the small herds it was only 16.5 weaners per sow. 
Also, large units may have had more incentives to invest in animal breeding than 
small units, contributing to an increased number of weaners per sow as well as 
decreased feed costs per kilogram of pork produced in large units. 
Nevertheless, the data suggest that most Finnish hog farms are too small to use 
modern production technology as efficiently as their Danish competitors. Therefore, 
we can expect that the Finnish hog industry has the potential to reduce production 
costs substantially through expanding firm size. Once firm sizes have increased (and 
average costs declined) sufficiently it may even eventually turn out that the industry 
can become competitive enough to export and expand market share outside Finland. 
Nevertheless, this is unlikely to happen at least in the• short run. Furthermore, the 
domestic adjustment programs, including income transfers and investment subsidies, 
can no longer be justified under the Common Agricultural Policy if the industry goal 
is to penetrate to the export market. As explained above, the adjustment programs can 
only be justified to get the industry competitive enough for meeting domestic demand 
for pork and for maintaining the current meat processing industries in Finland. 
2.4 Entry to the EU and Adjustment Programs 
As noted above, the average producer price of pork fell by about 50 percent when 
Finland joined the EU. However, EU membership also resulted in a decrease in hog 
production costs as grain prices went down, environmental taxes on phosphorus and 
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nitrogen used in fertilizers were abolished, and the European Value Added Tax (VAT) 
was introduced. 
The projected income losses caused by the decreased producer prices are 
compensated for farmers through direct income transfers, which are: Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform aid, Less Favored Areas aid (LFA), agri-
environmental aid, and national aid. National aid includes permanent Northern aid as 
well as a gradually declining aid for 1995-1999. The Accession Treaty did not allow 
for a sufficient permanent national aid in Southern Finland and, therefore, the 
introduced aid level would have declined very rapidly without any further stipulations. 
However, it was agreed that, if serious difficulties appear, a new form of national aid 
can be negotiated for Southern Finland as well. This so-called aid for serious 
difficulties, was negotiated in 1996 and is to be paid over the period 1997-1999. Even 
though numerous new direct income transfers were introduced, most farmers have to 
respond and adjust their production to the increased competition if they want to 
maintain an adequate income level (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1996). 
Hog producers' economic environment also changed because the licensing 
scheme, which earlier deterred farmers from expanding their production units, was 
abolished and new favorable adjustment programs were introduced. The main goal of 
these adjustment programs is to promote the structural adjustment of rural enterprises 
and rural areas into the European Common Market and Common Agricultural Policy 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 1996). Many other aspects have also been 
incorporated into the programs. For example, they provide incentives and impose 
restrictions on maintaining and improving environmental sustainability of agricultural 
production practices. More importantly, at least from the viewpoint of the present 
study, the program includes extensive investment and early retirement schemes which 
provide interesting altematives for a farmer. He can either continue producing as 
before, and perhaps accept a gradually decreasing income level. Or he can quit 
farming and choose the early retirement pian provided he is old enough and eligible in 
the pian, or he can apply for investment subsidies and expand. 
Finland got permission from the EU to support investments in hog production 
facilities temporarily during the transitional period of 1995-1999, provided the 
subsidy does not increase the total hog production capacity in Finland from the 1994 
level. It is, therefore, required that at least the same amount of capacity has to exit the 
industry as new capacity is built. It was also required that certain standards for 
enterprise sizes are followed. These standards are reported in Table 2.6. Only full time 
farmers are eligible under the program.' 
4  Requirements for a full time farmer: at least 50 % of the applicant's labor input used 
on the farm, at least 25 % of the income is from agriculture, and at least 50 % of the 
income is from the farm. 
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Table 2.6. Capacity Restrictions on Subsidized Hog Production Facilities. a 
Type of investment Minimum capacity Maximum capacity 
Enlargement of a facility for 
sows 50 400 
fattening pigs 300 3000 
A new facility for 
sows 65 400 
fattening pigs 400 3000 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 1996. 
Nevertheless, the filmi terms and implementation of the investment subsidy 
scheme were delayed until 1996 and, in Southern Finland, the subsidy was further 
increased in 1997 as part of the serious difficulties aid package. Also, the time period 
over which the subsidies are allowed to be paid, was extended to the year 2001, 
because the implementation of the scheme was delayed (a summary of the key events 
concerning entry and adjustment to the EU is given in Table 2.7). The resulting 
maximum accepted subsidy rates, measured as percentages from the initial investment 
outlay, are presented in Table 2.8. The amount of the subsidy for an investment 
project is computed as a sum of the investment allowance and the present value of the 
interest rate subsidy. A 50 % subsidy may, for example, consist of an allowance that is 
30 % of the investment outlay and an interest subsidized loan in which the discounted 
present value of the interest rate subsidy is 20 % relative to the investment outlay. 
Table 2.7 Milestones of Finnish Agriculture in its Adjustment to the EU. 
Year 	Event 
1991 	Debate about Finland joining the EU began 
1994 	Accession Treaty was negotiated 
1995 	Finland joined the EU; a five year transitional period for agriculture 
began 
1996 	So-called aid for serious difficulties was negotiated 
1997 	Investment programs in effect (the package of serious difficulties and 
other investment subsidies) 
1999 	Last year of the initially negotiated transitional period 
2001 	Last year of the investment subsidies in the "serious difficulties" subsidy 
package negotiated in 1996 
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Table 2.8. Maximum Investment Subsidy Rates (%) from the Investment Outlay. a  
Investment good 	 Southern Finland 	 Northern Finland 
Production building for pigs b 	 50 	 27 
Arable land 	 20 20 
Drainage 50 	 20 
Grain dryer 	 60 	 20 
Storage 6 40 20 
Housing and heating 	 20 	 20 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 1996. 
Either enlargement or a new 
Storage for feed, machinery or farm products. 
It has to be emphasized that the reported subsidy values only set a ceiling for the 
subsidy rates. The realized subsidies, as well as the types of investments subsidized, 
will depend on how many farmers apply for them and the amount of fimds designated 
to the program. It may eventually turn out, for example, that the state budget for 
agriculture is too small to pay the maximum support rates, at least for ali types of 
investments listed in the subsidy scheme. 
Preliminary data suggest that the temporary investment subsidy scheme, with 
the risk that it will run out of sufficient funding, combined with a downward sloping 
trend (per capacity unit) in the direct income subsidy scheme, is accelerating 
investments in the hog industry, even though market prices are more uncertain than 
before. Farmers are responding not only to the incentives provided through the 
extensive investment programs but also to the expected lost direct income subsidies 
caused by delays in investment decisions. In other words, the value of information 
about market price movements has been smaller than the expected lost subsidies from 
postponing investments and, therefore, it has payed to take advantage of the highest 
subsidies rather than wait for new market information. 
Investments in new production facilities started to emerge in 1995 and 1996. A 
survey made in spring 1996 indicates that 11% of hog farms had already invested in 
hog production facilities in 1995 or in early 1996. As suggested by the decreasing 
trend of the income subsidies, farmers in the southern support areas have been more 
eager than farmers in the northern areas to invest early (Kallinen et al. 1996). 
The survey of Kallinen et al. (1996) also shows that only 5 % of hog farms pian 
to exit the industry within two years, while 70 % of the farms pian to continue in the 
industry after the year 2000. About 56 % of the farms staying in the business pian to 
invest in their hog production facilities and estimate their new production capacity at 
1.6 times the current capacity. The majority of these investments will be realized 
between 1996 and 1998, and half of these investments have already begun. 
Chapter 3 
A REVIEW OF DYNA1VIIC 1NVESTMENT MODELS 
This chapter reviews and discusses the literature on methods for constructing dynamic 
investment models. We start the review with the empirically tractable and widely used 
add hoc flexible accelerator model, because it provides a good framework for defining 
the central concepts and issues we are dealing with in our study. The next section 
highlights the most important literature on formulating dynamic optimization models 
that formally rationalize the theory of investment, i.e. the link between the theory of 
the firm and the flexible accelerator model. The chapter closes with a preferred 
approach for our study. 
3.1 Flexible Accelerator 
In the flexible accelerator model, a firm's capital stock is assumed to accumulate as a 
linear function of the firm's desired steady state capital stock and its actual, less 
volatile capital stock (Lucas 1967, Treadway 1971, and Mortensen 1973). In 
particular, a firm's net investment, 1 , is proportional to the discrepancy between the 
firm's desired and actual capital stock such that 
= N(K - K), 
where N = matrix of adjustment rates 
(the adjustment matrix) 
K = actual capital stock 
= desired, steady state capital stock 
(3.1) 
Without any irmovations or shocks to the system, the capital stock converges into a 
stable steady state level, provided that the characteristic roots of the adjustment 
matrix, N, lie between zero and one. Usually, the diagonal elements of N are expected 
to lie between zero and one, although this is a stronger requirement than the stability 
condition. 
Adjustment rates are symmetric if N is symmetric. With symmetric adjustment 
rates, a disequilibrium in the market of good s has the same effect on the investment 
of good j as a disequilibrium in the market of good j has on the investment of good s. 
Adjustment rates are independent if the off-diagonal elements of N are zeros, i.e. N is 
a diagonal matrix. Further, the capital stock adjusts instantaneously if N is an identity 
matrix. If, for example, the off-diagonal elements in the jth row of N are zeros, and the 
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j' diagonal element is one, good j adjusts instantaneously to the changes in its steady 
state stock. A good that adjusts instantaneously is a variable input. A good which does 
not adjust instantaneously has been defined in the literature as a quasi-fixed input. We 
use the terms capital good, capital stock, and quasi-fixed input interchangeably. 
Adjustment rates also can be asymmetric with respect to investment. In this 
case, an adjustment rate with a negative investment differs from that with a positive 
investment. Modeling adjustment rates that are asymmetric in investment requires that 
the regimes of negative and positive investments can be identified in the sample. 
A problem with the accelerator model is that it does not explicitly determine 
what the steady state capital stock is. In other words, the right hand side variable is 
unobserved in (3.1) or, more importantly, a function that determines 1 is not defined 
by (3.1). The steady state capital stock has to be determined by another model and, 
therefore, the accelerator does not provide a rigorous theory of investment. 
3.2 Dynamic Optimization Models 
A formal investment theory, which is consistent with the theory of the firm, requires 
that we solve a dynamic multi-period optimization problem. The solution will then 
trace out an optimal investment demand as a function of exogenous state variables, 
including the firm's actual capital stock. Further, by setting net investment to zero the 
model can be solved for the optimal steady state capital stock, whibh is also a function 
of the exogenous state variables (excluding the firm's actual capital stock) in the 
model. Usually the dynamic optimization problems have been constructed so that the 
firm's one-period outcomes are linked to each other through frictions, modeled as 
uncertainty and/or adjustment costs. 
There exists an extensive literature on investment under adjustment costs and 
investment under uncertainty. We highlight only the most important literature which 
is relevant to this study. Meese (1980) provides a comprehensive list of references on 
the adjustment cost literature prior to 1980, and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Pindyck 
(1991) have provided comprehensive reviews on investments under uncertainty and, 
in particular, the real options approach to irreversible investment. 
The core problem in constructing dynamic optimization models of investment 
has been summarized by Keane and Wolpin (1994): 
"There are no conceptual problems in implementing models with large choice 
sets, large state spaces, and serial dependencies in unobservables. The problem 
is in implementing interesting economic models that are computationally 
tractable." 
The literature on modeling adjustment costs in a dynamic context under 
uncertain future cash flows can be divided into four distinct strategies, or approaches. 
The first approach imposes restrictions on how expectations are formed, assumes an 
analytically convenient production technology, and solves for the optimal decision 
rules explicitly in a closed form. The second approach is more realistic than the first 
one, in the sense that it allows for both flexible production technology and flexible 
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expectations structures by estimating the first order conditions (Euler equations) from 
a dynamic optimization problem directly. In the third approach, the entrepreneur's 
choice alternatives, as well as the space of the state variables, are discretized and the 
optimization problem is then solved numerically without solving for any first order 
conditions or closed form decision rules. Bach of these three approaches are primal, in 
the sense that they involve explicit solution of a well-defined optimization problem. 
The fourth approach imposes a structure on how expectations are formed, allows for 
flexible production technology, and uses intertemporal duality for deriving the closed 
form optimal decision rules. 
The primal and the dual models are both functions of prices and possibly some 
exogenous constraints, like exogenous technology and output (Howard and Shumway 
1988). But the specifications of these models differ. The primal model is specified in 
terms of the instantaneous (or one-period) production function, cost function, or profit 
function. Then, the necessary optimality conditions are imposed through a set of first 
order conditions (Euler equations) or, altematively, the model is solved numerically. 
In the dual model, on the other hand, the optimal value function is specified and the 
envelope theorem is used to derive the decision rules. In subsequent sections we shall 
examine the primal approach and the dual approach in more detail. 
3.2.1 Primal Approach 
The first primal method considered here was developed by Hansen and Sargent 
(1980,1981), and further modified by Epstein and Yatchew (1985). The approach is to 
defme an analytically convenient fiinctional form for the one-period cost, production 
or profit function, and to solve the decision rules explicitly in a closed form through 
the Euler equations. Then the observed decision variables are used for estimating 
either the structural form parameters or the reduced form parameters. In this approach, 
information from the transversality conditions can be incorporated into the estimation 
equations for increasing the efficiency of the estimates, but at the cost of restricting 
the production technology to be quadratic. Perhaps more importantly, a difficulty 
arises in a multiple capital good setting if the adjustment rates are dependent across 
the capital goods, i.e. the adjustment matrix is not diagonal. With a nondiagonal 
adjustment matrix, it is not generally possible to find explicit expressions for the 
reduced form parameters in tenns of the underlying technology parameters (structural 
form parameters). If the number of capital goods exceeds two, one has to assume and 
impose independent adjustment rates in order to get a formal link between the reduced 
form parameters and structural form parameters. That is, the adjustment matrix has to 
be diagonal. 
The difficulty with the closed form solutions is, in particular, that the adjustment 
matrix, which solves the characteristic equations corresponding to the Euler equations, 
is related in a complex fashion to the structural form parameters, say, to the 
parameters in the production function. Epstein and Yatchew (1985) avoid this 
problem by reparametrizing some of the structural form parameters so that they are 
functions of the adjustment matrix and the remaining structural form parameters. Even 
though the reparametrization technique can be used to establish a feasible linlc, at least 
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in some special cases, between the structural and reduced form parameters, the 
algebraic relationship between the parameters remains ambiguous and complex. 
The second approach considered here has been developed by Kerman (1979), 
Hansen (1982), and Hansen and Singleton (1982), and applied, for example, by 
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983). In this approach, the structural form parameters are 
estimated directly from the Euler equations without solving them for closed form 
decision rules. Future exogenous variables are replaced by their observed values and, 
then, an instrumental variables technique is used to estimate their expectations. 
Kennan (1979), for example, suggests a simple two-step least squares procedure for 
obtaining consistent parameter estimates. Hansen and Singleton (1982), on the other 
hand, construct a set of population orthogonality conditions from the Euler equations 
and estimate their sample counterparts by the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation technique. Under rational expectations and fairly weak 
assumptions about the stochastic data generating processes, the method generates 
consistent estimates for the structural form parameters. Because the method 
circumvents solving the Euler equations for the optimal decision rules, it is very 
flexible in terms of allowing a wide range of altemative non-quadratic production 
technologies. However, the information included in the transversality conditions is 
ignored and the resulting estimates are not necessarily efficient (Epstein and Yatchew 
1985, and Prucha and Nadiri 1986). But, more importantly, this approach generally 
cannot be used to compute price or output elasticities, because the optimization 
problem has not been solved for the decision rules (e.g. Thjissen 1996). 
Later, Rust (1987) developed a numerical method for estimating a fuil solution 
to a structural, discrete choice dynamic programming model without solving it for 
optimal decision rules or any necessary first order conditions. He used the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique and a "nested fixed point algorithm" to iterate 
Bellman's equation until convergence occurred inside each iteration of the likelihood 
function. Although we can take advantage of particular structures, functional forms, or 
distributional assumptions, as he did, the method will be limited by computational 
complexity. Therefore, it is expected that this method will not be feasible for a large 
dimensional problem. For example, the original Rust (1987) bus engine replacement 
application had only two alternative choices (replace or continue), one observed state 
variable (mileage), and homogenous data (similar buses). And still all of his cost 
function specifications did not converge. 
More recently, some simulation and approximation methods, which circumvent 
the need for an exact full solution to the optimization problem, have been developed 
(Stock and Wise 1990, Keane and Wolpin 1994, Stern 1994). They allow for more 
complex dynamic programming models to be estimated feasibly, but require that the 
state variables are discretized so as to reduce the number of elements in the state 
space. The simulation methods can be used to approximate sequential dynamic 
discrete choice decisions with mutually exclusive altematives, especially when the 
state space is not large. The computational burden comes from the fact that to obtain 
the altemative specific value functions we must compute the expected maximum of 
the future period rewards (or costs) for each altemative. If one desires an exact 
solution, the expected maximum functions involve multiple integrations with as many 
dimensions as we have choice-altematives in the model. The computational intensity 
is further increased because the resulting expected maximum functions must be 
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evaluated at each element of the state space for tracing out the optimal choices. The 
computational burden could be reduced by the method for approximating the expected 
maximum functions as suggested by Keane and Wolpin (1994). Although the 
proposed method performed well in the study of Keane and Wolpin (1994), they 
conclude: "Much additional work must be done to determine the method's general 
applicability". 
3.2.2 Dual Approach 
The dual approach is based on dynamic, intertemporal duality theory, established by 
McLaren and Cooper (1980), formalized by Epstein (1981), and further explored by 
Epstein and Denny (1983). The method has been extensively applied to the dynamic 
investment and capital accumulation problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a 
typical dual approach, a risk neutral entrepreneur is assumed to minimize an expected 
value of a discounted sequence of production costs conditional on exogenous input 
prices and output levels. A flexible functional form is then chosen for the optimal 
value function, and the optimal decision mies are derived by applying the envelope 
theorem directly to the value function.1 
The dual approach is the most flexible in tenns of the generality of the 
underlying production technology. In particular, a major advantage of the dual 
approach is that the adjustment matrix and the parameters in the optimal value 
function are related to each other in a simple fashion and, therefore, it is 
straightforward to solve the model for closed form decision mies in terms of the 
underlying structural form parameters (Epstein and Denny 1983). Restrictions on the 
production technology, such as independent adjustment rates, are not required. 
Independence of adjustment rates can be tested rather than assumed. The model can be 
easily extended to cover an arbitrary number of variable inputs, capital goods, and 
outputs. 
Although the dual approach is flexible with respect to the underlying production 
technology, it has limitations in identifying price and output expectations separately 
from the technology parameters (Taylor 1984). With endogenous output and an 
estimated supply equation, the model has enough overidentification restrictions for 
identifying and testing simple expectations structures that follow a first order 
differential equation system (Epstein and Denny 1983). But if an exogenous output is 
assumed and no supply equation is included in the model, there are no 
overidentification restrictions for testing how expectations are formed. Therefore, it 
has been a standard procedure that the technology parameters have been pinned down 
by imposing a specific expectations structure on the model. 
These kinds of applications are, for example, Taylor and Monson (1985), Shapiro 
(1986), Vasavada and Chambers (1986), Stefanou (1987, 1989), Howard and Shumway 
(1988, 1989), Weersink and Tauer 1989, Weersink 1990, Fernandez-Comejo et al. 
(1992). 
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Typically, studies have imposed static price and output expectations such that 
the current prices and outputs have been expected to prevail forever (e.g. Fernandez-
Cornejo et al. 1992, Vasavada and Chambers 1986). Some authors, e.g. Vasavada and 
Chambers (1986), claim that static expectations are realistic in relatively small 
agricultural firms where goods can be stored easily and frequent acquisition of market 
information is costly. In European agriculture, static expectations may be realistic 
because the marketing institutions and agricultural legislation have stabilized and 
protected farm outputs and farm gate prices (e.g. Thjissen 1994). Thjissen (1996) even 
concluded that the model with static expectations fits the Dutch dairy farm data well, 
but the rational expectations model is inconsistent with the theory. 
In many duality applications, however, the seemingly restrictive assumptions on 
the expectations structure can be made without much loss of generality. The 
expectations assumption does not necessarily alter the most important behavioral 
economic results. The statistical inference concerning adjustment rates, as well as 
price and output elasticities, may be independent of the expectation structure as long 
as they meet the Markov property, in the sense that the probability distribution and 
expected value of the next period price (or output) is a function of current prices and 
output. The reason is that, under Markovian expectations, the behavioral equations are 
functions of current prices and outputs, which include ali relevant information about 
their future values. Therefore, correctly specified behavioral equations will depict the 
aggregate effects of expectations and technology even though their separate effects 
cannot be identified and distinguished.2 
Most dynamic duality models of investment and capital accumulation use 
aggregate data maintaining the assumption of interior solutions with positive gross 
investment. The assumption can be made without loss of generality only in aggregate 
data. Studies using firm level data, on the other hand, have typically used the primal 
approach based on the argument that the dual approach is not applicable, because firm 
level investment can be zero, or even negative (e.g. Thjissen 1994). But there are no 
theoretical reasons that prevent relaxing the assumption of positive investments, and 
applying the dual approach to firm level data. Epstein (1981) concludes that the 
regularity conditions of the optimal value function with positive gross investment are 
readily extended to account for negative gross investment too. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to construct an optimal value function such that the regularity conditions hold 
for ali individual firms, because some of the regularity conditions differ qualitatively 
between the investing and disinvesting firms. For example, consistent shadow prices 
for installed capital, which are partial derivatives of the optimal value function, must 
alternate their signs depending whether the firm is investing or disinvesting (Epstein 
and Denny 1980). 
Another alternative is to endogenously stratify the data into positive, zero, and 
negative investment regimes. One can then specify a consistent value function for 
each of these regimes, and the regularity conditions for a consistent value function can 
be tested within each regime. With this approach, the firm level data provide a good 
opportunity to account for the asymmetries and discrete characteristics in the optimal 
2 The claim holds in our model, and this will become clear in the next chapter, where the 
economic model is derived. 
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investment rules. The decision mies can be estimated, for example, by the maximum 
likelihood technique. Chang and Stefanou (1988) and Oude Lansink (1996) have 
exploited this idea by modeling positive and negative net investments using an 
endogenous dummy model, and the two-stage self-selection model of Hecicman 
(1976). However, the dimensionality problem becomes severe when modeling both 
discrete and continuous characteristics of the optimal decision mies with a large 
number of capital goods. 
3.3 Preferred Approach 
Among the reviewed approaches, there are trade-offs in the flexibility of the 
underlying technology, identification of expectations, statistical efficiency, 
computational intensity, and the form of the results. The traditional primal methods 
with closed form decision mies would produce consistent results in a preferred form 
(e.g. elasticities), but these methods have problems. The derivation of the optimal 
decision mies is complex unless the production technology is restricted. If the number 
of capital goods exceeds two, the technology has to be restricted so that the 
adjustment matrix is diagonal. In addition, sufficient overidentification restrictions 
for testing how expectations are formed requires profit maximization conditions so 
that ali the input demands, the output supplies, and equations on price processes can 
be used for identification (Epstein and Yatchew 1985). With exogenously determined 
output, the structure of expectations has to be imposed on the model without testing 
its validity. 
If the Euler equations, on the other hand, are used for estimating the parameters 
we can allow for more flexible technology, but the closed form decision mies and 
elasticities can no longer be computed. Further, expectations could not be tested with 
this approach either, because the profit maximization conditions are not met in our 
application. The reason is the lack of overidentification restrictions, as explained 
above. Therefore, by using this method nothing would be gained compared to the dual 
approach, which allows fiexible technology but has no overidentification restrictions 
for testing the expectations. 
In this study, we use the dual approach because we wish to model more than just 
one quasi-fixed input and to test for independent adjustment rather than assume it. We 
are also interested in price, output, and scale elasticities, which are straightforward to 
estimate when the dual approach is used. 
Our dual model is constructed so that the instantaneous production technology is 
augmented by internal adjustment costs, which has been the standard in the 
adjustment cost literature (e.g. Fernandez-Cornejo et al). But, in addition, we 
generalize the model to allow for uncertainty, irreversibility, and more general 
adjustment costs, like fixed adjustment costs. Therefore, the model allows not only for 
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investment smoothing but also for an optimal choice of inaction, i.e. an optimal 
choice of zero investment3. 
The adjustment cost literature has focused only on the regime of positive gross 
investment, with few exceptions. Chang and Stefanou (1988) and Oude Lansink 
(1996), for example, stratified data into two regimes, contracting and expanding firms, 
while modeling adjustment costs asymmetric in net investment. But we follow Abel 
and Eberly (1994), stressing irreversibility of agricultural investments, and incorporate 
the mixture of discrete and continuous characteristics of investments by identifying 
and partitioning the following two investment regimes: 
a regime of zero gross investment and 
a regime of positive gross investment. 
The regime of negative gross investment was excluded in the analysis because the 
number of negative gross investments in the data was too small for a complete 
analYsis. Changes in the labor services, on the other hand, did not include zeros and 
only the regimes of negative and positive changes in labor services were modeled. We 
now move on to a detailed derivation of the economic model. 
3  An adjustment cost rationalization ofJohnson's (1956) fixed asset theory, as in Hsu and 
Chang (1990), results in a similar identification of frictions and classification of observed 
investment demands. 
Chapter 4 
THE ECONOMIC MODEL 
This chapter derives the economic model used in the study. We start by defining a general 
set-up for the economic model. That is, we describe how the stochastic processes are 
determined, how we deal with the optimal timing and size of investment, and how 
liquidity constraints are incorporated into the analysis. Then, we sketch out the main steps 
in dynamic optimization and deriving the optimal decision rules. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the optimal decision rules. 
4.1 Stochastic Processes and their Expectations 
The investment literature has revealed the significant effect that expectations and 
uncertainty have on investment decisions. Recent theoretical work has incorporated 
expectations and uncertainty into the analysis and used stochastic calculus to derive 
stochastic investment mies. 
1n dynamic models, as opposed to static models, uncertainty affects the necessary 
conditions for the optimum even when the optimizing agents are assumed to be risk 
neutral. Therefore, intemal consistency in a dynamic model cannot be maintained by just 
solving a deterrninistic problem and then taking expectations and adding random shocks 
on the model. A theory of how expectations are formed and how stochastic processes are 
generated has to be incorporated explicitly into a dynamic model before deriving the 
necessary conditions for optimality. 
One special method to account for expectations is to augment the optimal value 
function by a simplified measure of expectations, as in Howard and Shumway (1989). 
They modeled technology expectations by augmenting the optimal value fimction with 
a time trend. A detailed discussion on the method can be found in Larson (1989). A more 
widely used, and more general method, involves modeling expectations and uncertainty 
through stochastic transition equations for the exogenous state variables in the model. 
For analytical convenience, most studies have maintained simplified assumptions 
about the stochastic processes which generate expectations and uncertainty in the 
transition equations. Ingersoll and Ross (1992), for example, allow for a stochastic 
discount factor, while Fousekis and Shortle (1995) model investment under stochastic 
depreciation. Stefanou (1987) derived investment rules under capital augmented technical 
change that evolved stochastically. But in most studies, uncertainty is assumed to be 
driven by prices and possibly by the level of an exogenous output. 
We assume that the discount rate is known to the finn but that it is time-varying as 
in Sakellaris (1995). Uncertainty is driven by an exogenous output level and input prices 
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that are stochastic, log-normally distributed, and follow a non-stationary geometric 
Brownian motion without drift. More specifically, these assumptions imply that changes 
in the output level and input prices are expected to be zero, and have log-normal 
distributions with independent increments. The output level and prices satisfy the 
Markov property so that their next period probability distributions are functions of their 
current stage only, and variance of the prediction error increases linearly with the time 
horizon (e.g. Hamilton 1994). 
We begin by deriving the model allowing for a non-zero drift rate to show that the 
assumption of static expectations can be made without much loss of generality in our 
model. The logarithms of the prices and output are stacked into a vector Z, which follows 
a simple Brownian motionl: 
AZ = p,(Z)At + Pv, 
where Z = (lnY,lnW,lnQ)I = vector of exogenous state variables 
Y = output vector 
W = price vector for variable inputs 
Q = rental price vector for capital goods 	 (4.1) 
AZ = change in Z 
p.(.) = a nonrandom function or a drift parameter 
P = any matrix such that E = PP 
E = variance-covariance matrix with diagonal elements o 
2 
v = an 	vector with E(v1) = 0 and E(vtv,I )=IAt 
It is implicit in our treatment that expectations are also rational, in the sense that they are 
based on (4.1). In Chapter 7 we examine the price and output series and conclude that 
(4.1) with zero drift rate can be regarded as a realistic assumption for this application, 
because it does not contradict the observed data series on prices, output, and rental rates 
of land for Finnish hog farms. Under (4.1), the stochastic decision rules can be derived 
by using Ito's lemma as, for example, in Hertzler (1991). 
4.2 Timing and Size of Investments - 
Irreversible investment decisions involve two components: the choice of timing and the 
choice of the investment size. Both the timing and size have to be chosen simultaneously. 
For example, a firm with a physical plant must decide when to pay the sunk cost of 
converting the existing facility into a new one, and how much capacity to build up in the 
new plant (Capozza and Li 1994). These kinds of decisions have been modeled in the 
literature as binary one-time decisions rather than continuous or incremental capacity 
replacements and expansions (e.g. McDonald and Siegel 1986). But the data available for 
'The time subscripts have been dropped to simplify notation. 
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our analysis, described in Chapter 5 below, do not allow us to identify a binary one-time 
decision problem. For example, a building investment observed in the data may be a 
partial replacement and/or enlargement of the existing facility, or it can be a completely 
new plant. In addition, the investment expenditure may have been spread over several 
periods as a result of the adjustment costs that are increasing in investment. Therefore, 
we model investment as an incremental decision, but we allow for optimal choices of 
inaction, i.e. zero investments. But still, investment decisions are assumed to be made 
simultaneously. In other words, farmers decide simultaneously between the choices to 
take no action, or how much to invest. 
The marginal condition for optimal disinvestment or investment does not hold at 
zero gross investment. It is optimal to choose zero investment if the shadow price of the 
installed capital is between the marginal revenue from disinvesting and the marginal cost 
of investing (including the cost of lcilling the investment option). In other words, if 
neither disinvestment nor investment would yield the highest expected discounted net 
returns, farmers will postpone investment decisions and choose zero gross investment. 
Hence, it is likely that the optimal investment mies have a comer solution at zero gross 
investment, primarily due to potential irreversibility. 
The optimal size of an investment, on the other hand, is analyzed as an incremental 
decision. The marginal conditions for optimal investments are assumed to hold whenever 
gross investments differ from zero. In other words, at the optimal level of positive 
investment the shadow price of the installed capital equals the marginal cost of investing. 
4.3 Intensity of Use and Depreciation 
Use and decay characteristics of capital goods differ because the optimal intensity of use, 
or the optimal service extraction rate, is decided repeatedly once the good has been 
purchased and installed. In other words, the optimal extraction rates and decay pattems 
of capital goods vary over time, even if purchases themselves are lumpy and irreversible. 
Robison and Barry (1996) distinguish four groups of capital goods according to their 
decay characteristics and flexibility in use. We consider here two of them. They are (1) 
goods for which decay depends primarily on time, and (2) goods for which decay depends 
on both time and service extraction rates. 
In our application, buildings and drainage (and land) fall into the first class of 
durables. They are worn out primarily by time and it is typical that the marginal costs of 
extracting services are low, or even zero. As long as marginal services have positive 
value, services are extracted from these durables at the full capacity. Therefore, we 
assume that services are extracted from buildings, drainage, and land at a fixed rate and 
they depreciate at a constant geometric rate. This assumption can be made without much 
loss of generality. 
Machinery, on the other hand, falls clearly into the second class of durables so that 
its depreciation is a function of both time and intensity of use. Machinery wears out faster 
the higher the extraction rate is. The optimal extraction rates may vary over time with the 
actual decay so that the extraction rates for an aged machine differs from those of new 
machinery. The optimal extraction rates may be further influenced by output prices and 
input prices. Therefore, a fixed depreciation rate for machinery is a strong assumption 
that carmot be made without loss of generality. Nevertheless, with the data available for 
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our analysis we cannot control for machinery's actual service extraction rates. Hence, we 
assume a constant geometric depreciation rate for machinery, i.e. that the service 
extraction rate of machinery is constant. 
4.4 Liquidity Constraints 
It may be claimed that farmers' access to credit has been rationed for two reasons. First, 
until 1985 the Finnish credit market was organized so that interest rates for loans were 
set below the market clearing rates. At these loan rates, there was excess demand for 
loans, and firms access to credit may have been rationed by restricted credit approvals. 
Credit market liberalization began in 1985. 
Second, farmer access to credit may have been rationed over the whole study period 
by asymmetric information, or by asymmetric payout and payoff of risky credit between 
the borrower and lender. As an extreme case, when a firm's survival is at stake, the firm 
has an incentive to increase borrowing as long as the lender approves funding (for more 
details, see Robison and Barry 1987). Because the firm's cash flows determine its ability 
to meet debt obligations, one can conjecture that the access to credit may have been 
rationed for firms with high liabilities relative to their gross retums. 
For studying the effects of credit rationing we exogenously partition the sample into 
four partitions according to two factors: credit market regime and the firm's liabilities to 
gross retums ratio. In other words, the credit constraints are not formally imposed in our 
optimization problem and economic model, but we informally check whether the 
estimation results are robust to the changes in the credit regimes. Zeldes (1989) has used 
similar methods for studying liquidity constraints. 
4.5 The Optimization Problem 
The optimization problem could be stated and solved by two different techniques: 
contingent claims analysis or stochastic dynamic programming. In most applications, 
however, they both give identical decision rules, although they make different 
assumptions about discount rates and financial markets (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). In 
contingent claims analysis, the discount rate is a risk free rate by definition. In dynamic 
programming, on the other hand, the discount rate is exogenously given and cannot 
necessarily be interpreted as a risk free rate. Contingent claims analysis requires 
assumptions on the structure of financial markets for trading risks as a bridge for deriving 
the decision mies but the dynamic programming approach requires no such assumptions. 
Although the seemingly more restrictive assumptions of contingent claims analysis can 
be made without loss of generality, we chose here to use stochastic dynamic 
programming. For analytical convenience, a continuous time formulation is used. A 
discrete approximation is made later to fit the decision mies to the data. This approach 
is standard in dynamic dual models. 
Risk neutral farmers are assumed to minimize a sequence of discounted production 
costs conditional on a set of state variables, which includes the current capital stock, 
output level, and input prices. We partition the set of the state variables into two vectors 
K and Z. The vector K is the capital stock controlled through gross investment I. The 
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vector K also includes labor that is controlled through net changes in labor input L. The 
vector Z was defined previously in (4.1). The optimal value function is defined as the 
minimum of discounted cost over the infinite future time horizon: 
J(Z0,./C0 ) = mini.E0{ - f e ' {Cl(W,Y,K,1)+(U+y)Q1K} dt , 
o 
subject to (4.1) 
AK= (I-15K)åt 
Zo, Ko given 
where 
K = capital stock 
I = gross investment 
Et  = expectation conditioned on information at time t 
r = discount rate 
instantaneous variable cost function 
U = identity matrix 
y = diagonal matrix of parameters 
= diagonal matrix of constant depreciation rates 
(4.2) 
The instantaneous variable cost function is defined as2: 
Crl = minä {W IX: F(X,Y,K,I)=0} 
where 
F = transformation function with usual regularity conditions 
X = demand for variable inputs 
The variable cost function, C , accounts for intemal adjustment costs through the 
technology constraint F0=0. The transformation function is augmented by gross 
investment because, under the adjustment cost hypothesis, scarce resources need to be 
withdrawn from production to install new capital stock (Lucas 1967). Therefore, even if 
production is increasing in the capital stock it can be decreasing in gross investment. In 
tum, costs are increasing in investment at a given output level. Therefore, the solution to 
the instantaneous cost minimization problem is a function of both capital stock and gross 
2  The regularity conditions on F(.) are usually stated as: F(.) is continuous, twice 
differentiable, and convex in I; Strictly increasing in Y; and strictly decreasing in X, K, 
and absolute value of I. 
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investment. Variable costs are decreasing in the capital stock but increasing and convex 
in investment (Epstein and Denny 1983). 
A wedge between purchase and sales prices of capital goods is captured by the 
diagonal parameter matrix y, which is allowed to differ from zero only within the regime 
of negative investments or negative changes in the labor input. The sales price of a good 
is expected to be less than or equal to its purchase price (Arrow 1968). Therefore, we 
expect that y <0, for ali K < 0. It will become clear from the optimal decision rules 
below that nonzero elements in y imply adjustment rates which are asymmetric in 
investment. 
4.6 Necessary Conditions for Optimality 
To derive the necessary conditions for a minimum, we start with the principle of 
optimality and Bellman's equation, which has the following form at time to (Kamien and 
Schwartz 1991)3: 
It
o+A t 
" , Z0,1(0 ) = mini E0 f C(Z,K,I,y) dt + J(to+ A t, Z0+ å Z, K0+ 
to  (4.3) 
where C(Z,K,I,y)=C1(W,Y,K,I)+(U+y)Q 1K 
Next, assume a constant control, /, for a small time period zt t, which implies a constant 
C over At. Then, the integral on the right-hand side of (4.3) equals the product (or area) 
C At. Further, expand J(to + 4t, Zo + AZ) and use Ito's lemma, which results in: 
J = 	E{CA t + J+ Jt At +VzJ AZ +Vie'.  AK + (Pv)I(V2z.1)(Pv) + h.o.t.}, 
where Jt = anat (4.4) 
V zJ = Gradient of J with respect to Z evaluated at (t0,Z0,K0 ) 
V KJ = Gradient of J with respect to K evaluated at (to,Z0,K0 ) 
Vz2 J = Hessian of J with respect to Z evaluated at (t0,Z0,K0 ) 
h.o.t = Higher order terms which approach zero as At-0 
All subsequent equations are subject to the constraints in (4.2) and the definition for C. 
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Subtracting J from both sides of (4.4), dividing the result through by 4 t, and rearranging 
gives: 
	
AZ 	AK 1 -J 	 ,, /„_72 	1 t = 	E{C V zJ A t Vicf —A7 ± 	 ") "Ta- ' 	(4.5) 
where -Jt = -3, at =rJ . The left-hand side of (4.5) equals rJ, because the time 
variable t appears in Jonly through the discount factor e'. Finally, take expectations and 
take the limit as 	to get the fundamental partial differential equation obeyed by the 
optimal value function 4: 
1 rJ = 	{C + VzJii.(Z) + V KJ(I- ÖK) + -[Vec(Vz2 J)]1[Vec(Z)]} , 
= 	{ C + E[asai} 
(4.6) 
where 
E[e e l] PElvv ]1) /1 — = PP 
A t 
= covariance matrix for the error terms in (4.1) 
Equation (4.6) is often referred to as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (H.TB) equation. It 
states that the optimal value function equals the lowest discounted present value of the 
sum of four terms; (1) the immediate cost or payout; (2) the marginal cost from expected 
changes in output and prices, multiplied by the magnitude of the expected change in the 
output level and prices; (3) the marginal cost of the optimal change in the capital stock 
multiplied by the magnitude of the optimal change in the capital stock; and (4) a risk 
premium which is driven by the volatility of prices and output. The optimal value 
function is increasing with volatility of the output level and prices. The term VK J is 
interpreted as a shadow price for installed capital. It measures how many units the 
expected discounted present value of the firm's cost stream would change if the amount 
of installed capital in the &III is changed (ceteris paribus) by one unit. 
Altematively, the equilibrium model (4.6) can be interpreted per unit of time and 
the cost flow can be thought as a (negative) asset with value J. Then, the lett hand side, 
rJ, is the threshold payout per unit of time, with a discount factor r, for a decision maker 
to be willing to hold the asset. On the right-hand side, the first term is the immediate 
payout. The expected rate of capital gain or loss consists of the second and the third term. 
4 For some matrix A=(a, a2 a3) the vec-operator stacks the columns, a, a2 a3, 
of A into a one column vector, Vec(A)= (a,' a2' a3')'. 
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In addition, a decision maker requires compensation for the risks of holding the asset. 
The risks are accounted for by the fourth term on the right-hand side. For example, the 
more volatile the prices and output level are, the lower immediate payout is required for 
a decision maker to hold the asset. 
An optimal value function (J), which solves the minimization problem in (4.2), 
necessarily satisfies the second order differential equation (4.6). If, in addition, C is 
convex in (I,K), the sufficient conditions for a minimum are met (Kamien and Schwartz 
1991). The convexity of C in (I,K) implies that J is convex in K. Nevertheless, convexity 
is not required by the necessary condition for a minimum in (4.2) and we can conclude 
that if the integral in (4.2) converges, the optimal decision rules exist and are unique. 
It is expected, however, that the optimal investment pattem is discontinuous at zero 
investment, which generates lcinks in the optimal path of K. The optimal value function 
(J) and the shadow price for installed capital (VK J) must, nonetheless, be continuous 
along the optimal path of K. The Euler equation is satisfied between the boundaries and, 
at the boundaries, the Weierstrass-Erdmann Comer Conditions must hold (Kamien and 
Schwartz 1991). Similar conditions are also called the "Value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions" for a free boundary optimization problem (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
These conditions imply that J and VK J are continuous along the optimal path of K. As 
a special case, Abel and Eberly (1994) show that if the instantaneous cost function is 
homogenous of degree p in (KJ), then so is J. Therefore, we can conclude that, within 
the partition of 1, certain differentiability conditions hold between J and C. The regularity 
conditions for J can be deduced from the regularity conditions for C.5 
This result is important because it allows us to specify a consistent functional form 
for J and test the characteristics of C from J. Optimal value functions (J) which are 
consistent with the regularity conditions of C, assuming positive gross investments, are 
necessarily characterized by the following: 6 
(B.i) J is real valued and nonnegative. 
(B.ii) (r+ (3)(V KJ)/ - (U+y)Q - (V zK )) g(Z) - (VJ)k * - 	K [V e c 	Vec()11 < 0 
(VKJ)/ < 0 
r(V 1.1)1 - (V zyI)µ(Z) - (V KIJ)k - -21 Vy[Vec(V 2A1Vec(E )11 > 0, 
where k * is given by (4.11) below 
5  The local dual relationship between the optimal value function and the instantaneous 
function has been proven by McLaren and Cooper (1980) and by Epstein (1981). 
6  In the deterministic case with g(Z)=0, the differentiability conditions for positive gross 
investment are given in Epstein and Denny (1983). Condition (B.vi) follows, for 
example, Abel and Eberly (1994). A prime superscript, an asterisk, and a dot refer to the 
transpose, the optimal value, and the time derivative. 
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(B.iii) Jis nondecreasing and concave in (W,Q). 
(B.iv) Well defmed optimal decision mies exist and take the form given in (4.11), 
i.e. the integral in (4.2) converges. 
(B.v) 	The optimal decision rule /*=1?-* + SIC defines a unique, globally stable 
steady state R(Y, W,Q) for capital stock. 
(B.vi) Jis positively linearly homogenous in prices (W,Q) 
Property (B.i) is self-evident. Properties (B.ii) are obtained by differentiating (4.6) with 
respect to K, I and Y, rearranging, and using the properties of C. They are duals to 
VKC 	< 0, VIC > 0, and VyC > 0. Condition (B.iii) follows immediately, if C is 
convex in /and concave in W. By adding the conditions (B.iv) and (B.v) the optimization 
problem has a bounded continuous solution for K given by the optimal decision mies. 
Contrary to static models, condition (B.v) requires third order curvature conditions for 
guaranteeing that the first order conditions result in a global minimum in (4.2). Under 
static price expectations, these third order conditions are satisfied if the shadow prices for 
installed capital are linear in prices (Lemma 1 in Epstein 1981). We will retum to a 
discussion of conditions (B.v) in the context of our model in more detail below. With an 
instantaneous cost function that is positively linearly homogenous in prices (W,Q) 
condition (B.vi) follows from the result of Abel and Eberly (1994)7. 
The condition (VKJ)/ < 0, for ali I>0 in (B.ii) can be generalized. First differentiate 
(4.6) with respect to I and then add the complementary slackness condition to get 
= 0, for all I 
which, within the partition of 1, gives the following links between the regularity 
conditions of C and J 
V 	<0, for ali 1>0, if 	>0 
V KJ' > 0, for ali 1< 0, if 	<0 
(V IC(I=0)- )/ s le s (V IC(I=0)11, for ali I = 0 
where - and + superscripts refer to left- and right-hand side gradients. In other words, if 
the optimal investment is positive, the discounted present value of the cost stream (the 
optimal value function) is decreasing with the capital stock, and vice versa. Zero gross 
investment is chosen if the (negative of the) shadow price of capital is between the 
marginal cost of disinvesting and investing. Therefore, if we observe (V A,J)/ < 0 at /=0, 
7 The rental price vector (Q) is related to the purchasing price vector (P) through the 
equation: Q=(r+ ö)P. When Q is varied in the spirit of (B.vi) the discount rate r is held 
fixed, and the variation is driven up by variation in P. 
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then (V/C(/=0)')/  > 0 must hold. The value fimction is decreasing with the capital stock, 
but the frictions make zero investment optimal. Similarly, if (VKJ)/ > 0 at 1=0 
then (V/C(/=0)-)/  < 0 holds. The value function increases with the capital stock but 
frictions prevent disinvestment. 
Following Epstein (1981) and Epstein and Denny (1983), an inverse problem to (4.6) 
is: 
C = maxQ {rJ - V zJµ(Z) - 	- ÖK) - --[Vec(V z2 J)] I[Vec(Z)] 
There are two differentiability conditions that needs to be clarified for obtaining a unique 
solution to this maximization problem. First, if C is convex (concave) in I, then VKJmust 
be concave (convex) in Q. This condition is, nevertheless, always met if VKJ is linear 
in Q. 
Second, because C is concave in prices (Q) the right hand side term 
rJ - V.1(Z)  - V KJ(I - ÖK) - .[Vec(V 2zJ)]1[Vec(Z)] 
has to be concave in prices, too. This curvature condition is met, for example, if 
(D.i) 	J is concave in prices (=B.iii), 
(D.ii) V zIKZ) is convex in prices, 
(D.iii) VKJ is linear in prices, as above, and 
(D.iv) 	V». is linear in prices. 
Condition (D.i) was already set in (B.iii) and condition (D.iii) was set above, therefore, 
neither of them adds more restrictions in the model. Condition (D.ii) is always met if 
1.t(Z)=0, i.e. expectations are static. But in the case with nonzero 1.1(Z), (D.ii) is certainly 
met ifboth VzJ and i(Z) are convex in Q. For example, if Vz2J is linearly nondecreasing 
in prices and 1.1(Z) is convex in prices then (D.ii) is satisfied. To see this, suppose we 
impose V 2./ to be linearly nondecreasing in prices, so that — = 	0, where (pi is 
a nonnegative parameter and i refers to the elements of Z corresponding to input prices. 
Because they are the logarithms of input prices that appear in Z we can write the 
convexity condition as (in scalar notation) 
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a2(anazd aua2 fiazNaing/aqd] a[((pgixqd] 
	 2(pgi 0 
aqi2 	 aqi 	 aqi 
which says that the convexity requirement is met for ali 	0. 
Conceming the requirements for 11, on the other hand, the convexity condition can 
be made in practice without much loss of generality. For example, a stationary VAR(1) 
process or a nonstationary VAR(1) process with unit roots estimated on logarithms of 
prices will result in convex µ8. And, as mentioned above, unit roots in the univariate 
series for prices will result in a trivial case of V zIµ(Z) = 0 no matter what the properties 
of Vz/ are. 
Thus, the regularity conditions (D) required for a stochastic dual model with 
rational expectations do not further restrict the regularity conditions ofJ compared to its 
deterministic and/or static expectations counterparts. Strong restrictions do not need to 
be imposed on the empirical specification of expectations either, as long as they follow 
a VAR(1) process. A consistent model can be estimated for example with the following 
properties (D')9: 
(D'.i) 
(D'.ii) 
(D'.iii) 
(D'.iv) 
J is concave in prices, 
[1(Z) is convex in prices, i.e. Z in (4.1) follows either a stationary VAR(1) 
or nonstationary VAR(1) with unit roots. 
VKJ is linear in prices, and 
Vz2J is linearly nondecreasing in prices. 
It will be shown below that our model meets the regularity conditions (D'). 
Now the optimization problem and the resulting regularity conditions are set. The 
observed optimal decision rules (the investment schedules and the demand for variable 
inputs) are derived from (4.6) by differentiating and using the envelope theorem, but first 
a functional form must be specified for the optimal value function J. 
8 We use the approximation 2 z, 4./  - Z. Note that estimating the VAR(1) on levels of 
prices results in linear ji and, the convexity condition is met in this case for ali stationary 
and nonstationary series. 
9  The regularity conditions discussed in Luh and Stefanou (1996) relate to a profit 
maximization model in which the evolution of future prices is nonstatic but known with 
certainty, i.e. their model is deterministic. It is straightforward to generalize the regularity 
conditions presented here to a stochastic profit maximization problem. 
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4.7 Specification for the Optimal Value Function 
The optimal value function is a function of the capital stock, output, and prices. We 
specify the quantity index of capital stock K or, more specifically, the stock of quasi fixed 
inputs as having three elements: real estate, machinery, and labor. Output, Y, is 
aggregated into two indices: livestock and crop output indices. The logarithms of these 
output indices are stacked into a vector lnY. An aggegate variable input is denoted by x, 
and includes fertilizers, feed, chemicals, and energy. The price index of the variable input 
is used as a num6raire, and the logarithms of the normalized rental prices of the quasi-
fixed inputs are stacked into a vector InQ. Therefore, the optimal value function depends 
on the following vectors: 
K= [k1,k2,k31' 
[YDY2i' 
	
lnY= flny1,lny211  
Q= 	1,q2,q31' InQ= [Inq1,lnq2,1nq3]1  
Further, the exogenous output level and input prices are stacked into vector Z=11nY, 
InQ1'. The optimal value function is assumed to be additively separable from prices and 
inputs of other goods. 
A quadratic second order approximation with respect to the capital stock (K) and 
the logarithm of output and prices (Z) is used as a functional form for the optimal value 
function. The necessary third order curvature conditions in (D'.iii) are imposed on the 
model by assuming that the shadow price of installed capital is linear in prices. With 
these restrictions, the optimal value function (J) has the following form 
J(K,Y,Q) = ao + lnY 
lnQ 
r_ + 	1 	lnY/ 
2 
AEO 
E / B H 
. 	D 
lnY 
InQ 
Q /31- ix- (4.7)  
We have specified J with an inverted parameter matrix 3/P, because then the matrix M 
appears in the optimal decision rules. 
To obtain the terms in the necessary condition (4.6), first differentiate the value 
function to obtain the (transposed) gradient vectors: 
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VKJ/ = ai + AK + ElnY + 34-I Q 
[ 
a2 + E IK + BlnY + HInQ 
VzJ i - a3  + H IlnY + DlnQ + M -1KoQ 
where o = element by element multiplication 
(the Hadamard product) 
Then, differentiate the transposed gradient Vz,/' to obtain the Hessian of J as 
V2z.1 = 	 a2Q  H 	D +M -1K 
alnQ 2 
aw-licoo - Diag{(11/1-11(00i} where M -1K 22Q  - a alnQ 	lnQ 
j refers to the j element in the vector M -1K0Q 
Perfonning differentiation we then get 
3 
q1E mu
-1 
 ki 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
v2,1 3 
0 	q2E inv
-1 
 kJ 	0 
i=1 
H' D+ 
3 q,E  
-1 where Insj = (sj)111 element in M -1  
- (U + y)MK - -1-Ko[o2 
2 qi 
2 	2 
cr q2 0q3 
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Note that Vz2J is linearly nondecreasing in prices (Q), provided M is positive definite. 
Thus, the model meets the reg-ularity condition in (D'iv). 
4.8 Optimal Decision Rules 
The observed optimal decision rules are derived from (4.6) by differentiating and using 
the envelope theorem. Substituting (4.1) and (4.7)-(4.9) into (4.6), differentiating (4.6) 
with respect to lnQ, and taking expectations results in, 
r(VinglY = inQCY (V z1ng4-t(Z) + 1„01(Z))/(VAI 
+ (V Kin21)k + .1.2-aVec(V2zJ)1Vec(E)lalnQ 
where (VinQCY = (U+Y)K0Q 
[H 1 D+Diag(M -1KoQ)/ ] V  Zlnel 
V InQKZ) = Jacobian of µ(Z) with respect to lnQ 
VzJ is given in (4.8) 
= 11/1-11°Q and 
avec(v2,1-yvec(E)/ainQ 2 = M -1K0Q0[020, 0 	2 q2 G 11 
(4.10) 
(32 = variance of the J th input price, q. 
Solving for k we get 
= Diag{qi I } M[r(V ine,1)1 - (V zing1)µ(Z) - (V ind.t(Z))1V 2J 11 
Where Diag{q -1i  } is a diagonal matrix with qi a:s th diagonal element 
Then, we pin down the structural parameters in Jby assuming static price and output 
expectations such that Z follows a simple Brownian motion without drifi. In other words, 
we set 1.1(Z) = Vinc,g(Z) = 0. Although, the parameters in p.(Z)could be identified in the 
price and output equations (4.1), the decision rules (equations for k) do not provide any 
overidentification restrictions for testing whether the expectations follow (4.1) or not. 
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The reason is that the three terms r(V in2)) g- (7.1, and (V InQ p.(Z))1V z1" are ali zin  
functions of Y, Q, and K. Technically, we could obtain over identification restrictions, for 
example, through imposing a specific functional form for µ(2). It would not he good 
econometric practice, and it is not exploited here, because we could not distinguish 
between misspecified expectations and misspecified functional form. 
Now, it is easy to see that by allowing for µ(Z)*0 we would only split the 
parameters which multiply Z in the decision rules into two fractions. The sum of these 
two fractions, however, would remain unchanged no matter how we split the parameters 
into these two fractions. Furthermore, partial derivatives and elasticities of the decision--<-
rules with respect to Z would remain unaltered by the specification of µ(Z). 
There are no overidentification restrictions for testing the parameters 
2 	2 	2 • 	 1  o o and 	m the term - —Ko[oql q2 a g3 either. Nevertheless, this term can ql 	q2 q3 2 
be used for modeling an identified regime shift in which we observe a persistent shift in 
uncertainty. In other words, by using properly defined dummy variables we can model 
how the conjectured increase in uncertainty at the beginning of 1991 has affected 
farmers' investment behavior. 
By malcing substitutions for Vinci,Vzf Z, and µ(Z), and by collecting , 
terms, we obtain 
= Diag qi 1} M(ra3 + -I lnY + rDlnQ) 
+ (rU - (U + y)M)K 
- —1 [a 2
qi 0
2
q2 
0
2 
]/OK 
2  
(4.11a) 
Note that ak.iaa2
' 
. = -±k < 0 for ali j=1,2,3 in (4.11a), and optimal investment decreases 
q 	2 ' 
with the volatility of own price. In other words, volatile capital prices slow down capital 
expansion. Also note that the matrix M multiplies the price effects. Therefore, if the 
elements of M are small but they exceed r, the capital stock will adjust slowly towards 
its steady state level and demand is inelastic in the short run with respect to changes in 
prices and output. 
In the deterministic case with static expectations, such that ui = 0 for all j and with 
the assumption of y=0, the optimal investment schedules coincide with the widely used 
constant coefficient multi-variate flexible accelerator of the form k = (rU - M)(K - £), 
where (rU - M) and 1C stand for a matrix of adjustment rates and a steady state capital 
stock. 
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The demand for the num8raire input x is solved from the HJB-equation. Recall that 
with only one variable input, x, which is used as a num8raire, the instantaneous cost 
function C" equals x. Then, the HJB becomesw: 
rJ = x + (U+y)Q 1K + Vz4t(Z) + V KJk* + —21  [Vec(V2zJ)] /[Vec(E)] , 
where I refers to its optimal value. By solving the HJB for x we get: 
x = rJ - (U+y)Q I C - VzJKZ) - KJk * - —21  [Vec(Vz2 J)V[Vec(E)], 
which is rearranged further by malcing the familiar substitutions for 
V  Inelf 	Vzi, Z, and µ(Z) as in (4.11a)": , ZInel f,  
x = a o  + ai (rK - k* ) + a2 lnY + a3 1nQ x 
+ K IA(-r--K - k * ) + lnY IE I(rK - k* ) 
2 
+ 1  —1nY IBlnY + lnY IH(lnQ -1) + —
1 lnQD(lnQ - 2), 
2 	 2 
where ax0 = an intercept 
(4.11b) 
The economic model consists of four decision rules (4.11): net investment on real estate, 
; net investment on machinery, k2; the change in the labor input, L; and the demand 
for the num8raire input, x. For fitting the model to data, the discrete approximation 
ki zK11 -K is used. The net investments, 	are solved further for gross investments, 
by using the equality ij = k j + ö jkj , for j=1,2. The term ö refers to the geometric 
depreciation rate as above. 
The decision mies are given in terms of the structural form parameters that appear 
in the optimal value function, J. Thus, the parameter estimates can be used for testing 
hypotheses that are linked to the characteristics of the instantaneous cost function through 
the conditions given above. The decision mies also give a direct way to make inferences 
10 The equation is subject to the same constraints as (4.6). 
Constant terms are included in the intercept and, therefore, ax0 is not the same as ao 
in J. 
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about the short-term investment responses and long-term responses of the capital stock. 
We can also compare the observed and steady state capital stocks and, assuming the 
increased policy risks are realized through increased volatility of prices, the response of 
the investments on the conjectured increase in policy risk can be tested through the 
parameters of price variances in (4.11a). We now move on to the technique for estimating 
the optimal decision rules, which is presented in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 
ESTIMATING THE MODEL 
This chapter describes econometric estimation of the decision rules given in the 
preceding chapter. We first characterize the assumptions underlying the model, and then 
move on to the statistical specification of the decision rules. The last section gives a 
detailed description of the estimators, concluding with the likelihood function used for 
estimating the decision rules. 
5.1 Assumptions Underlying the Model 
The statistical model is constructed under three specific assumptions which allow the 
decision rules to be estimated separately from the output and price equations. This 
reduces considerably the computational complexity of the estimation procedure. The 
assumptions are justified by obtaining a feasible estimation procedure and, in particular, 
a statistical model that was found to converge. 
First, we assume that the output and price series follow a nonstationary geometric 
Brownian motion without drift, i.e. we set µ.(Z)=0 in (4.1). An autoregressive model and 
the ordinary least squares technique (OLS) will be used for testing whether the observed 
output and price series show strong evidence against the null hypothesis of zero drift. The 
testing procedure is discussed in Chapter 7 together with a report of the results. 
Second, we assume that the error terms in the decision mies are independent of the 
error terms in the transition equations. These covariance restrictions .are maintained 
without testing, because it was not possible to estimate the transition equations jointly 
with the decision rules. This may reduce the efficiency of the estimates but they remain 
consistent. 
Third, with regard to the parameters measuring volatility of the input prices, we 
model only a regime shift, i.e. a single persistent shift in uncertainty, which occurred at 
the beginning of 1991. As explained in the preceding chapters, it seems likely that price 
uncertainty increased at the beginning of 1991 when the debate on Finland's possible 
entry to the European Union started. The effects of this increased uncertainty on farmers' 
investment behavior are modeled and tested through dummy variables over the period 
1991-93 . 
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5.2 Specification of the Decision Rules 
The equations for the net investments k1 and k2 are solved for the gross investments 
and i2 using the equalities ij = + 8j, for] = 1,2, where ö is the geometric 
depreciation rate. There are four decision mies corresponding to the choice of real estate 
investment, i1; machinery investment, i2; change in the labor input, L; and demand for 
the other inputs (the numeraire), x. As explained in the chapters above, the optimal 
decision mies have both discrete and continuous characteristics. We observe positive 
values and zeros for gross investments in real estate and machinery. Strictly spealcing, the 
zero investments do not result from data truncation or censoring, but from the frictions 
that make them optimal choices. Nonetheless, our statistical model coincides with a 
model for censored data and has the same structure as a simultaneous Tobit model with 
two censored variables, i1 and i2 . The change in the labor input, on the other hand, has 
both negative and positive observations but no zeros. We model the labor changes and 
the demand for the numeraire input assuming they are continuous in the state space, and 
observed without limits. Therefore, the estimating equations are 
- t 	= Zeil + e 1 
= 0 if 	0 
= 2e,2 E 2 
i2 	i2* 	> 0  
= 0 if i; 0 
= 2e, E3 
x = 	 E4 
where 2 = g(Z,k1 ,k2 ,L) 
g is a function 
ei,, ei2, ei, and ex are subsets of the parameters 
in the optimal value function J 
and where the terms i1 and i; refer to the latent form investments, which are uncensored 
but not observed. The uncensored latent form investments have an interwetation as 
desired investments. That is, the latent forms refer to the optimal investments under a 
i; 
(5.1) 
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hypothetical condition in which the frictions, driven by uncertainty and fixed adjustment 
costs, were not apparentl. 
For later purposes we simplify the notation by partitioning the decision mies into 
two sets: / = (i1,i2), (or I* = (ii* ,i;)), and X = (i„x). The partition Ihas the variables 
that are bounded to be nonnegative. The partition X, on the other hand, has only 
continuous variables that are unlimited in their range. 
In our notation, the same set of exogenous variables appears on the right-hand side 
of each Equation (5.1). Exclusion restrictions, implied by the economic model, are 
imposed by setting the appropriate parameters to zero. Equations for the censored 
investment demands have neither censored variables nor any other endogenous right-hand 
side variables. These exclusion restrictions guarantee that the model is internally 
consistent and a unique solution is identified for both investment demands. 2 
The equation for x has three endogenous right-hand side variables, i1 , i2,and L. But 
ali of the elements in O are identified by the parameter restrictions between and within 
the equations that are, again, implied by the economic model. Note that it is the observed 
investments, not the unobserved latent form investments, which determine the 
endogenous treatment effect in the demand for x. The treatment effect is linear in i1, 
or L , but it is not constant. It interacts with the firm's current output and capital stock, 
including labor (see Equation 4.11b). 
5.3 Estimators 
The model can be estimated consistently by two different classes of methods: (1) by the 
two-stage method; or (2) by Full Information Maximum Likelihood methods (FIML). 
The two-stage method, originally suggested by Heckman (1976), can be applied to a wide 
class of models using standard estimation techniques. It can provide consistent estimates 
for complex problems even under certain nonstandard assumptions. 3  
Heckman's method could be used to estimate the investment decisions if they are 
conceived as a two stage decision. The endogenous choice of regime, i.e. whether to 
invest or postpone investment, could be modeled first as a binary choice and estimated 
by the maximum likelihood technique. Then, at the second stage, the decision "how much 
to invest if you decided to invest in the first stage" could be estimated by a least squares 
The standard adjustment costs that are convex in investment result in investment 
smoothing but do not result in zero investments. 
If the censored investments appeared in the right-hand sides of the investment demands, 
we could get two reduced form solutions for i ] and none for , or vice versa, unless 
certain inequality restrictions were imposed on the parameters. For more details, see 
Schmidt (1981). 
3  For example, a serially correlated, heteroscedastic, or nonnormally distributed error 
term. The Tobit MLE is inconsistent under heteroscedasticity or nonnormality (Amemiya 
1985). 
(5.2) 
2 04 
= El 
[Z21 Z2 
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method, with correction for the bias caused by the endogenous regime selection. The 
nonstandard assumptions mentioned above apply to the second stage estimation only. 
Obtaining consistent parameter estimates by the two-stage method is relatively 
straightforward and can be done by most econometric software. Nevertheless, obtaining 
the correct standard errors for the parameter estimates requires complex computations 
which are not usually given in standard software output. The reason for this is that the 
inverses of the Mills ratios, which are added as regressors in the second stage estimation 
for correcting the selectivity bias, are not observed in the data. They are estimated, which 
should be accounted for when computing the standard errors in the second stage. 
If the FIML method is used, the investment decision can be modeled as a 
simultaneous decision such that the decisions "invest or not" and "how much to invest" 
are made simultaneously. Under the assumption of a normally, identically, and 
independently distributed error term (Normal i.i.d.), the FIML provides estimators that 
are efficient among ali estimators (Amemiya 1985). The FIML method will be used in 
the study. 
We assume the errors { c 1 , e2 , c3, c4 } are 	drawings from a multi-variate 
Normal distribution with zero mean and a symmetric (4x4) covariance matrix whose 
lower triangle is given by4 
where the matrices 	(2x2) and Z 2 (2x2) correspond 
to the partitions I and X 
1n other words, we assume the demands for i1 , i2, L, and x are 	drawings from a 
multi-variate normal distribution with means 28u, "2, ", and (2,i1 ,i2,L)ex , and 
with a covariance matrix E. 
Denote a density function by fl(.) and the corresponding cumulative density 
function by FY.). Then the joint densities for the partitions I* =(i1* ,i2* ) and X can be 
decomposed into three equivalent products of conditional and marginal densities 
4 The normality assumption will be tested below by a general test for misspecification. 
5 Rigorously, ali densities are conditioned on a set of variables, but the terms marginal 
or conditional density are used if the conditioned set excludes or includes endogenous 
variables. 
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f d(XJ*12,0) = f d (x12,e) f d (I * 
= f d (xlz,0) f d (i2* 	f d(j; i2*2e) 
= f d (x12,0) f d(j lx,z,e) f d (i; I i ,x,2,0) 
	(5.3) 
where 8 = a set of parameters 
The vectors 2 and X are observed for every observation in the sample, but i; and i; 
are observed only when they are greater than zero. When constructing the likelihood 
function, the unobserved latent form variables, i; and i; , are replaced by their observed 
counterparts i1 for ali i; >0 and i2 for ali i; > 0 . 
As explained in the preceding chapters, the data are endogenously partitioned into 
four investment regimes, which are: 
i1>0 and i2>0 
i1 0 and i2>0 
i1>0 and i2=0 
i ] =0 and 12=0 
Then, incorporate the investment regimes and the cumulative distributions which 
measure the probabilities for negative latent form investments, i.e. for observed zero 
investments, into (5.3) and get the density 6: 
f d(x,11z,e) = fd(x12,e) 
fd(Jlx,2,(3)[ii>o][12>0 ] 
d(j2 ixze) F d(j1.<01i2,x,2,e)}[i,=0]ti2>oi 
{f d(ii 1X,Z,O) F d(12*<01i1 ,X,2,6)}[il>°" 	 (5.4) 
F d(i; <0,i2* <0 i(,20)
[ii-o][i2=o] 
1 if the statement is true 
where = 
0 otherwise 
6  This is a special case of the models in Maddala (1983). 
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Then, substituting the normal density and cumulative density functions into (5.4) and 
talcing logarithms result in the loglikelihood function for an individual observation. The 
function is: 
Q = t) i + [i1>01U2>01 + [ii .0]U2>0] + [i1 >0][/2 =0] + [ii =0][i2=0] Q5 	(5.5) 
where Pi  is the logarithm of the normal joint density of X conditional on 27 : 
1 	1 / 
= --1n1 21 -  
   
where E(XIZ) = 
E(L121 
E(xl2) 
201 
2,E(i1 l2),E(i212),E(L12))0_,_ 
 
  
E(ii12) = (1)(2eij1920u + crich(20iil cii) for j = 1,2 
(1)0 = standard normal cumulative density function (cdj) 
= standard normal density function 
And 122 denotes the logarithm of the normal joint density of I conditional on X and 2: 
122 	
1 - — lnIE1 - 12Z 2 E 121 
2 
- 	- mly[z - 2 /12E 	- m1) 2 
where m1 = [20„ 26i2]/ + B122 -2-1 ( /1" - E(XIZ)) 
The term /23 is the logarithm of the normal density of i2 conditional on X and 2 plus the 
logarithm of the normal cumulative density function of i1 conditional on i2, X and 2 
evaluated at ii=0 and 12>0: 
Conditional densities have been computed following Maddala (1983), Amemiya 
(1985), and Hamilton (1994). The constants not affecting the maximization have been 
dropped. 
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Q3  
2 	
[023 0241 2-1 [023 024]') 
1 	\2, 	2 	r 	1, -1 r _ 	i -(-2 - M21) (G2 -1023 024_1 -`'2 1023 024f)-1  2 
+ 1n0:1)(- m12 G m1/2 
where m21 = 28 	+ [4:3 23 	24 ]E 21(X - E(XIZ)) 
Zei2 
n112 	+ [012 013 014]( -1)  
X - E(XIZ) 
012 
2 	2 	r )-1 0.12 = 01 	- L012 013 0141( 	-1 013 
014 _ 
2 
G2 	a23 	02 
2 
032 	a3 	03 
2 
043 	04 
The term Q4 is similar to Q3,  but variables and parameters are switched. Thus, Q4 refers to 
the normal density of i conditional on i2 and 2 plus the normal cumulative density 
function of i2 conditional on 2 evaluated at the regime, in which i >O and i2=0: 
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Q4 	1n01( 2 - [a a 	[a a L 	13 	14 j 	2 L 13 	14j 2 
1 	\2 2 r 	r 
2
( -1 	m11) (°1 -1013 014.1"-'2 1_013 0141') 
+ ln (1)( - "1220m-212 
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For obtaining the sample loglikelihood function, Equation (5.5) is summed over the 
observations. The loglikelihood function is maximized using GAUSS software with the 
Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML) routine. Now, the statistical model is set, and 
the next chapter explains the data used for estimating the model. 
Chapter 6 
DATA 
This chapter discusses data sources and provides graphs and summary statistics for the 
data. The optimal decision rules were defined in Chapter 4 as functions of input prices, 
output level, and the capital stock, including labor. Ali price indices except land are 
obtained from the index series of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AERI) 
at Helsinki, or from the index series of the Statistical Office of Finland. Each series has 
one observation a year and they are chain-linked Laspeyres indices, so current prices are 
used as a base in estimating the rate of growth to the following year. 
The farm level data on investments, capital accumulation, output levels, and 
variable input use are from Finnish bookkeeping hog farms over the period 1976-1993. 
The boolckeeping program is managed by AERI and surveyed by the county extension 
offices. The data are summarized by annual income accounts and by balance sheets at 
the beginning and at the end of each year. 
The panel data span 18 years, but the panel is not balanced. The duration of each 
farm' s participation in the program over the study period varies as shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Frequency of the Farms' Duration in the Samplel. 
1  The duration of one Year has been eliminated and the duration is censored from the 
right by the number of sampling years. 
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The total number of farms in the data is 316, but only 23 farms participated in the 
program over the entire study period. The 41 farms that participated only one year were 
dropped from the sample, because we could not construct lagged variables for those 
observations. Hence, we were left with 275 farms. The average number of observations 
per year is 137, varying between 83 (in 1976) and 169 (in 1988). The total number of 
observations is 2,470, but 1,928 observations are used in estimating the decision rules.2 
Not ali the quantity and price indices needed for estimating the economic model 
are observed directry. But the unobserved indices are computed and aggregated from 
more micro observed quantities, expenditures, revenues, and price indices. The data and 
the computation of the variables in the economic model are described in detail below. 
6.1 Price Indices 
6.1.1 Real Estate 
Real estate is aggregated from three component goods: land, buildings, and drainage. 
Because there are no data on quantities of the component goods, except for land, a 
Divisia price index for real estate was computed using the expenditure shares and prices 
of the component goods. In addition, the price for land is not observed and must also be 
estimated. 
Price of Land 
Average annual rental prices and discount rates are used to value land, because land 
trading transactions data are insufficient to determine reliable purchase prices of land. 
The data have 1,326 land leasing cases, varying from 42 to 93 per year, but there are 
only 135 land purchasing cases. In every leasing case the sample farm was a tenant, not 
a lessor. The average leased area per tenant was 12.0 hectares. Across ali the sample 
farms, the average leased area was 6.42 hectares and 19.2 % of the arable land area. 
No information about the characteristics of leasing contracts is observed, but most 
leasing cases are expected to be cash leases with predetermined lease payments. In 1991, 
for example, only five percent of land leased in Finland were share leases or leases in 
which payments were made in kind (Ylätalo and Pyykkönen 1992). 
The average nominal rental price of land over all farms and the entire sample was 
831 FIM per hectare. The price increased from 400 to 1,400 FIM per hectare between 
1976 and 1990, and thereafter, it had a downward Sloping trend. In 1993 the average 
rental price was 1,130 FIM per hectare. The main trends in the purchase prices have 
been similar to those of the rental prices, but the purchase prices have been more volatile 
2 Some observations were dropped from the sample. For example, we could not compute 
lagged values for all of the observations in the original data set, because the panel data 
were not balanced. 
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ihan the rental prices, partly because the data have substantially more leasing than 
trading transactions (Figure 6.2) 3. 
The rental price over purchase price ratio is, on average, 0.049, suggesting an 
average 4.9 % discount factor if zero capital gains are expected. The ratio is consistent 
with the average real market interest rate (5.0 %), which will be characterized in section 
6.6 below. Therefore, the annual average price of land (Q1 ,) is computed simply as 
Qit = (Total Rent Payments FIM),/0.049*(Total Hectares Leased)t. 
Note that the same price is used for ali land. Thus, the price is exogenous for each farm 
and it measures average market prices of land. 
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Figure 6.2. Rental and Purchase Price Indices for Land (Base Year =1976). 
The Divisia Price Index for Real Estate 
The price of land and the building price index are aggregated by the Divisia technique to 
obtain a price index for real estate. The building price index is computed by the 
Statistical Office and it is used for valuing both buildings and drainage systems. The 
Törnqvist approximation of the Divisia price index for real estate (Q) is computed as 4: 
3 The land trading transactions are discussed in the section on investments and capital 
accumulation. 
For a detailed derivation of the index see e.g. Chambers (1988 pp. 232-239). 
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log(Q/Qt_ i ) = 
12 
(Sji + S 1)(1ogqi1 - logqjfri ) 
where Q, = Divisia price index at time t 
Sir = expenditure share of good j at time t 
= price of good j at time t 
=
11 for land 
1 2 for buildings and drainage 
(6.1) 
The expenditures are computed as a sum of interest and depreciation. The average share 
of land expenditure in total real estate expenditure was 61.0 %. 
6.1.2 Other Price Indices and Normalization 
The price indices for machinery, feed, fertilizers, fuels, and electricity come from the 
index series of AERI. The price index for labor is computed by the Statistical Office. It 
follows the annual average wages paid to agricultural workers. 
The feed, fertilizer, fuels, and electricity indices are aggregated to a Divisia price 
index for an aggregate variable input by using similar technique as above in the case of 
the price index for real estate (Equation 6.1). The variable input is used as a num&aire 
and ali prices are normalized by this index. The normalized price indices are presented 
in Fig-ure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. Normalized Price Indices for Real Estate, Machinery, and Labor (Base 
Year=1976). 
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6.2 Investments and Capital Accumulation 
6.2.1 Real Estate 
The accumulation of real estate was computed by farm in three steps: 
The accumulation of the nominal values of the component goods (i.e. land, 
drainage, and buildings) were computed through their initial book values, 
investment expenditures, and depreciation. More specifically, the first 
observed balance sheet value of good j, Kin„ for each farm was taken as a 
base value for constructing the nominal series of the capital stock in the 
good j and, then, the value at the beginning of the following period, 
was computed through the transition equation: 
Kj,nt+1 lj,nt + ( 1 91C.;„ for j = 1,2,3 	 (6.2) 
where /".4nt stands for the nominal gross investment expenditure and Si is the 
depreciation rate. The resulting value of the good, 	, was then used as 
the initial value for the next period. 
The resulting values of the component goods were aggregated into a 
nominal value for real estate. Similarly, the investment expenditures of the 
component goods were aggregated into the expenditure on real estate 
investments. 
The quantity indices of real estate and investments in real estate were 
obtained by dividing the nominal real estate values and the investment 
expenditures by the price index for real estate. 
Land 
Land and its accumulation are measured in terms of the capital stock in owned land. 
Leased land is excluded from the capital stock, because it is interpreted as a means of 
postponing investments in land, rather than as a long-term commitment that may be 
irreversible. 
At the beginning of 1976 the average farm size in the sample was 29.8 hectares of 
arable land. On average, farms owned 23.9 and leased 5.92 hectares (Figure 6.4). The 
average areas purchased and sold over the study period were 6.22 and 0.260 hectares per 
farm, and so the average farm size increased by 5.96 hectares. Farms entering the 
bookkeeping program during the study period accounted for 1.68 hectares of the increase 
in the average farm size because entrants had more land than the exiting farms. At the 
end of 1993, the average farm size in the sample was 31.6 hectares of land owned and 
5.65 hectares of land leased. The average land area owned in 1993 was 1.32 times the 
area owned in 1976. 
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Figure 6.4. Land Accumulation on the Sample Farms. 
The sample includes 135 land investment cases, which corresponds to about one 
investment per farm over the 18 years. The average investment size was 6.47 hectares. 
Land sales were less common than land purchases. Indeed, the sample has only 16 land 
sales cases. The average land area sold was 1.84 hectares, and only three sales exceeded 
two hectares in area. Areas of less than two hectares could have been traded without a 
permit for the purchase, and it is likely that they may have been bought for other than 
agricultural purposes, such as housing and recreation. 
The average nominal price of land was 18,320 FIM per hectare for purchases and 
34,050 FIM for sales. Hence, the price of land per hectare for sales was 1.9 times the 
price for purchases. The unplausible discrepancy between purchase and sales prices also 
supports the view that, in most cases, the land sold by farmers was bought for non-
agricultural use. The observed prices suggest that we should use higher price for land 
sales than land purchases, but this would imply that farmers could profit infinitely by 
purchasing and selling land. Nevertheless, we rule out the possibility that farmers could 
profit infinitely by buying at the low price and selling land at the high Price, and drop 
the rare land sales cases from the data. 
Production Buildings 
Accumulation of building capital was computed by transition Equation (6.2) as 
explained above. It is likely, however, that farmers have used depreciation primarily for 
adjusting and reducing their tax burden, and that observed depreciation is linked more to 
tax rates than to economic depreciation. Therefore, the observed depreciation is replaced 
by a constant geometric depreciation rate used in the national accounts of economic 
statistics. A building is assumed to have 10 percent of its initial value left after being 
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used for 35 years, which implies a depreciation of 6.4 % a year; 2.5 percentage points 
lower than the average observed rate of 8.9 %. 
At the beginning of 1976 the average value of production buildings was 50,600 
FIM a farm, which inflated by the building cost index to the year 1993 equals 126,600 
The average real gross investment expenditure was 19,600 FIM a year (in 1993 
FIM). At the end of 1993 the average value of buildings was therefore 221,000 FIM, 
which is 1.75 times the inflated value for 1976. 
The sample has 758 positive and 17 negative gross investments in buildings. The 
remaining 1,695 cases were zeros. Hence, an average sample farm invested in buildings 
5.52 times over the 18-year period. The average compounded investment expenditure, 
within the positive gross investments, was 64,600 FIM. 
Drainage Systems 
The value of drainage systems and their accumulation is computed in a similar way as 
the accumulation of buildings, resulting in a depreciation rate of 6.4 % per year. The 
observed average depreciation rate was 13 %. 
At the beginning of 1976 the average value of drainage was 7,680 FIM a farm, 
which equals 19,200 FIM when inflated to the year 1993 by the buildings price index. 
The average real gross investment expenditure was 3,670 FIM a year (in 1993 FIM). At 
the end of 1993 the average value of drainage was 38,600 FIM, which is 2.01 times the 
real value in 1976. 
The sample has 378 positive and two negative gross investment cases, leaving 
2,090 zero cases. An average sample farm invested in drainage 2.75 times over the 18-
year study period. The average compounded investment expenditure, within the positive 
gross investment cases, was 24,300 FIM. 
Real Estate 
The land, building, and drainage were aggregated into a single capital good, real estate. 
The nominal values of this aggregate series was inflated by the price index of real 
estate. At the beginning of 1976 the average value of real estate was 819,000 FIM (in 
1993 KM). The average compounded gross investment expenditure was 33,600 FIM a 
year. At the end of 1993 the average value of the estate was 1,138,000 FIM, i.e. 1.39 
times its inflated value in 1976. The annual averages of the inflated real estate values 
and investment expenditures are presented in Figure 6.5. 
The sample has 1,066 positive and 17 negative cases of real estate investments 
(Table 6.1). The remaining 1,387 cases are zeros. An average sample farm invested in 
real estate 7.76 times during the 18-year period. The average compounded investment 
expenditure, within the positive gross investment cases, was 78,200 FIM. Nevertheless, 
the negative gross investments were dropped from the data, because the number was too 
small for a complete analysis, as suggested also by irreversibility of agricultural 
investments. 
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Figure 6.5. Accumulation of Real Estate Capital and Investment on Real Estate5. 
Table 6.1. Negative, Zero, and Positive Gross Investments.  
Number Number Average 
Capital of negative Average Number of of investment 
good cases sales per casea zeros positive 
cases 
per casea 
Land 16 1.84 ha 2319 135 6.47 ha 
Buildings 17 18,200 FIM 1,695 758 64,380 FIM 
Drainage 2 7,857 FIM 2,090 378 24,330 FIM 
Real estate 17 17,150 FIM 1,387 1,066 78,210 FIM 
Machinery 29 37,620 FIM 483 1,958 87,370 FIM 
' Inflated to the year 1993. 
6.2.2 Machinery 
Machinery capital and its accumulation are computed in a similar way as for buildings 
and drainage, except that a machine is assumed to have a shorter average economic life 
than a building. A machine is assumed to have 10 % of its initial value left after 15 years 
of use, which results in a 14 % depreciation a year. The observed average depreciation 
rate was 22 %. 
5 The series are inflated to the year 1993. 
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At the beginning of 1976 the average value of machinery was 42,900 FIM a farm, 
which equals 132,000 MM if inflated by the machinery cost index to the year 1993. The 
average real gross investment a year was 69,400 FIM (in 1993 FIM). At the end of 1993 
the average value of machinery was 306,000 FIM, which is 2,32 times the compounded 
value in 1976 (Figure 6.6). 
The sample has 1958 cases of positive and 29 cases of negative gross investments 
in machinery (Table 6.1). The remaining 483 cases are zeros. Hence, an average sample 
farm invested in machinery in four out of five years. The average real investment 
expenditure, within the positive gross investment cases, was 87,400 FIM. As before, the 
observations with negative gross investments were dropped from the data, because the 
number of them was too small for a complete statistical analysis. 
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Figure 6.6. Accumulation of Machinery Capital and Investment in Machinery. 
6.3 Labor 
The data on labor input are observed only as a service flow in terms of the hours of 
labor services. The data exclude stock measures, like the number of workers and 
employees hired. Therefore, labor and its changes are measured by annual labor services 
and changes in these each year. 
The sample farms' average family labor input was 3,570 hours a year. They hired 
labor, on the average, 553 hours a year, which is 13.4 % of the total labor input. The 
average labor input had a downward sloping trend over the study period (Figure 6.7). 
The average decrease was 30 hours a year. The family labor input did not change much, 
but the hired labor input decreased by 38.3 % over the 18 years. 
The measured changes in the labor input were not trapped at zero, because the 
labor input was measured as a service flow rather than a stock. The annual change in the 
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labor input was negative in 1,105 cases and positive in 1,365 cases. Among the negative 
cases, the average reduction of the labor input was 482 hours. Among the positive cases, 
on the other hand, the average increase was 344 hours. 
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Figure 6.7. Labor Services on the Sample Farms. 
6.4 The Num6raire Input 
As explained above, the numeraire input is an aggregate of the four variable inputs, 
fertilizers, feed, fuels, and electricity. Again, the Divisia technique, similar to Equation 
(6.1), has been used for the aggregation. The resulting quantity index for the numeraire 
input is presented in Figure 6.8. 
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Figure 6.8. Index for Variable Inputs, Used as the Num6raire. 
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6.5 Output 
The sample consists of specialized hog farms. The average shares of livestock and crop 
output in total agricultural revenue were 83 % and 13 %, which together accounted for 
97 % of the total agricultural revenue (Table 6.2). Most livestock revenues were 
received from hog production. More specifically, the revenue share of pork, including 
piglets, was 95 % of livestock and 79 % of the total agricultural revenue. The crop 
revenue consisted mostly of (small) grains (67 %), and about half of the grain revenue 
came from barley. 
Table 6.2. Average Revenue Shares in the Sample Farms. 
Crops 
% of crop 
revenue 
% of total 
agricultural 
revenue' 
Livestock 
% of 
livestock 
revenue 
% of total 
agricultural 
revenue' 
Barley 33.5 4.1 
Rye 6.2 0.8 Pork 94.7 78.8 
Wheat 9.9 1.5 Beef 1.4 1.3 
Other grains 17.4 2.3 Milk 1.5 1.3 
Oilseeds 6.0 0.8 Chickens 0.6 0.5 
Sugarbeets 6.3 0.8 
Crops total 100 13.3 Livestock total 100 83.4 
Excluding income transfers. 
The output data are measured and summarized by two output indices, one for 
livestock output and the other for crop output. The livestock output was computed for 
each individual sample farm in terms of pork equivalents, because pork accounted for 
the largest share of the livestock revenues. The total livestock revenue was divided by 
the price of pork, resulting in an index for the output quantity (pork equivalent). 
Similarly, the quantity of crop output was measured by barley equivalents. The total crop 
revenue was divided by the price of barley. Both livestock and crop outputs have an 
upward sloping trend (Figure 6.9). The crop output, however, has been more volatile 
than the livestock output, because of varying weather conditions. 
The average livestock output is 42,000 pork equivalents, which roughly 
corresponds to a production unit with a 200 pig fattening capacity. The largest 
production unit in the sample is estimated to have a 1,300 pig fattening capacity.6 
The output data were also summarized by a single output index, which was 
computed in terms of pork equivalents. The average value of the aggregate output is 
49,000 pork equivalents. 
6 The fattening capacity is estimated from the livestock ouput index by assuming 74 
kilograms carcass weight and four months period for fattening. 
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Figure 6.9. Crop and Livestock Output Indices. 
6.6 Credit Regimes and Discount Rate 
The economic model given in Chapter 3 assumes perfect capital markets, but for 
studying the effects of the credit rationing we exogenously partition the sample into four 
regimes, as explained above. First, we partition the sample into two periods: (1) rationed 
years 1976-85 and (2) nonrationed years 1986-93. Then, we partition the sample into 
liabilities two groups: (a) nonrationed low-debt farms with 	 <0.9 and (b) rationed 
gross returns 
high-debt farms with 	 liabilities > 0.9. It is likely that over the years 1986-93 the 
gross returns 
farms with low liabilities to gross returns ratios have been free from liquidity 
constraints. 
Table 6.3 shows that the average investment on real estate does not differ much 
between the credit regimes. Machinery investment, on the other hand, differs between 
the regimes of low and high liabilities. The group averages suggest that, over the period 
of non regulated credit market, high liabilities may have been restricting machinery 
investments. Table 6.3 also reveals that the capital stocks are roughly constant but 
output levels differ across the low and high liability farms. In other words, farm capital 
has not been increasing along with production. 
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Table. 6.3. Farm Capital, Investments, and Output Stratified by Credit Regimes. 
Real Estate Machinery 
011tpUt b L/R Regime 
Investment Capital Investment Capital 
Rationed Market' 31.8 856 76.3 231 41.8 0.70 
Rationed by L/R 32.6 945 66.8 239 30.6 1.27 
Nonrationed by L/R 31.6 823 79.8 228 45.9 0.49 
Nonrationed Market d 34.1 1,040 66.3 331 48.0 0.81 
Rationed by L/R 35.3 1,120 54.4 303 38.0 1.41 
Nonrationed by L/R 33.5 1,000 72.3 345 52.9 0.51 
Full study period 33.1 962 70.6 288 45.3 0.76 
Rationed by L/R 34.3 1,060 59.1 279 35.2 1.35 
Nonrationed by L/R 32.6 920 75.7 292 49.8 0.50 
In FIIVI 1000 inflated to 1993. 
b In 1000 pork equivalents. 
L/R= fands total liabilities divided by gross retums. The fann is rationed by liabilities, if L/R>0.9. 
Otherwise nonrationed by liabilities. 
d Over the years 1976-84 the credit market was rationed and thereafter nonrationed. 
For discounting costs, we have used the real discount rate (r), which was computed 
from the nominal market interest rate (nr) and rate of inflation (infl) as (see Robison and 
Barry 1996, p.206): 
(1 + nr) (1 + r)(i + infl) 
=> r - nr -  infi  
1 + infi 
where the nominal rate is the annual average loan rate between 1976-86 and, thereafter, 
a 12 months HELsinIci Inter Bank Offered Rate (12 months HELIBOR) minus 0.25. The 
HELIBOR series was adjusted to the average loan rate series by subtracting 0.25, which 
is the average difference between the two series over the period 1986-93. It would have 
been desirable to set the nominal rate to, say, a 12 months HELIBOR over the whole 
study period. But as explained in the preceding chapters, the credit market was rationed 
prior to 1986 and the 12 months HELIBOR was not recorded in the statistics until 
1987. 7 
Inflation exceeded the nominal discount rate slightly in 1980 and 1981. 
Nevertheless, an inplausible negative real rate was ruled out by setting it to zero. The 
average real discount rate is about 5 %. The rate has an upward sloping trend until 1991 
and a downward sloping trend thereafter (see Figure 6.10). 
7 The market bond rates with 3 or 5 year maturities would have been preferred to the 12 
months rate, but the 12 months rate was available earlier than the rates with longer 
maturity periods. The 12 months rate was also used by Pajuoja (1995). 
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Figure 6.10. The Real Discount Rate 
6.7 Summary of the Farm Data 
The observations with real estate capital less than 75,000, machinery capital less than 
10,000, aggregate output less than 15,000, or labor less than 900 were dropped from the 
data, because it is likely that these extreme values have resulted from measurement 
errors. Summary Statistics for the resulting data set are presented in Table 6.4. 
The data were rescaled to improve the estimation procedure so that ali variables 
had approximately the same scale and weight in the optimization procedure. After 
scaling, the data are also consistent with the second order expansion of the optimal value 
function so that the variables get values around their expansion points. This also 
improves the flexibility of the optimal value function. 
The price indices were rescaled to have value one in the year 1985. The output 
quantities and num6raire input were divided by their sample means. Real estate and 
machinery investments were divided by 75,000 FIM. For maintaining equal units of 
measurement, the same rescaling factor was used for rescaling the capital stocks, too. 
The labor changes were rescaled by the average reduction of labor services, conditional 
on negative change in the labor use. The labor services were rescaled by the same factor. 
Table 6.4. Summary of the Farm Data.' 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Real estate capital 785,000 383,000 94,500 2,640,000 
Investment on real estate 25,800 68,200 0 1,160,000 
Machinery capital 219,000 136,000 10,100 741,000 
Investment on machinery 51,500 59,700 0 380,000 
Labor services 4,200 1,480 972 13,900 
Change in labor services -24.0 677 -3,030 4,080 
Crop output 68,800 78,400 0 652,000 
Livestock output 42,000 29,300 10,300 277,000 
Variable input 281,000 197,000 36,100 1,460,000 
In 1993 prices. 
Chapter 7 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The structural form parameters that appear in the optimal value function were estimated 
from the four decision rules using the FIML-technique, as outlined in Chapter 5. In 
particular, the loglikelihood function of the Tobit switching model was used. The model 
was estimated using the GAUSS Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML) routine. The 
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm (DFP), which approximates the Hessian, was used 
to speed up initial iterations. Then, the Newton-Raphson algoritlun, which computes the 
Hessian at every iteration, was used for obtaining the final model. 
The feasible parameter space was reduced in several ways during the iterations 
because of the computationally intensive estimation procedure. First, the covariance 
matrix was constrained to be positive definite. But, as expected, this restriction was not 
binding in the converged models. Second, the optimal value function was restricted to be 
nondecreasing and concave in input prices. The inequality constraints imposing that the 
value function be nondecreasing in prices were not active in the final estimated model, 
but at least one out of the three concavity constraints were active in each of the 
estimated models.' 
The original model specification had two output indices but it was so 
computationally intensive, and its log likelihood function was so flat around the 
maximum, that the model failed to converge and estimates could not be obtained. 
Instead we estimated an altemative model with only one aggregate output and informally 
checked this specification against the (unconverged) two output altemative. By 
comparing the log likelihood values of these two specifications it tumed out that the fit 
of the model could not be significantly improved by splitting the aggregate output into 
crop and livestock components.2 
Next, we tested for asymmetry in the adjustment rate matrix M. Depending on the 
model specified, the asymmetric model either did not improve the fit from that of the 
symmetric model, or the asymmetric model did not converge. Therefore, the symmetry 
of M could not be formally rejected. Hereafter, we continue to report and test the model 
These concavity conditions equal the regularity conditions (D'.i) given in Chapter 4. 
2  The likelihood ratio statistic for the test was 10.18, which is Chi-Squared distributed 
with nine degrees of freedom (X92)' suggesting that the "one output model" should not 
be rejected in favor of "the two output model", because the test statistic was less than the 
critical value 16.92. However, this result has to be interpreted cautiously because the 
"two output model" did not converge. 
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with one aggregate output, and which maintains symmetry of the parameter matrices A, 
D, and M. We now move on to the estimation results in more detail by starting with the 
model estimated using the full sample. Then we test for misspecification of the model 
and report the results for several altemative model specifications. The chapter concludes 
with elasticity estimates and estimates for steady state capital stock and labor. 
7.1 The Full Sample Model 
The parameter estimates for the full sample model are reported in Table 7.1. Although 
the reported full sample model converged, its loglikelihood function was so flat around 
the maximum that the Hessian was not invertible. There are no obvious ways to solve 
this problem. One way, however, is to isolate the parameters that are causing the trouble 
and compute the Hessian with these parameters fixed. In our case, the estimated 
covariance between the demand for labor and demand for the num6raire tumed out to be 
negligible and insignificant (significance is reported later). This covariance was set to 
zero in order to obtain an invertible Hessian and standard errors for the other parameters. 
With this restriction, most of the estimates remained unchanged when compared to the 
estimates in the unrestricted model. Most of the parameter estimates differ significantly 
from zero at the 5 	two tailed significance level (Table 7.1)3. We discuss the 
definitions of these parameter estimates below. 
3  The 5 % two tailed significance level is used hereafter for testing null hypotheses, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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Table 7.1. Estimation Results for the Full Sample Model.  a 
Parameter Estbnate Standard 
error 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
error 
kob 
a11 
a13 
a2 
a32 
a33 
A11 
A21 
A22 
A31 
A32 
A33 
EI 
E2 
E3 
1.0401 
-0.0314 
-0.7055 
0.0505 
1.0746 
-0.2172 
-0.8714 
-1.0684 
-0.0012 
0.0099 
0.0837 
0.0003 
-0.0049 
-0.0025 
-0.0215 
-0.3800 
0.0351 
0.9122 
0.0281 
0.0127 
0.0815 
0.0187 
0.1690 
4.2414 
0.0000 
3.2047 
0.0007 
0.0019 
0.0131 
0.0006 
0.0033 
0.0013 
0.0089 
0.0707 
0.0133 
0.0504 
H2 
H3  
D11 
D21 
D22 
D31 
D32 
D33 
Mli 
M21  
M22 
M31 
M32 
M33 
y for .i,>0 
2 
2 
2 
_ o q3 
bad year 
0.2012 
0.2756 
-0.6735 
-0.2503 
0.2100 
-1.9823 
-0.3563 
0.6326 
-1.3302 
0.1015 
-0.0024 
0.0214 
0.0071 
-0.0104 
0.1532 
0.2076 
- 0.0257 
- 0.1664 
- 0.0187 
0.0037 
0.1636 
0.2209 
0.1305 
5.2113 
2.2793 
0.0000 
2.6454 
2.5328 
1.8543 
0.0067 
0.0036 
0.0000 
0.0048 
0.0030 
0.0060 
0.0055 
0.0081 
0.0104 
0.0071 
0.0214 
The number of observations is 1928, and the average value of the loglikelihood function is 1.224. 
b 
 An intercept in the demand equation for the num8raire input. It is a fiinction of structural form 
parameters. 
Bad year: a dummy variable for the years of crop damages in the demand equation for the numCraire. 
Recall from Equation (4.7) that the structural form parameters presented in Table 
7.1. appear in the optimal value function as: 
J(K,Y,Q) = ao + alk + a2/1nY + a;InQ 
+ -1 K /AK + K iElnY + -1 InY IBlnY 
2 	 2 
+ lnY IH1nQ + -1 lnQ IDInQ + 
2 
The last 5 parameters in Table 7.1 are dummy variables. Recall from Equation (4.11a) 
that 
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= Diag q1-1}M(ra3 + rH ilnY + rDlnQ) 
+ (rU - (U + y)M)I( 
- —1[Cr 2 	2 	2 ilOK 
2 	qi 0q2 
a 
q3 
where the parameter y has been used to model an adjustment rate for labor that is 
asymmetric, depending on whether the use of labor increases or not. Because the sample 
average for the labor change is negative, the base model has been estimated for negative 
changes and the dummy variable has been used to identify positive changes. The result 
suggests asymmetric labor adjustment and this result is discussed in more detail in 
subsequent sections. 
The parameters cr2q, 	a2q3  are used for measuring the effects of a conjectured 
single persistent shift in uncertainty in 1991. They are parameters for dummy variables 
which have a value one over the years 1991-93 and zero otherwise. The parameter 
estimates are significant suggesting that increased volatility reduced, in particular, 
machinery investments. A dummy variable for exceptionally unfavorable harvest years 
was added to the demand equation of the num6raire input. This dummy variable has 
value one in the years of severe crop damages and zero otherwise. The parameter 
estimate for this dummy variable is denoted in Table 7.1 by "bad year", and it suggests 
that the demand for the num6raire decreases with crop damage. We shall examine the 
parameter estimates, as well as the price effects, output effects and adjustment rates, in 
more detail in subsequent sections. 
The R-squared of the regression is 0.465 in the labor change equation, and 0.823 
in the num6raire equation. In other words, the model explains 46.5 of the variation in 
the changes in labor services and 82.3 % of the variation in the demand for the 
numeraire input. We now move on to the fit of the investment demands in more detail so 
that goodn.ess of fit is measured by how well the model predicts the correct investment 
regimes within the sample. 
If we take investment on real estate and measure it as a binary choice such that the 
choice is one for positive investment and zero for zero investment, the model predicts 
the indicator correctly in 1,059 out of 1,928 cases, and the probability of a correct 
prediction is 54.9 % (Table 7.2). The predictions haye been computed so that the model 
predicts one if the estimated conditional probability for value one exceeds 0.5. 
Otherwise it predicts zero. Hence, the model predicts only 4.9 percentage points better 
than tossing a fair coin. Within the sample, the model over-predicts zero investment, 
predicting 1,581 zeros against an actual number of 1,062. 
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Table 7.2. Predicted and Observed Binary Investment Choices.  
Predicted 
Real estate investment 	 Machinery investment 
1 	 0 	 1 
Observed 	0 	 887 	 175 	 1 	346 
1 694 172 4 1,577 
The values 0 and 1 denote zero and positive investments. 
The binary choice for machinery investment is predicted better than that for real 
estate investment. The model predicts the indicator correctly in 1,578 out of 1,928 cases 
in the sample, and the probability of a correct prediction is 81.8 %. Positive machinery 
investments are over-predicted in the sample. The model predicts 1,923 ones against 
1,581 actually in the sample. 
If we look at both binary choices together, the model predicts both of them 
correctly in 842 cases, and the probability of a correct prediction is 43.7 % (Table 7.3). 
The product of the two probabilities for individual choices (54.9 and 81.8 %) gives 44.9 
% probability for predicting both of the variables correctly, whereas tossing a fair coin 
twice would give a correct prediction 25 of the time. The model predicts best in the 
cases in which real estate investment is zero and machinery investment is positive, 
because within the sample that regime is over-predicted. The percentage of correct 
predictions in that regime is 68.4 %. In the other regimes, the model's capability to 
predict the observed outcomes is low. However, the model will not predict any cases in 
which real estate investment is positive and machinery investment is zero, because firms 
investing in real estate usually invest in machinery, too. But the model does not predict 
well the sample observations in which both investments are positive, or in which both 
investments are zeros. The low within sample predicting power of the model may be 
caused by farm specific individual effects, which we have not been able to control for. 
Table 7.3. Observed Outcomes and Predictions in each Investment Category. a 
Investment 
group 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
predictions 
Number of 
correct 
predictions 
Percentage of the 
observations 
predicted correctly 
i1 >0andi2 >0 b 752 347 155 17.7 
i,>Oandi,=0 114 0 0 0 
i,=Oandi2 > 0 829 1576 686 68.4 
i1 =0 andi2 =0 233 5 1 0.305 
The full sample 1928 1928 842 43.7 
a For a correct prediction we require that both investment choices (zero, one) are predicted correctly. 
b i1 and i, refer to the real estate and machinery investments. 
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7.2 Testing for Misspecification 
7.2.1 Time Series Properties of the Price and Output Series 
As explained in Chapter 4, the structural form parameters in the optimal decision rules 
are pinned down by the maintained hypothesis that output and prices follow a geometric 
Brownian motion without drift. Thus, it is important to test this hypothesis empirically 
to determine whether the assumption of geometric Brownian motion is appropriate in 
this application. 
This section tests that the observed price and output series are geometric Brownian 
motion. A representative firm approach will be used, because it would be an overly 
onerous task to test each firms' series separately. Each output observation is constructed 
as an annual output average across the firms. The price data are normalized prices, as 
they appear in the decision rules. The series span 18 years. So we have 16 observations 
for estimating an AR(2) process. The tests are constructed for each univariate series 
separately. 
We first define a second order autoregressive model for the scalar zj as: 
Zjt = 	 111j2Zjr-2 	ejt 
where E(e i) = 0 
E(e j.t e j.S ) = 
for t=s 
0 otherwise 
which can be written in canonical form: 
zit = 	Pizit-i 
where p. = ji + 11I 
-1Ijj2 
Under the null hypothesis of geometric Brownian motion, 	j=0, and 1-iji j1-iJj j2=0, 
which also implies pi  =1. These conditions are stronger than implied by unit roots. A 
unit root in a univariate series would allow for nonzero l , while unit roots in 
multivariate setting would imply even more general conditions. To see this, stack the 
output and price series together (over j's) such that they define a vector valued AR(p) 
process with parameters 	T / ...Tp, or the canonical form with parameters 
p=1111 +...+Tp and = -(Ts+,+...+Tp) for s=1,2,...,p-1. Then, in general, the unit roots 
and cointegrating vectors solve 
(7.1) 
(7.2) 
69 
IU 	 Wpi 	 pl =0, 
in which the matrix U denotes an identity matrix. In other words, this condition implies 
that even though the zi  's are nonstationary and integrated of order one, there is a long 
run relationship tying the individual series together, so that a nonzero linear combination 
of the zj  's is stationary (Hamilton 1994). But, the special condition of unit roots 
included in our null hypothesis (i.e. pj=1 for ali j) is equivalent to the p=U which 
implies that the determinant of (U- p) equals zero, but not vice versa. 
The single equation OLS estimates of (7.2) and their standard errors are presented 
in Table 7.4a. The term A zit_ i is included in the estimating equations for factoring out 
potential serial correlation in e»  as suggested by the AR(2) process in (7.1). Regardless 
of the values of gi and pi , the memory of the process, i.e. the null hypothesis j=0, can 
be tested by a standard t-test (Hamilton 1994). In every series, the null hypothesis 
is rejected at a 5 two tailed significance level, suggesting the series follow an AR(1) 
process. Therefore, we continue simply by setting 	= 0 for ali j. The parameter 
estimates with this restriction are presented in Table 
Under the null hypothesis of pi =1, the estimates of in are biased toward zero 
such that in 95 percent of the cases they are less than one (Hamilton 1994). In addition, 
neither ft nor 	exhibits a standard asymptotic distribution. Therefore, the Dickey- 
Fuller tests will be used for testing unit roots (Dickey and Fuller 1979). When choosing 
the test statistic we assume that the true process has a unit root without drift, that is, 
µj=0 and for ali j. The null hypothesis of a unit root (pi =1) cannot be formally rejected 
in any series (Table 7.5). The joint hypothesis of a unit root without drift (pi=1 and 
gi=0) again cannot be rejected in any series. 
Despite these test results it is possible that the machinery prices and output level 
are stationary, because the sample used for testing these series was very small and the 
tests have low power problems, particularly in small samples. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis may also signal that the tested series are not informative about whether or not 
there is a unit root (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992). Nevertheless, we conclude that there does 
not seem to be very strong evidence against the null hypothesis, and so it is realistic to 
estimate the optimal decision rules under the assumption that prices and output follow 
geometric Brownian motion without drift. This result is also supported by Thjissen 
(1996). 
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Table 7.4a. OLS Estimates for the Output and Price Series of the Form (7.2). 
Parameter 
Series (z)' Drift rate (j.ii) Lagged level (p) Lagged difference ()2 
Price of Real estate 0.0156 0.844 0.0228 
(0.0186) (0.148) (0.237) 
Price of machinery 0.0590 0.483 0.458 
(0.0248) (0.237) (0.261) 
Wages 0.0338 1.03 0.0435 
(0.0213) (0.113) (0.301) 
Output 0.0688 0.774 0.166 
(0.0243) (0.102) (0.233) 
'The series are in a logarithmic form. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
2  The critical t-test value at 5 % two tailed risk level for the null rØ is 2.16. 
Table 7.4b. OLS Estimates for the Output and Price Series of the Form (7.2) with 
Series (z)1 
Parameter 
Drift rate (µ) Lagged level (p) 	Lagged difference ( i) 
Price of Real estate 0.0155 0.849 
(0.0179) (0.135) 
Price of machinery 0.0418 0.682 
(0.682) (0.223) 
Wages 0.0342 1.04 
(0.0203) (0.0964) 
Output 0.0705 0.784 
(0.0237) (0.0990) 
1 See Table 7.4a. 
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Table 7.5. The Dickey-Fuller and F-Test Statistics. 
Dickey-Fuller test i 	 F-test 2 
for pi=1 	 for pi=0 and p 
Price of Real estate 	 -2.42 	 0.622 
Price of Machinery -5.09 1.02 
Wages 	 0.588 	 0.0727 
Output -3.46 2.38 
The test statistics have been computed as Tcp - 1) with T=16. The critical value at two tailed 5 % 
risk level with T=25 is -12.5. The critical values with less than 25 observations have not been tabled. 
The null is maintained, if the entry is greater than the critical value. 
'The unrestricted versions have been run with Azj  as the dependent variable. The critical value at 
two tailed 5 % risk level with T=25 is 5.18. The null is maintaimed, if the entry is less than the critical 
value. 
7.2.2 Covariance Restrictions among the Error Terms 
We have set the insignificant covariance between errors in the labor and num6raire input 
demand equations to zero in order to obtain the standard errors for the other parameter 
estimates. This restriction did not alter the other parameter estimates reported in Table 
7.1. With no other restrictions among the errors in the decision rules, the lower 
triangular portion of the estimated covariance matrix 
2.54 
0.167* 0.561 
2 
0.164* 0.0377 1.66 
_-0.0838* -0.0337* 0 0.0880 
which is, in terms of correlation coefficients, 
1 
0.140* 1 
0.0805* 0.0388 1 
_-0.177* -0.152* 0 1 
An asterisk in the entry denotes that the covariance differs from zero at the 5 % 
sigilificance level. The significance of the covariances is tested by a Wald test. The test 
Series 
4  The unrestricted covariance between the labor and num6raire demand equations was 
insignificant, having value 0.0007. 
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statistics for the null hypotheses that the covariance between es and , for s and 
s,j=1,2,3,4, equals zero is computed as (Hamilton 1994): 
sj  asymptotically N(0,1) 
'o. + 2 1,2 
where n is the number of observations in the sample 
The resulting test statistics for zero entries in 	are: 
6.71 	. 
3.88 1.90 . 
8.45 7.26 . 
If the entry exceeds 1.96, the corresponding covariance differs from zero at the 5 % 
significance level. The tests suggest that innovations in the real estate equation correlate 
positively with the innovations in the machinery investment and labor demand. The 
innovations in both investment equations are negatively correlated with the innovation 
in the demand for the numeraire input. Therefore, we can conclude that an equation by 
equation estimation procedure, or a system estimation with a diagonal covariance 
matrix, E , would have resulted in inefficient parameter estimates. 
7.2.3 Liquidity Constraints and the Partition into Credit Regimes 
To investigate whether liquidity constraints have been affecting the farmer's 
optimization behavior, we partition the sample exogenously into four regimes on the 
basis of two factors: (1) rationing in the credit market; and (2) firm liabilities relative to 
gross retums. It has to be noted, however, that we do not construct formal tests for the 
effects of the liquidity constraints in the original optimization problem. Rather, we check 
informally to see if our results are robust to partitioning the data by the factors that may 
have been driving up liquidity constraints (see e.g. Zeldes 1989). 
We split the data into two time periods, a period of rationed credit market (1976-
85) and a period of nonrationed credit market (1986-93). The observations over the 
period 1976-85 are more likely to be constrained by liquidity constraints than the 
observations after 1985. We further partitioned the sample over the years 1986-93 into 
a group of farms whose liabilities to gross retums ratio exceeds 0.9, and a group of 
farms whose liabilities to gross returns ratio is less than 0.9. We conjecture that, even 
though the credit market was deregulated, firms who had high liabilities to gross retums 
ratios may still have been liquidity constrained. The observations over the deregulated 
years 1986-93 which have low liabilities to gross retums ratios are, on the other hand, 
expected to be free from liquidity constraints. 
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The results suggest that a separate model should be run over the regulated (1976-
85) and deregulated periods (1986-93). The likelihood ratio statistic for the Ml sample 
model as a null hypothesis against the two split models was 107.4. The test statistic 
exceeds the Chi-Squared 5% critical value with 48 degrees of freedom (X8 = 64.89), 
and the full sample model is rejected in favor of the two separate models in the split 
data. But even though there is a statistically significant difference between the models, 
there does not seem to be economically significant differences between the parameter 
estimates. The parameter estimates in the full sample model and in the partitioned 
sample models are almost identical (compare Table 7.1 and Appendix 1). We conclude 
that the credit rationing has had economically significant effects neither on the parameter 
estimates reported in Table 7.1 nor on investments. This result is also supported by 
Pajuoja (1995), who concluded that credit rationing has not had significant effects on 
farmer access to capital in Finland. 
Next, we partitioned the deregulated period (1986-93) further into two subsamples 
representing the observations that meet different liabilities to gross retums ratios, as 
explained above. Although the regulated subsample model did not converge, the 
loglikelihood values reveal that the sample should be split and a separate model should 
be estimated for the different ratio categories. The likelihood ratio statistic for this test 
was 342, which clearly exceeds the critical value (X8 = 64.89) and the null hypothesis 
is rejected in favor of splitting the sample. In this case, the parameter estimates differ 
between the deregulated model (Table 7.6) and the full sample model reported above 
(Table 7.1). The subsample model, in which observations have high liabilities to gross 
retums ratio over the period 1986-93, is not reported because the model failed to 
converge. 
Hereafter, we will report the results for the full sample model and for the model in 
the deregulated subsample, in which farm investments have been liquidity constrained 
neither by the credit market nor by liabilities. These models are referred to as "the full 
sample model" and "the deregulated subsample model". 
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Table 7.6. Estimation results for the Deregulated Subsample Model.  
Parameter Estimate Standard 
error 
Parameter Estimate Standard error 
1.1251 0.0000 H, -0.0782 0.2503 
H2 1.8745 0.6933 
0.0350 0.0222 H3  -1.5560 0.2544 
a12 -0.0782 0.1122 
a13 0.0857 0.0362 D11 -4.4395 0.0000 
D21 2.4419 0.0000 
az 1.4560 0.3693 D22 -10.6005 0.0000 
D31  -3.7782 4.4982 
a31 -4.2655 5.4498 D32 7.0961 1.6383 
a32 -0.7860 1.7151 D33  -1.0956 0.0000 
a33 0.7892 2.8040 
M11 0.1179 0.0088 
Al , -0.0040 0.0016 M21 -0.0225 0.0082 
A21 -0.0023 0.0030 M22 0.0753 0.0244 
A22 0.0348 0.0195 M31 0.0176 0.0060 
A31 0.0009 0.0013 M32 0.0068 0.0062 
A32 -0.0115 0.0053 M33 0.1800 0.0093 
A33 -0.0029 0.0025 
E, 0.0267 0.0133 
y for L>0 
2 
0.2062 0.0081 
E2 -0.1764 0.0958 -GT/ 0.0101  0.0081 
E3  0.0776 0.0216 -02 q2 -0.1139 0.0169 
B 0.9841 0.0804 _0q3 0.0299 0.0085  
bad year -0.0462 0.0000 
a The number of observations is 743, and the average value of the loglikelihood funetion is 0.9666. 
An intercept in the demand equation for the numeraire input. It is a function of structural form 
parameters. 
7.2.4 Testing for Nonstandard Assumptions 
In this section we examine whether the error terms in the estimated Tobit model meet 
the assumptions required for consistency of the parameter estimates. By nonstandard 
assumptions we mean nonnormality, heteroscedasticity, and serial correlation. The Tobit 
model is inconsistent if the normality or homoscedasticity assumption of the error terms 
is violated, but it remains consistent if the errors are serially correlated (Amemiya 1985). 
Therefore, it is important to check whether the normality and homoscedasticity 
assumptions are met in the model. Even though the Tobit model remains consistent if 
the error terms are serially correlated, it is also important to test whether the model is 
well-specified dynamically. 
Tobit versus Probit Estimates 
We do not construct a formal test for normormally distributed errors, but we check more 
generally the model specification by comparing the estimates between Probit and Tobit 
models, which are both run for the same decision rules. We can check whether the Tobit 
model is correctly specified by comparing the Tobit and Probit estimates, because it is 
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unlikely that two different misspecified models would generate similar parameter 
estimates. Therefore, if there are wide discrepancies between the compared estimates 
either the normality assumption is violated or the specification is otherwise incorrect. If, 
on the other hand, the estimates are close to each other then it suggests the models are 
correctly specified. 
Nevertheless, the Probit model can identify only the ratio between the parameters 
0 . 
and the Standard Error (SE) of the error term in the estimated equation, say 	(using 01 
the notation in Equation 5.1) . Therefore, we mean by parameter estimates being "close 
to each other" that the estimates are close to each other up to a multiple. This multiple is 
one over the equation's SE (e.g. I) estimated by the Tobit model .5  
G 1 It tumed out, however, that the Probit estimates are almost identical to those 
estimated by the Tobit model above. Without reporting the Probit results in more detail, 
we conclude that the Probit estimates do not reveal any mis-specification in the reported 
Tobit models. 
Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is first checked using simple auxiliary, or artificial, OLS-regressions 
run on logarithms of the squared error terms. Separate auxiliary regressions are run for 
each equation (denoted by j) amongst the four equations in (5.1). 
These auxiliary regressions are rigorously valid under the null hypotheses of 
homoskedastic errors only in the uncensored equations, i.e. in the labor and num6raire 
equations. Thus, in these equations the auxiliary regressions are valid for making 
statistical inference on whether the null hypotheses are violated or whether they are not 
violated (e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). 
But only the observations with positive investment can be used when explaining 
the logarithms of the error variances in the investment equations, and these auxiliary 
regressions are estimated conditional on positive investment. Therefore, the simple t-
and F-tests on these auxiliary regressions are biased in favor of finding 
heteroskedasticity. In other words there is tendency for the auxiliary regressions to 
suggest heteroskedasticity even if the original unconditional errors were homoskedastic.6 
Nevertheless, we estimate the full set of auxiliary regressions, and use these estimates as 
starting values for estimating the model under the altemative hypothesis of 
heteroskedasticity, then proceeding to a more formal Likelihood Ratio test for 
heteroskedasticity. 
Under the altemative hypothesis, heteroskedasticity is assumed to be driven up by 
real estate capital, 1(1, machinery capital, k2 , labor services, L, and by logarithm of 
output, lny, such that: 
In practice, we identified the Probit estimates by fixing the SE's at their Tobit estimates. 
By unconditional variance we mean that the variance is not conditioned on positive 
investment. 
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111( 	= 13of  . + 13 .k + [3 .k + 13 .L + p Iny + v 2j 2 	3 j 	4j 	j 
where e . predicted error in (5.1) for all j = 1,2,3,4 
= parameters for ali j and for ali s=0,...,4 
v. = an i.i.d. error term for ali j 
The parameter estimates of these artificial regressions and their standard errors are 
reported in Tables 7.7a and 7.8a for the fuli sample model and for the deregulated 
subsample model. The estimation results infer significant heteroskedasticity in the labor 
and numeråire equations of both models. Heteroskedasticity may be a problem also in 
the investment equations. Therefore, we revise the estimated decision rules by correcting 
the covariance matrix for heteroskedasticity. But to obtain a model that is feasible to 
estimate, the number of parameters in the equations which explain the variation in the 
variances of the error terms is decreased by dropping the insignificant parameters. 
Nevertheless, the same set of explanatory variables is used for correcting the 
heteroskedasticity in both investment equations. Estimation results from these auxiliary 
regressions when the insignificant variables have been dropped are reported in Tables 
7.7b and 7.8b. 
Next we corrected the estimation of the decision mies for heteroskedasticity as 
suggested by the artificial regressions in Tables 7.7b and 7.8b. However, ali parameters 
of the revised model were re-estimated jointly by using the MLE-technique as before. 
The heteroscedasticity corrected model in the deregulated subsample is reported in 
Table 7.9. The likelihood ratio statistic testing for the revised model against the null of 
the unrevised model (Table 7.6) is 354.2, which clearly exceeds the Chi-Squared 5% 
critical value with nine degrees of freedom (x29 = 16.92). Therefore, the 
heteroscedasticity corrected version (Table 7.9) differs significantly from the model 
reported in Table 7.6. 
The full sample model, on the other hand, either could not be improved, because 
a feasible step length was not found, or the model did not converge when it was 
corrected for heteroscedasticity. Hence, the revised full sample model is not reported. 
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Table 7.7a. Regressions on Logarithms of the Squared Errors in the Full Sample 
Model. 3 
Variable 
Investment/Demand Equation 
Real Estate Machinery Labor Variable 
Input 
Intercept -1.81* b -3.22* -3.07* -3.97* 
(0.293) (0.224) (0.195) (0.189) 
Real Estate 0.0204 0.0113 0.0144 0.000922 
Capital, k, (0.0212) (0.0165) (0.0143) (0.0138) 
Machinery -0.154* 0.237 -0.0210 -0.0539 
Capital, k2 (0.0559) (0.0445) (0.0384) (0.0372) 
Labor 0.125' 0.0239 0.166" 0.0123 
Services, L (0.0205) (0.0167) (0.0145) (0.0142) 
Output, lny 0.660* 0.289* -0.0949 1.70* 
(0.177) (0.139) (0.120) (0.116) 
R-squared 0.0685 0.0635 0.0682 0.154 
The model is reported in Table 7.1. 
b  An asterisk denotes significance at the two tailed 5 % risk level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Table 7.7b. Regressions on Logarithms of the Squared Errors in the Puh Sample 
Model. a 
Variable 
Investment/Demand Equation 
Real Estate Machinery Labor Variable 
Input 
Intercept -1.69 	b -3.16" -2.99* -4.00* 
(0.266) (0.204) (0.154) (0.0501) 
Real Estate 
Capital, k, 
Machinery -1.13* 0.249* 
Capital, k2 (0.0507) (0.0405) 
Labor 0.125* 0.0262 0.167* 
services, L (0.0205) (0.0163) (0.0142) 
Output, lny 0.724* 0.326* 1.62* 
(0.164) (0.128) (0.0867) 
R-squared 0.0676 0.0632 0.0675 0.153 
" See Table 7.7a. 
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Table 7.8a. Regressions on Logarithms of the Squared Errors in the Deregulated 
Subsample Model. 
Variable 
Investment/Demand Equation 
Real Estate Machinery Labor Variable 
Input 
Intercept -1.86* b -3.98* -3.19* -3.73* 
(0.460) (0.411) (0.326) (0.318) 
Real Estate 0.0273 0.0389 0.0459 -0.00582 
Capital, k1 (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.0327) (0.0222) 
Machinery -0.0571 0.183* -0.0847 0.0129 
Capital, k2 (0.0693) (0.0715) (0.0558) (0.0546) 
Labor 0.102* 0.0518 0.165* -0.0501 
Services, L (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0245) (0.0239) 
Output, lny 0.374 0.436 -0.0760 1.65* 
(0.243) (0.253) (0.195) (0.191) 
R-squared 0.0472 0.0860 0.0603 0.172 
a The model is reported in Table 7.6. 
b  An asterisk denotes significance at the two tailed 5 risk level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Table 7.8b. Regressions on Logarithms of the Squared Errors in the Deregulated 
Subsample Model. a 
Investment/Demand Equation 
Variable Real Estate Machineiy Labor Variable 
Input 
Intercept -1.62.b  -3.72* -2.98* -3.75* 
(0.370) (0.311) (0.254) (0.248) 
Real Estate 
Capital, k1 
Machinery -0.0301 0.220* 
Capital, k2 (0.0623) (0.0660) 
Labor 0.0992* 0.0551 0.164* -0.0499* 
Services, L (0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0242) (0.0236) 
Output, lny 0.458* 0.565* 1.64* 
(0.224) (0.234) (0.134) 
R-squared 0.0449 0.0832 0.0586 0.172 
b See Table 7.8a. 
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Table 7.9. Heteroscedasticity Corrected Model in the Deregulated Subsample. a  
Parameter Estimate Standard error Parameter Estimate Standard error 
a„oa 1.1877 0.0000 11, 0.3161 0.3124 
1I2 0.5268 0.7494 
0.0175 0.0247 113  -1.0291 0.2441 
a12 -0.1634 0.1202 
a13 0.0325 0.0324 1311 -6.6808 0.0000 
Dzi -1.0704 0.0000 
az 0.9802 0.3519 D22 -10.1852 0.0000 
D31 0.7592 0.0000 
azi -6.4631 0.0000 D32 3.0413 23.1634 
a32 -5.9748 6.6877 D33 -0.8468 0.0000 
aB  1.3705 6.1571 
M 1 I 0.1172 0.0077 
Au -0.0022 0.0017 M21 -0.0223 0.0091 
A21 -0.0013 0.0034 M22 0.0704 0.0275 
A22 0.0211 0.0209 M31 0.0181 0.0042 
A31 0.0002 0.0013 M32 0.0065 0.0058 
A32 -0.0022 0.0048 M33 0.1840 0.0105 
A33 -0.0013 0.0021 
y for L>0 0.2151 0.0084 
0.0130 0.0156 2 
E2 -0.1819 0.1038 
- Gqi 0.0048 0.0105 
E3 0.0286 0.0189 2 -092 -0.1174 0.0196 
0.8006 0.0702 
2 
Cr93  
0.0153 0.0087 
bad year -0.0164 0.0000 
The number of observations is 743, and the average value of the loglikelihood function is 0.7001. 
b  An intercept in the demand equation for the num8raire input. It is a function of structural form 
parameters. 
Serial Correlation 
Serially correlated error terms are checked informally by a first order autoregressive 
model on the predicted error terms: 
= Pio + Pises,r-1 + vi,t ,  
where 	e 1  are predicted errors in (5.1) at time t for j,s = 1,2,3,4 
13  hs =parameters for ali s and for h =0,1 
= an i.i.d. error term 
Again these auxiliary regressions are estimated for the investment equations conditional 
on positive investments and, therefore, they favor finding serial correlation. Nevertheless 
in the labor and num6raire equations the regressions are valid under the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation in (5.1) i.e. 13 =0 for j=3,4. Results from standard t- and F-tests 
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in these two equations suggest that the errors are serially correlated. The innovation in 
the labor equation is negatively correlated with its own innovation lagged. And the 
innovation in the numeraire equation correlates positively with its own lagged 
innovation. There is also potential that the innovation in the real estate investment is 
positively correlated with the lagged innovation in the machinery investment, and vice 
versa. 
The results suggest that the economic model is either dynamically incomplete or, 
alternatively, the decision rules are affected by significant farm specific effects. The 
latter result may follow because the artificial regressions were run in the pooled panel 
data and farm specific individual effects may have resulted in persistency in the values 
of the innovations across time. 
However, we do not correct the estimation of the optimal decision rules for serial 
correlation. Serial correlation does not result in inconsistent estimates and the R-
squareds in these artificial regressions are in most cases low although they favor serial 
correlation. 
Table 7.10. Autoregressions on the Error Terms in the Full Sample Model (Table 7.1). 
Variable 
Investrnent/Demand Equation 
Real Estate Machinery Labor Variable 
Input 
Intercept 1.02* 0.157* -0.169* -0.0288* 
(0.0646) (0.0266) (0.0355) (0.00710) 
Lagged Error in the 
Equation for 
Real Estate 0.133* 0.075* 0.0246 0.0176* 
(0.0458) (0.0207) (0.0286) (0.00573) 
Machinery 0.150* -0.0627* 0.0813* 0.0152* 
(0.0622) (0.0270) (0.0379) (0.00758) 
Labor 0.113* 0.0267 -0.0849* -0.00169 
(0.0429) (0.0190) (0.0260) (0.00521) 
Variable Input -0.0470 -0.0700 0.0196 0.559* 
(0.177) (0.177) (0.0997) (0.0199) 
R-squared 0.0378 0.0164 0.00910 0.329 
An asterisk denotes significance at the two tailed 5 risk level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
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Table 7.11. Autoregressions on the Error Terms in the Deregulated Model (Table 7.6). 
Variable 
Investment/Demand Equation 
Real Estate Machinery Labor Variable 
Input 
Intercept 0.967* a 0.546* -0.0442 -0.00791 
(0.0777) (0.0504) (0.0568) (0.0119) 
Lagged Error in the 
Equation for 
Real Estate 0.104 0.172* 0.0800 0.0191 
(0.0648) (0.0486) (0.0589) (0.0123) 
Machinery 0.185* 0.0765 0.0726 0.0109 
(0.0863) (0.0541) (0.0654) (0.0137) 
Labor 0.0298 0.0426 -0.110* -0.00932 
(0.0600) (0.0414) (0.0466) (0.00974) 
Variable loput -0.213 -0.202 -0.0310 0.439* 
(0.255) (0.150) (0.174) (0.0364) 
R-squared 0.0419 0.0471 0.0153 0.216 
a  An asterisk denotes significance at the two tailed 5 risk level. Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
7.3 The Effects of Increased Uncertainty 
As explained above we conjectured that, at the begirming of 1991 when the debate about 
Finland's joining the EU started, there was a one time persistent shift in uncertainty 
faced by Finnish farmers. This shift was measured by a dummy variable over the years 
1991-93. The parameter estimates for this dummy variable are summarized for three 
model specifications in Table 7.12. 
An increase in uncertainty either reduced or did not affect real estate investments. 
Machinery invesment, on the other hand, was clearly decreased by the prospect of 
joining the EU. The deregulated sample models also suggest that increased uncertainty 
increased the use of labor. Therefore, we conclude that less machinery was substituted 
for labor when uncertainty increased. 
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Table 7.12. Estimates for the Dummies over the Years 1991-93. 
Decision rule Full Sample Deregulated Subsample Deregulated Subsample 
for Model Model Model Corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity 
Real Estatea -0.0257* 0.0081 0.0048 
(0.0081) (0.0101) (0.0105) 
Machinerya -0.1664* -0.1139' -0.1174' 
(0.0104) (0.0169) (0.0196) 
Labora -0.0187 0.0299' 0.0153' 
(0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0087) 
2 	2 a When reporting the parameter estimates, these dummies have been denoted by -crql -aq2, and - (r
2 
q3 • 
7.4 Adjustment Rates 
As shown in Chapter 4, we can write the optimal decision rules in the flexible 
accelerator form. For ali k>ø, 12>0, and .t<0 then y=0 and we can write 
=N(K -1(), in which the matrix of adjustment rates is given by N =rU -M. 
Estimated adjustment rate matrices are reported in Table 7.13 for the full sample model, 
the deregulated subsample model, and the 'atter with a correction for heteroskedasticity. 
The adjustment rates are more plausible in the deregulated subsample models than 
in the full sample model, as expected. Ali diagonal entries in ./ .‘«T' have plausible negative 
signs in the deregulated sample, and most of the entries in fit have larger magnitudes in 
the deregulated sample than in the full sample model. Heteroscedasticity seems to have 
only negligible effects on the adjustment rate estimates, as the estimates are insensitive 
with respect to the correction for heteroscedasticity. 
Null hypotheses about the adjustment rates have usually been constructed as: 
The jth  good in K adjusts instantaneously, i.e. it is a variable input. Under the 
null, the jth  diagonal element of N equals -1 and, in addition, its off-diagonal 
elements in the jth  row are zeros. If this holds for ali goods in K, the matrix N 
equals the identity matrix multiplied by minus one. 
The adjustment of the r good in K is independent of disequilibrium in the 
market of the other goods. Under the null, the off-diagonal elements in the jth row 
of N are zeros. If this holds for ali goods in K, then N is diagonal. 
The adjustment rates are symmetric; N is symmetric. 
We add a fourth null hypothesis: 
(4) The adjustment of labor is symmetric with respect to changes in the labor 
services (y=0). 
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Table 7.13. Estimates for the Adjustment Rate Matrices: Ar.  = F U - d121. a 
Deregulated Subsample 	Deregulated Subsample Model 
Full Sample Model b 	 Model 	 Corrected for 
Heteroscedasticity 
-0.0525* -0.0689* -0.0680* 
0.0024 0.0276* 0.0225* -0.0263* 0.0223* -0.0214* 
-0.0071 0.0104* -0.1042* T0.0176* -0.0068 -0.131* -0.0181* -0.0065 -0.135* 
The adjustment rates have been computed for P=0.049, fc,>0, ic2>0, and 	The corresponding 
models are reported in Tables 7.1, 7.6, and 7.9. 
b An asterisk, if it is attached to a diagonal entry, denotes the entry is greater than -1 at the 5 % one sided 
risk level. If the asterisk is attached to an off-diagonal entry, it denotes the entry differs from zero at the 5 
% two sided risk level. 
When testing the parameters individually, the first null hypothesis, which assumes 
instantaneous and independent adjustment, is rejected for ali goods, because ali diagonal 
elements of I are significantly greater than -1. The second hypothesis assuming 
independent adjustment is also rejected, because at least one off-diagonal element in År‘ 
differs significantly from zero in every specification. The third null hypothesis, stating 
that N is symmetric, is maintained without testing, because the models with asymmetric 
M failed to converge. The fourth null hypothesis, which conjectures symmetric labor 
adjustment with respect to changes in labor services, is rejected as well. The dummy 
variable used for modeling asymmetry in the labor adjustment was estimated 
significantly in every specified model. Depending on the specification, the third diagonal 
element in l'\?‘ for positive labor changes is either 0.103, 0.0705 or 0.0801. Each of these 
estimates is significantly greater than -1, suggesting that labor services increase 
sluggishly.' 
We conclude that real estate, machinery and labor are quasi-fixed in the sense that 
they adjust sluggishly to the shocks in the exogenous state variables. Ali three goods are 
subject to adjustment costs. In addition, the adjustment of each good depends on 
discrepancy between the current and steady states of at least one of the other goods, and 
labor adjustment is asymmetric depending on whether labor services are decreasing or 
increasing. We now turn to the adjustment rates in more detail. 
Real estate 
The adjustment rate of real estate with respect to the discrepancy between its own 
current and steady states has a plausible sign in every model specification, and the 
adjustment rate has a larger magnitude in the deregulated subsample than in the full 
sample. In the deregulated subsample the estimated adjustment rate is -0.07, suggesting 
that real estate capital converges to a steady state equilibrium but it adjusts slowly 
7 We have used one sided test at 5 % significance level. The critical value is 1.645. 
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towards the equilibrium. For example, over a five- year period, the response to an initial 
shock will decrease the discrepancy between the actual and the steady state capital by 
30%. 
The adjustment rate of real estate with respect to the discrepancy between 
machinery's current and steady states is significant and positive, suggesting 
intertemporal complementarity between real estate and machinery. In other words, the 
result suggests that real estate investment is increasing in machinery and, similarly, 
machinery investment is increasing in real estate.8 Thus, excess machinery drives real 
estate investment up, and vice versa. This complementarity between real estate and 
machinery implies that, for example, excess machinery can be utilized more efficiently 
by purchasing more real estate. Similarly, excess real estate can be employed more 
efficiently by investing more in machinery. 
The result that capital goods are complements is interesting because numerous 
empirical investment studies use aggregated capital and, therefore, make an implicit 
assumption that capital goods are perfect substitutes for each other. In the light of our 
results, on the other hand, aggregating real estate and machinery into a single capital 
good is not justified. 
The adjustment rate of real estate with respect to the discrepancy between the 
current and steady state labor is significant and negative. The result suggests that labor 
and real estate are short-run substitutes so that excess labor, for example, decreases real 
estate investment. In other words, farm's excess labor is employed in the short run by 
delaying substitution of capital for labor. 
Machinery 
The estimated adjustment rate of machinery with respect to the discrepancy between its 
own current and steady states is positive in the full sample and negative in the 
deregulated subsample. This suggests that farmers' access to machinery capital may 
have been restricted by liquidity constraints. Even though the adjustment rate is negative 
in the deregulated subsample, its magnitude is small (-0.03), suggesting that machinery 
capital adjusts very slowly towards its steady state level. A discrepancy between the 
observed and steady state capital stock will shrink over a five-year period by only 14 %. 
We would expect a faster machinery adjustment, and this sluggish investment behavior 
may signal significant farm specific individual effects, which are time constant but vary 
across individual farmers. It is likely, as the shadow prices reported below will suggest, 
that the unobserved individual effects have been driven up by individual tastes. Some 
farmers have preferred modem to old equipment, which has resulted in excess 
machinery capita19. Altematively, additional incentives to invest in machinery have been 
provided by successive tax shields generated by the difference between the economic 
and tax depreciations. 
Investment in machinery is independent of the disci epancy between the current 
and steady state labor. Symmetry of the adjustment matrix implies also that changes in 
8 Recall that we have maintained symmetry of the adjustment rate matrix. 
9 I.e. we have unobserved time constant individual effects, which we have not been able 
to control for. 
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labor services are independent of the discrepancy between the current and steady state 
machinery. This result is somewhat surprising because we would expect that machinery 
and labor are substitutes even in the short run so that, for example, a shortage in the 
firm 's labor would trigger the firm to invest more in machinery and labor saving 
technologies. Nevertheless, the elasticity estimates reported below support our 
expectations. 
Labor 
Around the sample mean, the change in the labor services is negative with an adjustment 
rate estimated. at -0.13. Thus, labor services converge and a discrepancy between the 
firms current and steady state labor is reduced by 50 % over a five-year period. Labor 
adjusts asymmetrically so that increases in labor services are even more sluggish than 
decreases in labor services. This result is supported also by Oude Lansink (1996). 
However, the adjustment rate for labor increases is positive at 0.08, suggesting that there 
is no convergent path for labor services in the regime of positive labor changes. Or, 
more importantly, the result suggests that farmer's access to short-term hiring contracts 
as an employer is restricted. In other words, the result supports the view that when more 
labor is needed in the short run, it is not available or, alternatively, the labor market is 
inflexible with regard to short-term hiring contracts. 
7.5 Shadow Prices for Installed Capital and Labor 
Recall the consistency conditions (B.ii) in Chapter 4, which conjectured that the shadow 
price for installed capital is negative if the firm is investing and positive if the firm is 
disinvesting. In other words, the optimal value function (the discounted present value of 
the cost stream) is expected to be decreasing in the capital stock when the firm is 
investing and increasing in the capital stock when the firm is disinvesting. With zero 
investment, the shadow price can be either negative or positive, but between the shadow 
prices of the investing and disinvesting firms. Because the approximation to the optimal 
value function holds only around the sample averages, we correspondingly test the 
shadow prices around the sample means only. From the conditions (B.ii) we construct 
the following null hypotheses: 
The shadow prices of real estate and machinery, evaluated around the sample 
means of the state variables, are negative, because the average observed 
investment is positive. 
The shadow price of labor, evaluated at the sample means of the state 
variables, is positive, because the average change in the labor services is negative. 
The estimated shadow prices for both capital goods differ significantly from zero, but 
they are positive, having opposite signs to what we expected (Table 7.14). The null 
hypotheses in (1) are therefore rejected and we conclude that the data does not support 
the view that the optimal value function is decreasing in real estate and machinery 
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capital. This result suggests that the discounted present value of the firm's cost stream 
is expected to increase, if its capital stock is increased ceteris paribus. 
Because real estate and machinery are both measured in equal units, their shadow 
prices should be equal at the margin, provided farmers have had equal access to both 
capital goods. But given the small standard errors of the shadow price estimates, it is 
obvious that the difference between the prices is statistically significant. Indeed, the 
shadow price of machinery is about one third larger than the shadow price for real estate. 
If there were internal adjustment costs only, firms could have reduced their costs by 
equating shadow prices across the capital goods. In other words, they could have 
decreased costs at the margin by delaying the machinery investments and by investing 
only in real estate until the marginal benefit from a unit of capital became equal across 
the goods. The large difference between the shadow prices cannot be explained by 
intemal adjustment costs. Therefore, the result suggests that farmers have not had equal 
access to both capital goods or, more likely, they have had external incentives for 
investing in machinery. Farmers have been more eager to invest in machinery than in 
real estate either by tastes, or because of higher incentives through tax shields. 
Using the equality 	-afiaki for j = 1,2, the estimated shadow prices 
imply that adjustment costs exist, but the instantaneous cost function is decreasing with 
investments, i.e. 	0 for 	0, j = 1,2. This result supports the view that there 
are scale effects in investment, such that the larger the investment the smaller the 
adjustment costs that are realized. This result is plausible, but it contradicts the 
traditional postulate that adjustment costs are increasing and convex in investment. Our 
result is also supported by Rothschild (1971), who claims that the arguments for cost 
functions being increasing in investment are weak. It has to be noted, however, that the 
result obtained does not meet the sufficient conditions for an extremum in the original 
maximization problem. We rely, therefore, on the necessary conditions. 
Even though the shadow price of installed real estate capital is positive, the 
instantaneous cost function is decreasing in real estate (Table 7.15). This result suggests 
that the cost of investing, including adjustment costs, has outweighed the cost reductions 
resulting from the increased capital stock. Investments in machinery, on the other hand, 
have not even reduced the instantaneous costs. 
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Table 7.14. Shadow Prices for Installed Capital and Labor. 
Good 
Full Sample 
Model 
Deregulated Subsample 
Model 
Deregulated Subsample Model 
Corrected for Heteroskedasticity 
Real Estate b 10.4 11.0 11.3 
(3.16) (0.00) (n.a.) 
Machinery b 52.0 16.1 17.3 
(1.05) (0.00) (n.a.) 
Labor 9.62 3.91 3.73 
(1.10) (1.03) (n.a.) 
a The shadow prices are elements of the gradient VA.J / = a1 + AK + ElnY + 3/1-1Q, and they are evaluated 
at sample means. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b The sample average of gross investment is positive. 
The sample average of change in the labor services is negative. 
n.a. refers to "not available". 
Table 7.15. Derivatives of the Instantaneous Cost Function with respect to Capital and 
Labor. a 
Good 
Full Sample 
Model 
Deregulated Subsample 
Model 
Deregulated Subsample Model 
Corrected for Heteroskedasticity 
Real Estate b -0.310 -0.271 -0.252 
(0.210) (0.00) (n.a.) 
Machinery b 8.83 2.04 2.27 
(0.198) (0.00) (n.a.) 
Labor -0.529 -0.809 -0.817 
(0.0539) (0.0505) (n.a.) 
'The derivatives are computed as Vi<C/ = (r + 8) oV 	A(I - K), and they are evaluated at sample 
means and at I=ÖK. 
b' n.a. See notes in Table 7.14. 
The shadow price of labor is positive and significant, as expected, and the null 
hypothesis (2) is supported by the data. The optimal value function is increasing in labor 
even though the instantaneous cost function is decreasing in labor (see Tables 7.14 and 
7.15). In other words, the sum of expenses, including adjustment costs, to purchase more 
labor services has exceeded the sum of instantaneous cost reductions provided by 
increased labor. Net  returns to incremental labor services have been negative, and firms 
have been gradually substituting capital for labor to decrease costs. Further, had the 
firms been able to reduce their labor input even more, they would have been able to 
reduce their production costs, ceteris paribus. 
Again, using the conditions in (B.ii) and, in particular, the equality 
aciaL= 	we conclude that the instantaneous cost function is decreasing in 
changes of labor, i.e. 8ciai< 0 for L< 0, as expected. Note that, as the average labor 
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change is negative, this result implies that the cost function is increasing in the absolute 
value of the labor change. 
In summary we conclude that, even though instantaneous costs have been 
decreasing with one out of two capital goods, and with labor services, the sample farms 
have had excess capital and labor relative to their output levels. At a given output level 
they could have reduced the discounted present value of their production costs by 
reducing the capital stock and labor. 
7.6 Short-Run Response Probabilities and Elasticities 
Response Probabilities 
We measure response probabilities by how many percentage points the probability of a 
positive investment is predicted to change, if an explanatory variable is changed, ceteris 
paribus, by one percentage point. In other words, we have rescaled capital stocks and 
labor services so that a one unit change corresponds to a one percentage unit change in 
the original untransformed variables around their mean values. Because output and price 
indices are in a logarithmic form, a one unit change in them corresponds to a one 
percentage point change in the original untransformed variable. Estimated response 
probabilities for real estate and machinery investments in the deregulated subsample 
model, which is corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported in Table 7.16. I° 
The response probabilities for positive investments with respect to output have 
plausible positive signs, but their magnitudes are negligible. Even though the probability 
of investing is increasing with output, it is insensitive to changes in output. This result 
is consistent with the results above, suggesting that farms have had excess capital. Thus, 
increased output has resulted in more intensive use and more efficient utilization of 
existing capital, but it has not necessarily driven up investments. Further, the result 
suggests that there are significant scale economies in utilizing the capital stock. 
Most of the price effects have plausible signs. For example, negative own price 
effects suggest that investments have been decreasing with their own prices, as expected. 
However, the magnitudes of the price effects are negligible, suggesting that investments 
have not been sensitive to prices. These results may signal that under fairly restrictive 
production controls then prices have not been dominant factors in determining 
investments. 
The physical level of firms' capital and labor services have played a more 
important role in determining investments than the prices and the level of output. A ten 
percent unit increase in the farm's real estate capital, for example, has reduced its 
probability to invest in real estate about two percentage units. The probability of 
investing in real estate has been decreasing in the firm's actual real estate capital and 
labor services but increasing in machinery capital. In other words, excess real estate 
capital and labor has driven real estate investments down, but excess machinery capital 
I° To reduce the number of tables in the text, the short-run response probabilities and 
elasticities are reported here only for the deregulated subsample model, which is 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. The results of the other two model specifications are 
given in Appendix B. 
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has driven real estate investment up. This result suggests that, in the short run, real estate 
and machinery capital have been complements, but real estate and labor services have 
been substitutes. 
Gross investments in machinery have been increasing in the firm's actual 
machinery capital, because machinery depreciates and large replacement investments are 
required to maintain a capital stock of machinery. But still, the probability of a positive 
net investment in machinery has been decreasing with the actual machinery capital 
stock, as expected. Excess machinery capital has, in other words, been driving net 
investment in machinery down. Machinery investment has also been decreasing in labor 
services, which suggests that machinery and labor have been substitutes in the short run. 
Excess real estate capital has, on the other hand, been driving machinery investment up. 
This result again implies that machinery and real estate have been short-run 
complements, as explained above. It has to be noted, however, that we have maintained 
symmetry of the adjustment matrix resulting in sign-symmetric elasticities between 
capital stocks and labor. 
Table 7.16. Response Probabilities for Positive Investments. 
With 
respect to 
Real estate Machinery 
gross 
investment 
net 
investment 
gross 
investment 
net 
investment 
Log of output 0.00010 0.000089 0.000352 0.000417 
Log of prices: 
real estate -0.00192 -0.00170 0.00119 0.00140 
machinery -0.00236 0.00209 -0.00576 -0.00682 
wage rate 0.000086 0.000076 0.00289 0.00342 
Capital' 
real estate -0.166 -0.196 0.0755 0.0894 
machinery 0.0192 0.0170 0.106 -0.0226 
Labor b -0.0584 -0.0517 -0.0217 -0.0257 
one percentage change around the sample average. The sample averages are 754,000 and 199,000 
FIM. 
b  A one percentage change around the sample average. The sample average is 4,090 hours. 
Elasticities 
We define two kinds of elasticities: conditional elasticities and unconditional elasticities. 
Conditional elasticity is conditioned on the exogenous state variables and, in addition, 
on positive gross investment. The unconditional elasticity is conditioned on the 
exogenous state variables, only. Elasticity estimates are presented in Tables 7.17 and 
7. 1 8 . 
As above in the case of the response probabilities, output and price elasticities 
have plausible signs in the sense that output and cross price elasticities are positive, but 
own price elasticities are negative. The magnitudes of these elasticities are, nevertheless, 
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negligible. We conclude that investments have been inelastic with respect to the output 
level and prices. Again, the unplausibly low output elasticities may result from the 
stringent production controls that have influenced the connection between output 
changes and the level of investments. The observed range of output fluctuations may 
have resulted primarily in marginal adjustments of intensity in capital use, rather than 
lumpy investments. This phenomenon is also supported by the result that farms have 
been in excess capital relative to their output levels. Nevertheless, low unconditional 
output elasticities are consistent with significant economies of scale. 
Unconditional elasticities of real estate, in particular, with respect to capital stocks 
and labor 'services are clearly larger in magnitude than the corresponding conditional 
elasticities. This suggests that the combined effects of a regime shift (from zero to 
positive investment) and an increase in investment size are important in measuring 
elasticities of real estate investments, whereas either one of these two responses alone 
shows relatively inelastic effects. 
Real estate investment is decreasing and elastic with respect to its own capital 
stock. Elasticity estimates confIrm, again, that real estate investments are increasing 
considerably in excess machinery but decreasing in excess labor. In other words, 
elasticities show substantial short-run complementarity between real estate and 
machinery but short-run substitutability between real estate and labor as above. 
The differences between the conditional and unconditional elasticities are not as 
large in machinery investments as in real estate investments, partly because the number 
of zero machinery investments in the data is small. The elasticity estimates in Table 7.18 
show notable increase in the gross investment in machinery with respect to the increases 
in machinery capital. Net  investment in machinery is, however, slightly decreasing with 
its own capital, as before. In addition, the elasticities show that machinery investment is 
increasing substantially with excess real estate capital, again signaling strong 
complementarity between real estate and machinery. Labor and machinery are, however, 
short-run substitutes, as excess labor will decrease machinery investments and slow 
down substitution of labor saving technologies for labor. It has not paid, for example, to 
invest in advanced feeding technologies if there has not been any alternative demand and 
income sources for the saved labor input. 
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Table 7.17. Short-Run Elasticities for Real Estate Investments. 
With 
respect to 
Gross investment Net investment 
conditional unconditional conditional b unconditional 
Output 0.000122 0.000509 0.000118 0.000544 
Prices: 
real estate -0.00233 -0.00976 -0.00226 -0.0104 
machinery 0.00287 0.0120 0.00278 0.0128 
wage rate 0.000105 0.000439 0.000102 0.000470 
Capital: 
real estate -0.202 -0.843 -0.260 -1.20 
machinery 0.0233 0.0975 0.0226 0.104 
Labor -0.0710 -0.297 -0.0687 -0.318 
a Elasticities are evaluated at the sample means. 
Expected investment is conditioned on the predetermined state variables and on positive gross 
investment. 
Expected investment is conditioned on the predetermined state variables only. 
Table 7.18. Short-Run Elasticities for Machinery Investments. a 
With 
respect to 
Gross investment Net investment 
conditional b unconditional conditional b unconditional 
Output 0.000693 0.00118 0.000659 0.00144 
Prices: 
real estate 0.00234 0.00398 0.00222 0.00486 
machinery -0.0113 -0.0193 -0.0108 -0.0236 
wage rate 0.00569 0.00970 0.00541 0.0118 
Capital: 
real estate 0.149 0.254 0.141 0.310 
machinery 0.208 0.355 -0.0358 -0.0783 
Labor -0.0428 -0.0730 -0.0407 -0.0891 
See notes in Table 7.16. 
Changes in labor services are decreasing (becoming more negative), but 
inelastically, with the output and the wage rate in the short n.m (Table 7.19). The short-
run response of labor with respect to the other prices is also negligible. The results 
suggest, however, that labor services are decreasing with excess capital and, in 
particular, with excess real estate. Further, labor services are decreasing elastically with 
excess labor services. Therefore, we can conclude that it is the firm's current capital 
stock and labor services which determine the short-run changes in labor services. The 
short-run effects of output and prices are negligible. 
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Table 7.19. Short-Run Elasticities for Changes in Labor Services. a 
With Full Sample Deregulated Subsample Deregulated Subsample 
respect to Model Model Model Corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity 
Output -0.00422 -0.0108 -0.00727 
Prices: 
real estate -0.00236 -0.0299 0.000478 
machinery 0.00480 0.0504 0.0191 
wage rate -0.00150 -0.0137 -0.0103 
Capital: 
real estate -0.0711 -0.178 -0.182 
machinery 0.0275 -0.0181 -0.0172 
Labor 	 -1.04 	 -1.31 	 -1.35 
Computed at the parameter estitnates in the regime of negative changes in labor services. Elasticities are 
evaluated at sample means. 
7.7 Long-Run Elasticities 
Long-run price and output elasticities of capital stocks and labor services are computed 
by setting optimal net investment to K  zero, and then solving the resulting equation for 
K as a function of exogenous prices and output. When the optimal net investment has 
been set to zero, the resulting capital stock equals the steady state capital stock by 
definition. We denote the steady state capital stock by k and define it by: 
K = (M - rUr t [Diag qi I } M(ra3 + rH ilnY + rDlnQi)] 
Even though the LeChatelier principle no longer holds in a dynamic model, the 
elasticity estimates suggest that capital is more elastic with respect to output in the long 
run than in the short run (Table 7.20). But still the capital stock increases very 
inelastically with the output level, suggesting scale economies in capital utilization as 
above. Labor services are decreasing with output, but inelastically. In other words, 
increasing output will result in labor savings or it does not affect the use of labor. 
The long-run price elasticities seem to be very sensitive to the model specification. 
Even the signs vary between the different models and, therefore, we focus on the 
deregulated sample models only and, in particular, on the heteroskedasticity con-ected 
model, which is expected to be more robust than the other models. 
Real estate capital is suggested to be decreasing with respect to its own price or 
have no response in the long run But real estate capital is decreasing with machinery 
prices and increasing with the wage rate. In other words, real estate and machinery are 
4 
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long-run complements, as expected, but somewhat unexpectedly, real estate and labor 
are long-run substitutes. 
Machinery capital is decreasing in its ovvn price, as expected. It is also decreasing 
in the price of real estate but increasing in the wage rate. These cross price effects 
suggest that machinery is a long-run complement for real estate but a substitute for 
labor, as expected. 
Labor services are increasing in the prices of both capital goods and decreasing in 
the wage rate. The result implies, again, that labor and capital are long-run substitutes. 
Therefore, we conclude that the estimated long-run price effects support our 
expectations. 
Following Fernandez-Comejo et al. (1992), the elasticity of scale is defined as: 
alIJ alIJ - 	It measures how many percentage units the discounted present value of 
ay/y a/ny 
the cost stream is expected to change if the level of output is changed by one percentage 
unit, ceteris paribus. The estimated elasticity of scale was 0.85 in the heteroskedasticity 
corrected deregulated model, suggesting economies of scale. In other words, the 
discounted present value of the cost stream is expected to increase by 8.5 percentage 
points if the output level is increased by 10 percentage points. This result is consistent 
with the low output elasticities reported above. We conclude that there is potential for 
reducing the production cost per unit, and for increasing the competitiveness of the 
Finnish hog industry, through expanding firm size. If the estimated scale effect holds 
more than just at the margin, a ten percent reduction in the production costs per unit, for 
example, would be gained by tripling the size of current production units, ceteris 
paribus." 
We have used the term elasticity of scale interchangeably with the term elasticity of 
size. Nevertheless, the measured scale elasticity does not assume homothetic oduction 
technology and, therefore, it allows for optimal substitution effects 
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Table 7.20. Long-Run Elasticities of Capital Stocks and Labor Services. a 
Good 
Elasticity with 
respect to 
Model Specification 
Full Sample 
Deregulated 
Subsample 
Deregulated 
Subsample, 
Corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity 
Real Estate Output 0.0556 0.00865 0.00323 
Price of 
real estate -9.96 -0.116 0.000470 
machinery 0.166 -0.0775 -0.0872 
labor -0.834 -0.0316 0.117 
Machinery Output 0.00484 0.0525 0.00372 
Price of 
real estate 0.0390 0.421 -0.162 
machinery 8.60 -1.81 -0.222 
labor 0.106 1.65 0.178 
Labor Output -0.0248 -0.0443 -0.0118 
Price of 
real estate -0.128 -0.849 0.206 
machinery 0.0780 0.543 0.150 
labor -0.107 -0.910 -0.589 
We have first set k = 0, and then solved the decision mies for optimal steady state capital stock and 
labor. Elasticities are evaluated at the means. 
7.8 Steady State Capital Stocks and Labor Services 
The estimated steady state levels of capital and labor services are well below their 
observed values in the heteroscedasticity corrected model (Table 7.21). The estimates 
for steady state labor services are even negative, which cannot be true. Perhaps this 
inplausible result is caused by a gradual decrease in the observed labor services. 
Nevertheless, the estimates suggest, as do our findings above, that farms have had 
excess capital and labor at their exogenously restricted production levels. 
Table 7.21. Steady State Capital Stocks and Labor Services. 
Full Sample Deregulated Subsample Deregulated Subsample 
Good Model Model Model Corrected for 
Heteroskedasticity 
Real Estate 1,300 38,900 86,700 
Machinery -3,220 23,300 147,000 
Labor 34.1 -49.4 -118 
Chapter 8 
ECONOMIC INIPLICATIONS FOR THE HOG PRODUCTION SECTOR 
IN FINLAND 
This chapter discusses what kinds of answers our estimation results suggest to the 
questions given in Chapter 1. The discussion is further, expanded to broader practical 
implications of the estimation results for the hog production sector in Finland. 
In the first section we discuss the prospects the sector has in the light of our 
estimation results conceming economies of scale. Then we move on to the 
implications of our results for capital and labor markets. Uncertainty will be discussed 
in the last section. Throughout the chapter we highlight the connections between our 
results and the new adjustment programs, which were briefly described in Chapter 2. 
8.1 Economies of Scale 
Recall from Chapter 1 that one of the most important questions addressed in this study 
was: is it realistic to expect that the Finnish hog industry can become competitive 
enough, and reach a cost level, that allows it to survive in the Common Market? 
Chapter 2 introduced the marked structural differences between the Finnish and 
Danish hog industries, resulting in production costs that are, depending on the farm 
group compared, 19-30 % higher in Finland than in Denmark. 
The estimated low output elasticities and dynamic scale elasticity indicate that 
the Finnish hog industry is operating with an increasing retums to scale technology. 
Increasing output per firm will result in more efficient utilization of farm capital, as 
well as labor savings. In other words, expanding the farm size will result in labor 
saving technologies and reduce the labor costs per unit produced. Substantial labor 
savings are plausible because, in large production units, it is possible to take 
advantage of technologies such as advanced automatic feeding. Advanced feeding 
technologies will also decrease feed costs. 
The long-run scale elasticity was estimated at 0.85, which suggests that 
production costs will increase less than the output level when firm size is expanded. If 
output is doubled the present value of the total production costs will increase by 85 %, 
which will decrease the average costs per unit produced by 7.5 %. Similarly, if the 
firm's output is tripled its average production costs will decrease by 10 %I. For 
Note that we are projecting cost reductions outside the range of most of the existing 
data used in the study and therefore the projections should be interpreted with caution. 
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example, with an inifial 400 pig fattening capacity, which is common in Finland, this 
would result in a fattening capacity of 1,200, a capacity that is still well below the 
maximum capacity of 3,000 given in Table 2.5. But access to the agri-environmental 
program requires that a farm has at least 110 hectares of arable land for spreading 
manure and slurry for 1,200 fattening pigs. Thus, obtaining the 1,200 fattening 
capacity would imply for most hog farms a substantial land area expansion, too. 
Capital costs, including building and equipment, account for 21 % of total 
production costs on Finnish booklceeping hog farms. The new investment subsidies 
will account about 50 % of these capital costs, provided maximum subsidies are 
granted as reported in Table 2.6. Then, a maximum investment subsidy is estimated to 
reduce production costs by, roughly, 11 %. 
Summing up the long-run scale effects and investment subsidies, it is reasonable 
to expect that the Finnish hog industry has potential for reaching the average cost level 
of the Danish hog industry had in 1995. But to reach the Danish cost level of 1995, 
Finnish production units would have to at least triple their size. This implies that the 
estimated investment size in the survey of Kallinen et al. (1996), which results in the 
production units of 1.6 times their current size, seems too small for fully adjusting in a 
new market environment.2 
An aggregate production level that meets the domestic demand for pork is a 
feasible goal for the industry, because the EU-Commission has approved means for 
paying extensive investment subsidies in Finland as long as the aggregate production 
does not exceed its level in 1994. In this respect the future of the Finnish hog industry 
seems favorable. It has to be emphasized, however, that tripling the average firm size, 
while keeping the aggregate production capacity constant, requires that two thirds of 
the current producers need to exit the industry. Over a five year period, for example, 
this would require an exit rate of 8 % per year, which is almost twice the 4.3 % 
average exit rate of 1996 in Finnish agriculture. Even though it is estimated that 10 % 
of hog producers quit in 1995, the estimate of Kallinen et al. (1996) that 5 % of farms 
will exit over the two-year period 1996-97 appears too small for adjusting to the new 
market environment over the five-year transitional period. 
If high cost producers who are not going to stay in the industry in the long-run 
do not exit the industry quickly enough, the investment program may temporarily 
increase production in excess of domestic demand. But talcing into account the 
aggregate capacity restrictions imposed by the investment program, it is not 
reasonable to expect that the industry could significantly penetrate the export market 
for bulky pork products for a any length of time. In other words, it seems unlikely that 
the industry could reach such a low cost level that it could compete in the export 
market without subsidies. 
Conceming short-run scale economies, we found the important result that, when 
allowing for fixed and asymmetric adjustment costs, instantaneous production costs 
are not increasing in investment as traditionally postulated in the literature dealing 
with adjustment costs. Our results support the view that adjustment costs exist, but the 
instantaneous cost function is decreasing in investment and larger investments will 
2 Note also that the Danish hog industry is not stagnated at 1995 structure. Danish 
production units continue to expand and decrease their costs from the costs in 1995. 
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result in lower adjustment costs. In other words, there are scale economies in 
investment. 
The result that the cost function is decreasing in investment, combined with 
long-run economies of scale, has important consequences for the adjustment of the 
Finnish hog industry in the European Common Market. It suggests that the production 
technology favors large scale industrialized hog production and fast adjustment to the 
new market environment. In other words, when the timing for an investment is right, 
farmers should choose new technology and implement large investments in order to 
get the highest benefits from the new technology and reach the lowest possible 
production costs per unit produced. 
8.2 Capital and Labor Market 
As noted in Chapter 1, the most important issues conceming the capital and labor 
market addressed in this study are: Do the observed and steady state capital stock and 
labor differ and, if they do, then by how much; how quicldy capital and labor adjust 
towards their steady states; and how are the markets for capital goods and labor 
linked? 
There is no evidence supporting the view that either credit market rationing, or 
firms' high liabilities to gross retum ratios, have resulted in liquidity constrained 
investments. The results suggest that the discounted value of the firm's cost stream 
was increasing in capital within the regulated as well as deregulated farm groups. 
Hence, hog farrns appear to have unconstrained access to capital. Furthermore, the 
shadow price estimates support the often posed view that Finnish hog fanns have had 
excess capital relative to their production levels, which has resulted in inefficient 
utilization of farm capital. Therefore, it is likely that the stringent production controls 
in the 80s and early 90s have resulted in a shortage of profitable investment 
alternatives for farm families to develop their enterprises. 
One explanation for the estimated shadow prices is that opportunity cost for 
farming capital has been low. This result is also supported by Penttinen et al. (1996), 
who concluded that retums to forest investments, which are natural opportunities for 
agricultural investments in Finland, have been low. Altematively, excess capital may 
have decreased costs that we have not observed. Ari example of these kinds of 
unobserved costs are costs or foregone returris caused by a delayed harvest. Similarly, 
there may have been a tendency towards excess capital. For example, excess 
harvesting capacity has been to some extent a risk reducing input so that even though 
it has not increased expected net retums it has decreased the variance of the retums. 
Nevertheless, we simplified our analysis by assuming risk neutral farmers and, 
therefore, could not address this issue formally in this study. 
There have also been other institutional incentives and regulations that may 
have triggered investments in excess capital. For example, the imposed link between 
the farm's arable land area and the maximum size of the livestock unit may have 
resulted in excess real estate capital relative to the firm's output level. This regulation 
has been, of course, environmentally justified, but it may also have implied increased 
costs in livestock husbandry so that marginal retums to livestock have been 
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capitalized into land values. This phenomenon is supported by Ylätalo's (1991) result 
that land prices have exceeded the marginal value product of land. 
The estimated shadow price for machinery is more positive than the shadow 
price for real estate, which suggests that farmers have had, in addition to individual 
tastes, even more incentives to invest in machinery than in real estate. This incentive 
may have been caused by risk reducing characteristics of machinery capacity or by tax 
shields, generated by high marginal income tax rates and the difference between the 
tax and economic depreciation rates. Because the tax depreciation rate has exceeded 
the economic depreciation rate then firms have been able to postpone their tax outlays, 
while guaranteeing adequate equipment for future production. 
Nevertheless, we conclude that, when Finland entered the EU, most hog farms 
had a reserve, or savings, in terrns of excess farming capital which can be utilized for 
expanding the firm's production. As production controls have been abolished, farm 
capital will be more efficiently utilized and allocated. But still, low returns to farm 
capital cause severe difficulties in the farmers' adjustment to a new market 
environment. Access to credit, on the other hand, is not a problem. Rather, 
investments accepted in the programs, or recommended to be carried out, should be 
more carefully considered by institutions which participate and intervene in the 
agricultural investment programs. The results support the view that farm investments 
have been carried out with low returns to capital. 
The estimated positive elasticities of investments with respect to their own 
capital stock, on the other hand, suggest that low existing capital stock is required for 
triggering new investments. Therefore, farmers may need to depreciate the old 
technology first, especially if it is inflexible in its design, to obtain the most profitable 
timing for new investments. The result implies that farmers who have invested quite 
recently, say in late 80s or early 90s, in inflexible production facilities may have 
difficulties in adjusting quickly to the new market environment. 
The adjustment rates for capital are estimated at low values, which also suggests 
that capital stock and labor will adjust slowly towards their steady state values. The 
adjustment rate of real estate capital with respect to discrepancy between its current 
and steady states was estimated at -0.07. This indicates that over a five-year period, 
after a shock changing the steady state level has been observed, the discrepancy 
between the actual and the steady state capital stock will shrink by 30 %, i.e. by less 
than one third. In this light, the five-year transitional period would not be long enough 
for adjusting to the new market conditions. 
It is likely that the low adjustment rate of real estate capital is influenced by 
market failure in the local land market such that farmers have not had adequate access 
to land. When supplementary land has been available they have bought it even though 
the price has exceeded marginal value product of land. The supply of land has been 
further decreased, for example, by the old early retirement contracts, which included 
an incentive for retiring farmers to idle their land. As mentioned above, the land 
market failure is also supported by Ylätalo's (1991) result that strong demand for 
supplementary land and low supply for land has increased land values even above 
their marginal value products. 
It is expected that the low estimated adjustment rates for machinery, on the other 
hand, have resulted primarily from unobserved individual effects, which we have not 
been able to control for. These individual effects may have been caused by tax shields, 
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as explained above, or individual tastes. That is, some farmers have preferred new to 
old equipment. 
We conclude that, even though farms have had excess capital, land market 
failure will slow down the adjustment process, because the maximum size of a hog 
production unit is tied to the farm's arable land area, which is justified by 
environmental arguments. Therefore, it is expected that environmental regulations, 
which tie the size of the firm's hog production unit and land area together, are going to 
play an increasingly important role in determining hog production costs, hog industry 
structure, and the hog industry's spatial concentration. 
Labor services are estimated to be decreasing with an adjustment rate estimated 
at -0.13, implying that the discrepancy between the current and steady state labor is 
reduced by 50,% over a five-year period. The low adjustment rate, combined with the 
result that farms have excess labor, signals that farmers have not been able to find 
enough employment alternatives, while the demand for farm labor has been gradually 
decreasing. 
Labor adjusts asymmetrically in the sense that increasing labor services are even 
more sluggish than decreasing labor services. The result supports the view that, when 
more labor is needed in the short run, it is not available or, altematively, the labor 
market is inflexible with regard to short-term hiring contracts. In other words, the 
results suggest that there is market failure in the rural labor market, which will slow 
down the industry's adjustment process. 
Labor and capital markets are closely linked. An infiexible labor market, 
combined with excess labor in farming, will delay the substitution of capital for labor. 
Another important fmding is that the demand for labor is more likely decreasing than 
increasing in the firm's output level. Therefore, structural adjustment programs 
stimulating investments and focusing on the capital market will result in increased 
excess labor not only among the contracting (or exiting) firms but also among the 
expanding firms. In other words, an adjustment program stimulating investments will 
accelerate the decrease in the demand for farm labor in the hog industry. These results 
also question the rationale of "the full-time farming" -condition as a prerequisite for a 
farmer to be eligible for the investment programs. It is likely that the requirement for 
full-time farming will result in inefficient labor allocations and decreased retums to 
labor on hog farms. 
It is not sustainable in the long run to enhance current farm employment in the 
hog sector. This will only result in inefficient labor allocations, raise labor costs, and 
decrease farmers' labor income. Decreasing labor costs are crucial in improving the 
competitiveness of the hog industry through expanding size. The fast decrease of the 
number of active farmers will, nevertheless, have a real cost for rural areas and society 
as a whole through the multiplier effects caused by decreasing employment and 
purchasing expenditure. 
We conclude that, even though production technology favors large scale 
industrialized production units and large one-time investments, it is likely that the 
industry's adjustment to the new market environment will be retarded by market 
failures in the local land and labor markets. It is crucial, therefore, that early 
retirement plans and altemative employment activities increase the supply of land 
(either leasing or selling) and decrease the number of households supported by the hog 
industry. In other words, to decrease the hog industry's adjustment costs and to 
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promote the industry towards a competitive structure it is important that adjustment 
programs focus on decreasing transactions costs in rural labor and land markets. 
Further, because land constraints may retard farmers from reaching low costs with 
environmentally friendly practices for spreading slurry and manure, trade in manure 
between farms should be promoted. Contracts to trade manure could replace 
expensive and sluggish land trading (either purchases or leases) transactions and, 
therefore, decrease hog industry's adjustment costs? 
8.3 Uncertainty 
Our results indicate that uncertainty has a significant effect on investments. The 
modeled persistent shift in uncertainty decreased investments and slowed down the 
substitution of capital for labor. This would imply that uncertainty will slow down 
adjustment significantly, even though investment subsidies provide challenging 
incentives for investments by reducing the capital costs as much as 50 %. 
Nevertheless, the combined effects of the adjustment programs produce not only 
an exceptional incentive to invest but also a disincentive to postpone investment. The 
gradually decreasing direct income payments per capacity unit, the marked investment 
subsidies, and the risk that the program will run out of sufficient funding trigger a 
farmer to invest as soon as possible, if he considers investing and plans to stay in 
business in the long-run. The expected lost subsidies for delaying investments 
outweigh the compensations required for the market risks involved in the investments, 
and it pays to start risky investments as soon as possible. This phenomenon is 
supported by the observation that investments started to emerge already in 1995 and 
1996, even though farmers did not know whether investment subsidies would be 
granted. In other words, it paid for early investors to take the advantage of high direct 
income payments over the first years in the EU, as compensation for the market risk 
and the risk that they may not be eligible for the investment programs afterwards. 
It is expected, therefore, that the extensive adjustment programs, combined with 
the effects of the direct income subsidies, are hastening adjustment of the Finnish hog 
sector to the new market environment. The filmi effects of the adjustment program 
depend on how much funds are used for subsidizing investments in the hog sector. 
3  By flexible environmental regulations we do not mean loosened standards of 
nutrient leakages. Instead, contracts between firms could be designed to decrease their 
costs, given the standards for nutrient leakages. 
Chapter 9 
SUMIVIARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this study was to investigate the effects of frictions caused by uncertainty, 
irreversibility, and adjustment costs on investments in Finnish hog farms. External 
restrictions, such as liquidity constraints caused by credit rationing, were also studied. 
The main goal was to obtain estimates for adjustment rates, elasticities, and shadow 
prices while allowing for corner solutions in the farmers' investment choices. The most 
important questions addressed were: does the production technology exhibit long-run 
scale economies; do adjustment costs exist and, if they exist, how are they best 
characterized; how are capital and labor markets characterized; how do investments 
respond to shocks in input prices and the output level; and how does uncertainty affect 
investments? 
The study develops a method for estimating a generalized model of investment 
which is consistent with the dynamic theory of the firm. The model accounts for price 
and output uncertainty, irreversibility, and generalized adjustment costs. Price and 
output uncertainty are modeled through stochastic transition equations. Adjustment costs 
are allowed to be asymmetric in investment, to have nonzero intercepts (fixed 
adjustment costs), and to have kinks at zero investment. Thus, the study makes a 
contribution to the current investment literature by estimating a generalized investment 
model so that irreversible investment behavior is allowed to arise either from 
generalized adjustment costs or from uncertainty, or both. 
The model is estimated for a group of Finnish hog farms over the period 1977-93. 
The model has two endogenous quasi-fixed capital goods, real estate and machinery. 
Gross investments in real estate and machinery are each allowed to have positive values 
or, alternatively, be trapped at zero. The third endogenous quasi-fixed input is labor 
services which is either negative or positive, but is not zero. The fourth endogenous 
variable is an aggregated variable input that is used as a numeraire. Consequently, a 
system of four decision rules is estimated. Two out of the four decision variables are 
allowed to be zero with positive probability. The sample is endogenously partitioned 
into the regimes of zero and positive investments (four regimes in total) and, then, the 
decision mies are jointly estimated using the maximum likelihood technique outlined in 
Chapter 5. The estimated model has a similar structure to the censored Tobit model. 
The results suggest that the Finnish hog industry is operating with increasing 
retums to scale technology. Increasing firm size will result in labor savings and more 
efficient utilization of farm capital. Summing up the long-run scale effects and 
investment subsidies, it is reasonable to expect that the Finnish hog industry has 
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potential for reaching the average cost level the Danish hog industry had in 1995. But to 
reach the Danish cost level, Finnish production units have to at least triple their size. 
There are also short-run scale economies in investments so that the larger the 
investment is the lower adjustment costs realized. This result, combined with long-run 
economies of scale, has important consequences for the adjustment of the Finnish hog 
industry in the European Common Market. It suggests that the production technology 
favors large scale industrialized hog production and drastic one time expansions. In 
other words, hog production technology favors fast adjustment, or a swift to the new 
market environment. 
The results support the often posed view that the stringent production controls 
have resulted in shortage of farm investment alternatives and inefficiently utilized, 
excess capital on Finnish hog farms. This has, furthermore, implied low returns to 
farming capital. But now as the production controls have been abolished, it is expected 
that farm expansion provide a potential for more efficiently utilized and allocated farm 
capital. The initial excess farm capital as well as farmer easy access to credit can allow 
for access to large investments and fast adjustment. 
But even though production technology favors fast adjustment to the new market 
environment and farmers appear to have unconstrained access to credit, it is likely that 
the adjustment will be slowed down by inflexibilities and market failures in the local 
labor and land markets. The adjustment rates for capital and labor were estimated at low 
values, which suggests that capital stock and labor will adjust slowly towards their 
steady states. Labor and capital markets are also closely linked to each other so that an 
inflexible labor market, combined with excess labor in farming, will delay substitution 
of capital for labor. 
Conceming the labor market, tripling the finn size would require an exit rate of 
almost twice as large as the realized, actual average exit rates, provided expansions are 
carried out over the five year transition period and aggregate production is kept constant. 
In other words, the results signal that realized exit rates seem too small and rural labor 
market does not allow for adjusting fast enough to the new market environment. For 
hastening the adjustment it is, therefore, important that early retirement plans and 
alternative employment programs increase the supply of land and decrease the number 
of households employed in the hog industry. 
The substantial structural shift needed to enhance a competitive industry structure 
is going to have a real cost, because two thirds of the current producers would need to 
exit the industry. These costs will be realized in terms of adjustment costs to the exiting 
farmers and multiplier effects on local economies. Even though new investments on 
capital goods and facilities generate positive multiplier effects in the local economy 
there are negative multiplier effects too. These negative effects are caused by falling 
population and income in rural areas which fiirther reduce local consumption 
expenditures and shrink local businesses. 
Our results suggest that environmental regulations are going to play an 
increasingly important role in determining hog production costs and spatial 
concentration of the hog industry. The reasons for this are the combined effects of size 
economies in the industry and environmental regulations, which tie the maximum size 
of the firm's hog production unit and land area together. These environmental 
regulations are justified, of course, because they aim at environmentally friendly 
utilization of manure and slurry. But if there are market failures in the local land market, 
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as our results suggest, inflexible regulations may substantially increase hog production 
costs and slow down industry adjustment. Therefore, it would be essential to promote 
not only land trading and leasing transactions but also transactions to trade manure and 
slurry. The hog industry's adjustment costs could be decreased if, for example, hog 
farms' land area requirements could be at least partially reduced through contracts of 
trading manure from hog farms to organically cultivated farms. 
Our results indicate that uncertainty has a significant effect on investments. The 
modeled persistent shift in uncertainty decreased investments and substitution of capital 
for labor. This implies that uncertainty will slow down the adjustment significantly even 
though investment subsidies provide challenging incentives for investments by reducing 
capital costs as much as 50 %. Nevertheless, the combined effects of the adjustment 
programs produce not only an exceptional incentive to invest but also a disincentive to 
postpone investment. It is therefore expected that the programs will considerably hasten 
hog sector's adjustment to the new market environment. 
A need for further investment analysis is evident. Some of our estimation results 
may suggest significant farm specific individual effects, which are unobserved and 
which we have not been able to control for. Therefore, unobserved individual effects on 
investments or, more importantly, investment analysis in which time constant individual 
effects have been factored out, require more research than we have been able to conduct 
in this study. New methods have already been developed for factoring out unobserved 
individual effects in discrete choice models and in dynamic models estimating Euler 
equations (see Wooldridge 1995). These new methods open new altematives for 
conducting etnpirical research on investment behavior. 
For conducting accurate investment analysis and implementing correct investment 
decisions it would be essential to get further insights on how volatile the agricultural 
commodity markets are in Finland and how well they are integrated to the markets in 
other European countries. The effects of agricultural adjustment programs on farmer 
welfare hinges crucially on how well the supply shocks caused by these programs are 
absorbed in the markets. This, in turn, depends on how well the Finnish commodity 
markets are integrated to the commodity markets in other European countries. Further 
research is also called for to develop methods for insuring against risks involved in 
drastic agricultural investments. 
This research has focused on expanding farms, but it has suggested that it is the 
low exit rate that will slow down the hog sector's adjustment to the new market 
environment. For better understanding the combined effects of the retirement plans, 
alternative employment programs, and investment programs it would be essential to 
study further the characteristics of the discrete decision between the three altematives: 
exit, continue with current size, or expand. New knowledge of decisions between these 
discrete choices would be valuable help for designing optimal adjustment programs that 
increase farmer and society welfare. 
As explained above, it is expected that hog industry adjustment, the resulting 
industry structure, and the industry's spatial concentration within and among the 
European countries, will depend on environmental regulations. Therefore, it would be 
essential to study in detail how these regulations might be designed for promoting an 
environmentally friendly, competitive, and spatially balanced hog industry structure in 
Europe. 
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APPENDIX A 
Parameter Estimates with the Data Split into the Credit Market Regimes 
The Model Estimated over the Period of Rationed Credit Market 1977-85.  
Parameter Estimate Standard error Parameter Estimate Standard error 
a„ob 1.0397 0.0395 H, 0.2016 0.3526 
H2 0.2759 0.2925 
a1 , 
alz 
-0.0318 
-0.7054 
0.0206 
0.1257 
H3 -0.6730 0.3581 
a,3  0.0504 0.0258 D„ -0.2503 0.000 
D21 0.2100 0.000 
az 1.0741 0.3527 D22 -1.9823 0.000 
D31 -0.3564 0.000 
a31 -0.2172 0.000 D32 0.6326 0.000 
azz -0.8714 0.0795 D33 -1.3302 0.000 
a33  -1.0683 0.000 
M I I 0.1001 0.0105 
A„ -0.0031 0.0015 M21  -0.0059 0.0053 
A21 0.0096 0.0049 M22 0.0210 0.0319 
A22 0.0840 0.0588 M31  0.0046 0.0079 
Az] -0.0021 0.0011 M32 -0.0139 0.0077 
A.32 -0.0051 0.0058 M33 0.1507 0.0091 
A33  -0.0040 0.0021 
E, -0.0216 0.0163 
y for L>0 
- 02 
0.2095 0.0078 
E2 -0.3799 0.5146 91 
E3  0.0348 0.0202 - 02 q2 
2 
B 0.9123 0.0805 - 00 
bad year 0.0037 0.0261 
' The number of observations is 845 and the average value of the loglilcelihood fimction is 1308. 
b An intercept in the demand equation for the num8raire input. It is a function of structural form 
parameters. 
109 
APPENDIX A 
The Model Estimated over the Period of Nonrationed Credit Market 1986-93. 
Parameter Estimate Standard error Parameter Estimate Standard error 
axo' 1.0387 0.0651 111 0.2017 0.3108 
H2 0.2760 0.7617 
au -0.0322 0.0174 H3 -0.6730 0.2571 
a12 -0.7054 0.1005 
a13 0.0501 0.0322 D11 -0.2502 4.1529 
D21 0.2103 0.000 
az 1.0740 0.3705 D22 -1.9822 0.000 
D31  -0.3559 2.0032 
azt -0.2173 1.9646 D32 0.6331 0.000 
a32 -0.8715 0.000 D33  -1.3302 0.000 
a33  -1.0684 0.000 
M I I 0.1010 0.0079 
A„ -0.0003 0.0009 M21  -0.0004 0.0029 
A21 0.0091 0.0024 M22 0.0226 0.000 
A22 0.0840 0.0182 M31  0.0082 0.0060 
A3 I -0.0002 0.0010 M32 -0.0068 0.0047 
A32 -0.0030 0.0049 M33 0.1530 0.0089 
A33 -0.0019 0.0023 
y for L>0 0.2085 0.0078 
EI -0.0221 0.0107 2 
E2 -0.3799 0.0878 -aql - 0.0257 0.0093 
E, 0.0348 
0.9122 
0.0204 
0.0735 
-a2 q2 
- a43 2 
-0.1603 
- 0.0180 
0.0114 
0.0084 
bad year 0.0035 0.000 
a The number of observations is 1,083 and the average value of the loglikelihood function is 1.109. 
An intercept in the demand equation for the numeraire input. It is a function of structural form 
parameters. 
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APPENDIX B 
Response Probabilities and Short kun Elasticities 
The Full Sample 
Response Probabilities for Positive Investments. 
With 
respect to 
Real estate Machinery 
gross investment net investment gross investment net investment 
Log of output 0.00027 0.00025 0.000174 0.00022 
Log of prices: 
real estate 0.00013 0.00012 0.000124 0.00015 
machinery 0.00054 0.00052 -0.00060 -0.00074 
wage rate -0.00083 -0.00080 0.00040 0.00049 
Capital 
real estate -0.1346 -0.19206 0.00757 0.00944 
machinery 0.00242 0.00233 0.13967 0.02865 
Labor -0.02681 -0.02578 0.03246 0.04045 
Short-Run Elasticities of Real Estate Investments. 
With 
respect to 
Gross investment Net investment 
conditional unconditional conditional unconditional 
Output 0.00019 0.000889 0.00019 0.000939 
Prices: 
real estate 9.25171 0.000434 9.07699 0.000458 
machinery 0.00039 0.001810 0.000379 0.001911 
wage rate -0.00060 -0.00279 -0.000584 -0.00295 
Capital: 
real estate -0.09633 -0.45164 -0.14019 -0.70716 
machinery 0.00173 0.00812 0.00170 0.00857 
Labor -0.01918 -0.08994 -0.01882 -0.09493 
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Short-Run Elasticities of Machinery Investments, Evaluated at the Means. 
With 
respect to 
Gross investment Net investment 
conditional unconditional conditional unconditional 
Output 0.000361 0.000592 0.00035 0.00072 
Prices: 
real estate 0.000256 0.000420 0.00025 0.00051 
machinery -0.001233 -0.00202 -0.00118 -0.00247 
wage rate 0.000822 0.001347 0.00079 0.00164 
Capital: 
real estate 0.015687 0.02571 0.01505 0.03139 
machinery 0.28936 0.47422 0.04570 0.09530 
Labor 0.067244 0.11020 0.06451 0.13454 
The Nonrationed Subsample Model: 
Response Probabilities for Positive Investments. 
With 
respect to 
Real estate Machinery 
gross investment net investment gross investment net investment 
Log of output -0.00131 -0.00124 0.00208 0.00236 
Log of prices: 
real estate -0.00168 -0.00157 0.00406 0.00460 
machinery 0.01086 0.01021 -0.01390 -0.01574 
wage rate -0.01041 -0.00978 0.00963 0.01091 
Capital 
real estate -0.18617 -0.23275 0.07946 0.08999 
machinery 0.02141 0.02013 0.10609 -0.02773 
Labor -0.06318 -0.05940 -0.02385 -0.02700 
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Short-Run Elasticities of Real Estate Investments. 
With 
respect to 
Gross investment Net investment 
conditional unconditional conditional unconditional 
Output -0.00107 -0.00514 -0.00105 -0.00544 
Prices: 
real estate -0.00137 -0.00656 -0.00134 -0.00694 
machinery 0.00886 0.04250 0.00867 0.04495 
wage rate -0.00849 -0.04073 -0.00831 -0.04307 
Capital: 
real estate -0.15197 -0.72876 -0.19762 -1.02477 
machinery 0.01747 0.08379 0.01709 0.08861 
Labor -0.05158 -0.24733 -0.05044 -0.26155 
Short-Run Elasticities of Machinery Investments, Evaluated at the Means. 
With 
respect to 
Gross investment Net investment 
conditional unconditional conditional unconditional 
Output 0.00333 0.00634 0.00318 0.00765 
Prices: 
real estate 0.00650 0.01237 0.00621 0.01492 
machinery -0.02225 -0.04231 -0.02123 -0.05105 
wage rate 0.01542 0.02932 0.01472 0.03538 
Capital: 
real estate 0.12722 0.24194 0.12142 0.29192 
machinery 0.16986 0.32301 -0.03742 -0.08995 
Labor -0.03818 -0.07261 -0.03644 -0.08760 
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